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Abstract 
 
This dissertation looks at the linked issues of justification and public reason 
– under what conditions do political authorities count as legitimate, and what is the 
appropriate mode of reasoning together in the public sphere? The main contender in 
the field currently is Rawls’s political liberalism. His conception of justification 
gives a key role to the justifiability of political power to each citizen, based on 
shared (because mutually acceptable) reasons. This approach to justification affects 
how we reason in the public sphere – in  discussing certain fundamental issues, 
Rawlsian public reason requires limiting our reasons to public ones (viz., those 
which others could reasonably endorse), and bracketing those based on disputed 
conceptions of the good. How we think about justification thus has concrete 
implications for how we live together in political society. 
 Rawls’s political liberalism is commonly pitted against comprehensive 
liberalism. The disagreement tends to be cast as being about comprehensive liberals 
rejecting the need for justifiability. I argue that this is mistaken, and that Rawls 
shares more than we might think with the comprehensive liberal. Taking Raz as the 
modern champion of comprehensive liberalism, I show that both Rawls and Raz are 
deeply committed to justifiability, and trace the disagreement between the two to a 
metaphysical dispute about how to conceive of the project of justifying the 
implementation of political principles. In light of their shared commitment to 
justifiability, the question becomes whether justifiability requires shared reasons. I 
propose a heuristic reading of Rawls’s requirement of mutually acceptable reasons, 
which explains how Rawls’s and Raz’s views on justification can be brought 
together without needing to bracket the truth of the principles of justice. This 
proposed reconciliation leads to a mode of reasoning in the public sphere that does 
not require setting aside non-public reasons in order to proceed. 
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Introduction 
 
Rawls famously announced his aim in Political Liberalism as being to 
“appl(y) the principle of toleration to philosophy itself”,1 by constructing a “shared 
and public political reason” that, as far as possible, is “independent of the opposing 
and conflicting philosophical and religious doctrines that citizens affirm”.2 His 
stated aim was to attempt to provide a solution to the question of how “deeply 
opposed though reasonable comprehensive reasonable doctrines may live together 
and all affirm the political conception of a constitutional regime”3 by way of a 
strategy of avoidance, constructing a political liberalism that avoids taking sides 
between comprehensive doctrines.
4
 
Following this planting of the flag of political liberalism, there has emerged 
a large, and still growing, literature, which pits political liberalism against 
comprehensive liberalism. This literature tends to portray the difference between the 
two as one of a disagreement about the importance of justifiability. For example, in 
a recent book devoted to defending political liberalism against the perfectionism of 
comprehensive liberalisms, Jonathan Quong says this: “Liberal perfectionists thus 
usually reject both of political liberalism’s main claims: they reject the view that 
liberal philosophy is fundamentally about the public justification of political power, 
and they reject the view that the state may not permissibly act for reasons grounded 
in some particular view of the good life.”5  
In contrast, there has been relatively little serious study of the stretch of road 
Rawls and the comprehensive liberal walk together. My project is to explore this 
neglected path. The comprehensive liberal I have in mind is Joseph Raz, whom 
Rawls classes with Kant and Mill in the classical liberal tradition.
6
  Given that it is 
the preoccupation with the fact of reasonable pluralism that gives rise to Rawls’s 
drawing a line between his political liberalism and comprehensive liberalisms, Raz 
                                                          
1
 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Expanded Edition) (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2005), 10. 
2
 Political Liberalism, 9. 
3
 Political Liberalism,  xviii. 
4
 Political Liberalism, xxviii. 
5
 Jonathan Quong, Liberalism Without Perfection (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 3. 
6
 Political Liberalism, 200, fn34. 
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is also the logical choice, since his affirmation of value pluralism furnishes us with a 
comprehensive liberal’s answer to the same phenomenon of modern-day pluralism. 
By constructing a conversation that (for the most part) never took place between 
Rawls and Raz, I try to demonstrate that the political and the comprehensive liberal 
share more than one might be led to believe, despite the post-Political Liberalism 
literature which pits them against each other.  
 
A public reason that is just: Justice requires justifiability 
The first deep commonality between Rawls and Raz is a concern with 
justifiability – with some normative standard of legitimacy. They approach the 
question of justifiability in different ways, using different questions – Rawls asks 
how principles of justice can be publicly justified; Raz asks what the conditions for 
legitimate authority are. Yet in both cases, they are concerned with the project of 
justifying the implementation of political principles,
7
 and for both, the answer has, 
crucially, to do with the reasons that there are for those authorities to exist. Both 
Rawls and Raz hold an instrumental view of authorities. Governments, by their 
lights, are there to serve the purpose of doing good to citizens - to safeguard their 
liberties, to assure the provision of collective goods which would be otherwise 
beyond the reach of individuals, and so on. Importantly, in laying out their 
respective approaches to achieving justifiability, neither Rawls nor Raz is very 
much concerned with the actual consent of the governed. Rather, it is with the 
underlying reasons for authority that they are each primarily concerned.  
Take a step back, for a moment, and consider what we want from an account 
of justifiability; an account of what it would take to justify the implementation of 
political principles? My suggestion is that there are four desiderata to be met:
8
 
1. It must take seriously the deep and reasonable disagreements about value 
that exist in modern societies. 
2. It must provide a way for us to get along together without bloodshed. 
                                                          
7
 Though, as Raz notes, his interest is much broader than merely justice. See Joseph Raz, The 
Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 2-3. 
8
 These concerns are derived from Rawls’s presentation in his 1992 Introduction to Political 
Liberalism. What I have called the fourth desideratum, about well-being and wholeheartedness, is 
framed in Raz’s terms rather than Rawls’s. In essence, however, it is as much a concern of Rawls as 
of Raz.  
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3. It must achieve (2) in a way that is moral, not merely convenient, so that 
it is stable.  
4. It must preserve the well-being of the individual person, including 
individuals’ ability to lead wholehearted lives in pursuit of their 
conception of the good.  
My positive suggestion in these chapters proceeds by way of trying to separate out, 
from within Rawls’s and Raz’s approaches to justification, these four elements.  
The strongest feature of Rawls’s later work in Political Liberalism, is that it 
addresses (1) directly – his project in that work is precisely to provide an account of 
justifiability in light of reasonable disagreement. By comparing the overlapping 
consensus with a Bratman-style shared intention, I will argue that it is concern (2) 
which drives Rawls to come up with this innovation of the overlapping consensus. 
As for (3), it is the combination of Rawls’s account of justifiability, combined with 
the overlapping consensus, which is meant to achieve the stability of his well-
ordered society.  
It is on (4) that Rawls’s proposal of justifiability requiring shared reasons 
starts to show cracks. With Raz, I press on Rawls’s epistemic abstinence with 
regards the truth of his theory of justice, which arises from his defence of a 
justifiability test that requires shared reasons. In particular, my concern is with the 
impact of such epistemic abstinence on the wholeheartedness and therefore the well-
being of the individual citizen.  
In part to address concerns about wholeheartedness (4), I suggest an 
alternative reading of Rawls’s take on justifiability. Rawls’s proposal, in brief, is 
that justifiability requires shared reasons (what in these chapters I call the 
“reasonableness requirement”). My take on this, which I believe can be supported 
by Rawls’s own arguments, downplays the need for agreement on shared reasons, 
while conserving the core ideas of reciprocity and mutual respect. My suggestion is 
that Rawls’s reasonableness requirement should be read as a heuristic device, 
designed to confront us with, and force us to take account of, the reasons that exist 
on the other side; the reasons of those who disagree with us. Reading Rawls this 
way still places substantive constraints on what is justifiable – it concludes, for 
instance, that coercive interference based on principles that cannot be defended by 
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reasons that could be accepted by those who disagree with us, would be unjust. At 
the same time, however, such a reading does away with the need for epistemic 
abstinence. Whilst we are compelled by justice to consider the reasons of those who 
disagree with us, there is no call to segment our own reasons into two separate 
classes of “public” and “non-public”, in order to make justification possible. Whilst 
justice requires justifiability, justifiability does not require epistemic abstinence.  
 
Not just “public” reason 
The body of literature that pits political liberalism against comprehensive 
liberalism also tends to draw a straight line between the justificatory strategy of 
political liberalism and deliberative restraint. In a recent article, R.J. Leland and Han 
van Wietmarschen explain the link in this way: “Political liberals believe that when 
citizens keep (some of) their disputed views out of their political decision making, 
then those disagreements no longer pose a threat to the mutual justifiability of the 
resulting decisions.”9  
I look again at this line, drawn by so many, between the justificatory strategy 
of political liberalism and deliberative restraint, and conclude that there is no need 
for it. With my proposed heuristic reading of Rawlsian justifiability in place, the sort 
of deliberative restraint which requires bracketing a certain class of non-public 
reasons for the sake of rendering justifiable certain policy decisions is no longer 
necessary. Justifiability does not require restricting ourselves to shared public 
reasons. 
This leads us to the very practical question of – what does all this mean for 
how reasoning in the public sphere should look like? While these chapters by no 
means furnish what Rawls calls a “full account of public reason,”10 I try to draw out 
the lines of application from my heuristic reading of Rawlsian justifiability to what 
this might mean for how we should reason together in the public sphere. I attempt to 
show that, even without epistemic abstinence, we have reason to retain the form of 
what Rawls calls the “duty of civility”- those attitudes that ought to mark our 
                                                          
9
 R. J. Leland and Han van Wietmarschen, “Reasonableness, Intellectual Modesty, and Reciprocity in 
Political Justification,” in Ethics, Vol. 122, No. 4 (July 2012), 724. 
10
 Political Liberalism, 214-5. 
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practice of reasoning together in public, such as a willingness to listen to others with 
whom we disagree, and a fair-mindedness in deciding when accommodations to 
their views should reasonably be made. 
A final aspect of commonality between Rawls and Raz is their relative 
unconcern with the precise forms that political power takes. So long as authorities 
meet the conditions of justifiability, neither Rawls nor Raz are too concerned with 
how exactly they are organized. For Rawls, there could be many shapes which a just 
basic structure – the major institutions of a political society – could take. For Raz, 
even more than Rawls, his account of how justifiability is achieved is unconstrained 
by the form of political power. This means that their accounts of justification retain 
bite beyond the narrow confines of the world’s liberal democracies. At the same 
time, their unconcern with the form of political power does not mean that either of 
them need hold back criticism of oppressive regimes – each theory places 
substantive constraints on what governments can legitimately do to their citizens. 
The case studies serve, I believe, to illustrate the hard-nosed pragmatism that a 
combined account of liberal justification could offer to the political realities of our 
world.  
 
Orientation for the journey  
Chapter 1 looks at Rawls’s and Raz’s approach to justification, and argues 
that the source of the divergence between their two views is a metaphysical 
difference of opinion as to what constitutes the project of justifying political 
principles. Subsequent chapters explore the downstream consequences of this 
difference in approach to justification. Chapter 2 draws out the implications of this 
difference in justification for how Rawls and Raz conceive of the type of reasoning 
appropriate to the public sphere. I suggest that Rawls’s conception of public reason 
is vulnerable to the charge of undermining individual well-being by eroding the 
possibility of wholeheartedness.  
Chapter 3 looks at two aspects of Rawlsian political justification, as 
modelled in the original position and the overlapping consensus. Using Michael 
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Bratman’s intention-based theory of shared agency,11 I argue that Rawls’s 
overlapping consensus is best understood in terms of the practical matter of living 
together in a political community.  
Chapter 4 pins down Rawls’s argument for why justification requires the 
mutual acceptability of reasons. I argue that the concern for mutual respect is at the 
heart of why Rawls thinks justification needs to be in the form of reasons others 
could accept. I then propose an alternative reading of Rawlsian justifiability, where 
the condition on the mutual acceptability of reasons should be understood as a 
heuristic device which helps us to see the reasons that others have and thus to 
respect their moral personality. I show that my suggested heuristic reading removes 
the need for epistemic abstinence as an intrinsic requirement of justifiability.  
Chapter 5 develops the implications of my proposed heuristic reading of 
Rawlsian justification for the question of how we should reason together in the 
public sphere. I outline a view of reasoning together in public that does not involve 
the segmentation of reasons into public and private, and which therefore avoids the 
charge of undermining wholeheartedness and therefore well-being.  
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 form a linked set which tries to draw the connections 
between philosophical theory and policy implementation, by examining three case 
studies falling under the general rubric of toleration. Chapter 6 looks at how Raz and 
Rawls respectively formulate and defend a principle of toleration, and traces the 
differences in the reasons they give for a principle of toleration to their respective 
take on justification. I then use the heuristic reading of justification developed in 
Chapter 4 to demonstrate how Rawls’s and Raz’s arguments for toleration may be 
drawn closer together. Chapter 7 looks at the state of religious toleration in 
Malaysia, highlighting the common ground Rawls and Raz share in emphasising the 
moral importance of national sovereignty. Chapter 8 lays out the cases of the 
Muslim veil in France and Turkey, which I use to argue that a commitment to liberal 
justifiability does not require secularism.  
                                                          
11
 Michael Bratman, Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, forthcoming). 
1 
A Disagreement about Justification 
 
One of the enduring concerns of political philosophy has been the 
justification of authority – under what conditions do political authorities count as 
legitimate? This chapter attempts to uncover the root of the disagreement between 
John Rawls and Joseph Raz, two prominent champions of a liberal answer to this 
question.
1
 I argue that the source of the divergence between their two views is a 
difference of opinion as to what constitutes the project of justifying political 
principles. Raz sees this as a question of uncovering the truth about the conditions 
under which political authority would be legitimate. On his view, authority is only 
justified when complying with the authority’s directives improves one’s conformity 
with reasons which independently apply to one, compared to trying to respond to 
those reasons directly. The philosopher’s job is to do the hard work of finding out 
what these reasons are. In contrast, Rawls conceives of justification as primarily a 
“practical social task” of providing a conception of justice that meshes with how we 
understand ourselves and our relation to society.
2
 On Rawls’s account, justification 
involves the philosopher in a search for a set of reasons which reasonable citizens 
can share, despite their deeply held, reasonable disagreements. Because he 
conceives of the task of justification in terms of agreement, the result is a 
recommendation of principled neutrality with respect to people’s metaphysical 
commitments. 
Why should this disagreement about justification matter to us? Raz, in his 
article on “epistemic abstinence” (his term for Rawls’s recommendation of 
epistemic neutrality), suggests one reason. Raz points out that it is a novel idea in 
political philosophy, that governments should not be concerned with the truth of the 
very doctrine of justice which is supposed to guide their action. At the very least, 
then, epistemic abstinence as an approach to justifying authority requires some 
                                                          
1
 In doing this, I have taken as a starting point Raz’s article on what he terms Rawls’s “epistemic 
abstinence,” one of the few places where he directly addresses Rawls’s work. See Joseph Raz, 
“Facing Diversity: The Case of Epistemic Abstinence” in Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 1 
(Winter, 1990), 3-46. 
2
 John Rawls, “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory” ” in Collected Papers, ed., Samuel 
Freeman (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press,1999), 306. 
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explanation.
3
 We want to know if such epistemic abstinence is the right response to 
the fact of diversity in modern democratic political life, or, to use Rawls’s term, to 
the fact of reasonable pluralism. Does the fact of reasonable pluralism indeed force 
the liberal philosopher into an “epistemic withdrawal from the fray” 4? Raz would 
beg to differ, and his account offers an alternative response to the fact of diversity in 
modern politics. As becomes clearer through this chapter, which side of the 
argument we fall on shapes our understanding of the task of the political philosopher 
today, faced with the fact of reasonable pluralism in a democratic society. 
 
Raz on Epistemic Abstinence  
Raz’s target is what he terms Rawls’s “epistemic abstinence,” viz., the 
latter’s choice to refrain from claiming that his theory of justice is true.  
He acknowledges that Rawls’s theory of justice avoids falling into a mere 
unprincipled search for consensus because it constitutes a moral doctrine of justice. 
It is a moral doctrine of justice because of its limited applicability to reasonable 
conceptions of the good,
5
 which are likely to persist in nearly just societies,
6
 and 
because the structure of Rawls’s overlapping consensus involves citizens justifying 
the truth or validity of the political conception from within their own comprehensive 
doctrine.
7
 
Raz traces Rawls’s epistemic abstinence to his emphasis on the practical 
nature of his theory, and the need to ensure consensus-based social stability and 
unity. On Raz’s reading, the need for such stability grounds the argument for the 
overlapping consensus.
8
 Raz observes that in order for Rawls to explain why his 
                                                          
3
 “Epistemic Abstinence,” 4. Raz puts it thus: (N)ever before has it been suggested that 
governments should be unconcerned with the truth of the very views (the doctrine of justice) 
which inform their policies and actions.  
4
 “Epistemic Abstinence,” 4.  
5
 Where the concept of the reasonable is already a moral notion.  
6
 “Epistemic Abstinence,” 12. 
7
 “Epistemic Abstinence,” 13. 
8
 Accordingly, Raz outlines the argument on p.30 of “Epistemic Abstinence,” and states his doubts 
that an overlapping consensus is necessary for securing social unity and stability. Rather, Raz thinks, 
affective and symbolic elements may be the “crucial cement” of society, in addition to individuals’ 
power to affect societal affairs. (See “Epistemic Abstinence,” 30-31 for the full argument). If Rawls’s 
argument for the overlapping consensus were simply one from the need for stability, then Raz’s 
hypothesis, if true, would be indeed a crippling blow. But as I try to show in what follows, Rawls’s 
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philosophical enterprise should aim at the practical goal of social stability and unity, 
Rawls must presuppose the truth of something like the following statement: ‘Social 
unity and stability based on an (unforced) consensus are valuable goals of sufficient 
importance to make them and them alone the foundations of a theory of justice for 
our societies.’9 Raz says: 
If it is argued that what makes it the theory of justice for us is that it is 
built on an overlapping consensus and therefore secures stability and 
unity, then consensus-based stability and unity are the values that a 
theory of justice, for our society, is assumed to depend on. Their 
achievement – that is, the fact that endorsing the theory leads to their 
achievement – makes the theory true, sound, valid, and so forth. This at 
least is what such a theory is committed to. There can be no justice 
without truth.
10
  
 
As I understand it, the force of Raz’s argument against Rawls’s epistemic abstinence 
is this. Rawls’s argument for justice as fairness presupposes the objective value of 
consensus-based social unity and stability. In this way, it contains within it an 
implicit appeal to truth. Without this appeal to truth, Rawls’s argument for his 
theory of justice would be incoherent. That is, it would not be able to make sense of 
its own project, which is to provide a theory of justice, rather than, say, a theory of 
political expediency. Thus, contrary to Rawls’s claim that his doctrine of justice can 
bracket the question of truth, epistemic distance is not possible. Raz puts it thus in a 
footnote: “(Rawls) is committed to applying to the theory of justice whichever 
adjective is appropriately applied to moral propositions. There is no room for 
epistemic distance.”11 Furthermore, Raz thinks that Rawls is committed to saying 
that the achievement of consensus-based stability and unity is what “makes the 
theory true, sound, valid, and so forth.”12 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                   
main argument for the overlapping consensus is not primarily one grounded in the need for stability, 
but rather in the need for justification/political legitimacy.  
9
 A paraphrase from “Epistemic Abstinence,” 14. 
10
 “Epistemic Abstinence,” 15. Italics added. 
11
 “Epistemic Abstinence,” 15 (footnote 34). 
12
 “Epistemic Abstinence,” 15. 
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A Rawlsian answer from the nature of justification 
I am not convinced that Rawls is committed to this. It seems to me that Rawls 
could resist Raz’s interpretation of his project as that of showing that achieving 
stability is the truth-making condition for a theory of justice. Rather, Rawls’s 
concern with stability has to do with political legitimacy. Rawls says: 
 
...The problem of stability is not the problem of bringing others who 
reject a conception to share it, or to act in accordance with it, by 
workable sanctions if necessary – as if the task were to find ways to 
impose that conception on others once we are ourselves convinced it is 
sound. Rather, as a liberal political conception, justice as fairness relies 
for its reasonableness in the first place upon generating its own support 
in a suitable way by addressing each citizen’s reason, as explained 
within its own framework. 
Only in this manner is justice as fairness an account of political 
legitimacy...A conception of political legitimacy aims for a public basis 
of justification and appeals to free public reason, and hence to all 
citizens viewed as reasonable and rational.
13
  
 
For Rawls, the concern is not with stability as the be-all and end-all. Rather, the 
importance of stability stems from the need to justify the coercive power of 
government in a way that expresses the deeply-held intuition, widely shared in 
democratic societies, that society is a fair system of social cooperation over a 
complete life.  
At bottom, Rawls and Raz disagree about what constitutes the project of 
justifying political principles. Raz sees it as a question of truth (Rawls would 
probably say that Raz considers the question of justification an “epistemological 
problem,” a search for moral truth interpreted as a fixed and independent order of 
objects and relations which is distinct from how we conceive of ourselves.)
14
 Rawls, 
in contrast, conceives of the project of justifying his theory of justice as having to do 
not with truth-seeking, but primarily as the “practical social task” of furnishing a 
                                                          
13
 John Rawls, “The Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus” in Collected Papers, ed., 
Samuel Freeman (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press,1999) 488. Italics added. 
14
 “Kantian Constructivism,” 306. 
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conception of justice that is congruent with how we understand ourselves and our 
relation to society.
15
 
In line with this difference of approach to theory-justification, and contrary 
to Raz’s reading of him,16 I think that there is evidence to show that Rawls does in 
fact see himself as replacing the appeal to truth with the idea of “reasonableness”, 
where reasonableness consciously avoids reliance on the truth of any given 
comprehensive doctrine but instead makes reference only to political concepts.  
 
What justifies a conception of justice is not its being true to an order 
antecedent to and given to us, but its congruence with our deeper 
understanding of ourselves and our aspirations, and our realization that, 
given our history and the traditions embedded in our public life, it is the 
most reasonable doctrine for us.
17
 
 
For Rawls, the answer to the question of “why should I accept your doctrine of 
justice as fairness?” is a constructivist one – You should accept justice as fairness as 
the most reasonable doctrine for you because it accords with your deepest intuitions 
about society as being a fair system of social cooperation over a complete life. 
Agreement is important because such justification, to have bite, must be able to 
appeal to citizens who hold different reasonable comprehensive doctrines. 
Consensus-based stability is simply proof that justification has succeeded and 
political legitimacy achieved.
18
 
 Elsewhere, Rawls specifically rejects the idea that he replaces “true” with 
“reasonable” because he is proposing an alternative theory of truth.19 Rather, he 
uses “reasonable” in contrast with the rational intuitionist’s usage of “true”, by 
which the latter refers to an independent moral order.
20
 The usage of “reasonable” 
                                                          
15
 “Kantian Constructivism,” 306.  
16
 “Epistemic Abstinence” 15, footnote 34. Raz says, “I have been equating ‘true’, sound’, ‘valid’, 
and so on. Could it be that Rawls merely refuses to endorse truth, while being willing to apply one of 
the other adjectives? I think that the text suggests otherwise…” 
17
 “Kantian Constructivism,” 306. 
18
 In contrast, for Raz, legitimacy and stability would be two separate issues – for him, political 
legitimacy is achieved when the normal justification thesis holds, that is, when submitting to the 
political authority allows one to better conform to reasons that independently apply to one.  
19
 “Kantian Constructivism,” 355. 
20
 To be fair, Raz  believes in moral truth but is not a rational intuitionist. 
17 
 
rather than true thus reflects Rawls’s constructivist conception of theory 
justification. 
 
Truth vs objectivity – a political conception of truth?  
At this point, and before engaging in any further dispute at the level of 
metaphysics, Raz might justly point out that Rawls is, however reluctantly, 
committed to the truth of those claims on which he thinks people could reasonably 
agree. The very notion of agreement necessarily carries with it the concept of truth – 
to agree to a claim just is to agree that it is true.
21
 Yet recall that Rawls’s aim is a 
radical one – his objective is nothing less than to do without the concept of truth 
entirely, replacing it with reasonableness. Political constructivism, in Rawls’s 
words, 
  
does not... as rational intuitionism does, use (or deny) the concept of 
truth; nor does it question that concept, nor could it say that the concept 
of truth and its idea of the reasonable are the same. Rather, within itself 
the political conception does without the concept of truth.
22
  
 
At first glance, this seems to present a problem for Rawls even before we embark on 
any dispute at the metaphysical level. 
Rawls’s response – his ‘replacement strategy’ - involves trying to convince 
his reader that substituting truth with reasonableness will not compromise the 
objectivity needed for justice. In other words, you can have objectivity without 
truth.
23
 First let us clear up an ambiguity about the concept of objectivity. On one 
hand, a phrase like “objective truth” would seem to refer to a metaphysical claim 
about truth, of a realist variety. However, in ordinary language, “objective” is also 
used to describe a person who is free from bias. Given Rawls’s concern to steer 
clear of any disputed metaphysical claims, it is no surprise to find that he does not 
                                                          
21
 I am grateful for Allen Wood for impressing this point on me.  
22
 Political Liberalism (Expanded Edition) (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005) 94. Italics 
added.  
23
 Rawls provides an extended account of his conception of objectivity in Lecture III of Political 
Liberalism, called “Political Constructivism”.  He says that this lecture is develops his earlier 1980 
lectures on “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory”. (footnote 1, Political Liberalism 90) 
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(indeed, given his other commitments, he cannot) defend objectivity in the first 
sense. Rather, Rawls’s aim is to show that his conception of objectivity, which is 
satisfied by the notion of reasonableness, is both necessary and sufficient for a 
shared public basis of justification.
24
 Importantly, in order for his idea of an 
overlapping consensus to be vindicated, Rawls also needs to show that proponents 
of other metaphysical persuasions (such as the moral realist) would also be able to 
grant that the sort of objectivity possessed by Rawls’s political constructivism is 
both necessary and sufficient for his political and practical purposes.
25
 To determine 
whether he succeeds in doing this is the goal of this section.  
 What is the conception of objectivity which Rawls believes his concept of 
reasonableness satisfies? This conception has six essential elements, as follows:
26
  
1) First, a conception of objectivity must connect up with reasons in a public 
way. As Rawls puts it, it “must establish a public framework of thought 
sufficient for the concept of judgement to apply and for conclusions to be 
reached on the basis of reasons and evidence after discussion and due 
reflection.”27  
2) Second, for a moral and political conception to be objective it must specify a 
normative standard. That is, it must “specify a concept of a correct 
judgement made from its point of view,” 28 whatever that correct judgement 
is termed – it might be “true”, or it might be “reasonable”.  
3) Third, a conception of objectivity must specify an order of reasons, which 
serve as action-guiding for agents, regardless of whether the agents feel 
moved by them.
29
  
4) Fourth, a conception of objectivity must “distinguish the objective point of 
view”,30 such that it is distinguished from mere agreement between a group 
of agents, or from the agent’s point of view. In this way, an account of 
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objectivity would be able to explain why an agent might be mistaken.
31
 On 
this point, Rawls says, “It is part of understanding the concept of objectivity 
that we never suppose that our thinking something is just or reasonable, or a 
group’s thinking it so, makes it so.”32  
5) Fifth, a conception of objectivity has to have an account of how agreement 
in judgement can take place.
33
  
6) Sixth and finally, a conception of objectivity needs to be able to explain 
disagreements, or failures to converge on the same judgement.
34
  
How does Rawls’s account of his political constructivism satisfy the 
essentials of objectivity listed above? The first essential is satisfied by the fact that 
that which is reasonable is intrinsically public, since it makes reference to principles 
that others could accept as fair terms of cooperation.
35
 As for the second essential, 
Rawls’s political conception of justice specifies that the normative standard – the 
benchmark for ‘correct’ judgements – is that which is reasonable,36 “supported by 
the preponderance of reasons specified by the principles of right and justice issuing 
from a procedure that correctly formulates the principles of practical reason in union 
with appropriate conceptions of society and person.”37 That is, what is reasonable is 
supported by the balance of (relevant) reasons, which in turn are given by the 
appropriate procedure, namely, deliberation within the original position. On this 
point, Rawls emphasises that his political constructivism does not view a correct 
moral judgement as one that is true of an independent order of moral values.
38
 The 
third essential – that an objective framework should specify an order of reasons – is 
satisfied by the fact that citizens in Rawls’s well-ordered society must give priority 
to the reasons that emerge from deliberation in the original position, compared with 
reasons they might have from their own point of view, outside of the original 
position.
39
 The fourth essential – distinguishing an objective point of view -  is 
specified by the original position, which is “the point of view of free and equal 
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citizens as properly represented”, and distinguished from the point of view of any 
particular person by the veil of ignorance.
40
 Concerning the fifth essential, Rawls’s 
political conception of justice accounts for convergence on principles of justice 
because reasonable persons are able to learn and master the concepts and principles 
of practical reason as well as the principles of right and justice that issue from the 
procedure of construction.
41
 Finally, the sixth essential is satisfied by Rawls’s 
explanation of the failure of judgements to converge by appealing to the burdens of 
judgement, viz., the difficulties of surveying and assessing all the evidence, or the 
delicate balance of competing reasons on either side of an issue, resulting in 
reasonable people differing.
42
   
While Rawls’s account of objectivity seeks to unharness it from truth, which 
Rawls seems to understand in its metaphysical, realist sense, he is keen to 
demonstrate that his constructivist political conception “is not at odds with our 
commonsense ideas of truth and matters of fact”.43 To do this, Rawls distinguishes 
between two kinds of facts, both of which, Rawls says, are not constructed. 
The first category of facts is the kind of fact we would cite as a right- or 
wrong-making characteristic in moral argument. For instance, in arguing that 
slavery is unjust, we appeal to the fact that it allows some to own other people as 
property and to control the product of their labour. What Rawls would want to say is 
the following:
44
  
1) That slavery allows people to own other people and their labour is a fact 
(call this fact S), which is independent of the principles of justice, and 
independent of the procedure of construction. 
2) Fact S is not intrinsically action-guiding, though it is morally relevant.  
3) The constructivist procedure, of entering the original position to deliberate, 
allows us to come out with principles which no one could reasonably reject, 
among which principles which pick out fact S as one which counts as a 
reason against slavery.  
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On this account, then, the wrong-making fact is not constructed. It exists 
independently of any constructivist procedure as a morally relevant fact, but it does 
not yet count as a reason (in this case, a reason against slavery). It is only when this 
fact is picked out as relevant by a principle emerging from the constructivist 
procedure, that this fact becomes a reason.
45
 
A second category of facts are facts about the political conception itself. An 
example of this sort of fact is, for instance, that slavery is unjust. These facts, Rawls 
says, are also not constructed. He calls them (in an analogy to constructivism in 
mathematics) “facts about the possibilities of construction”.46 Rawls explains that 
what he means by “possibilities of construction” is that this sort of fact is “implicit 
in the family of conceptions and principles of practical reasoning that are the basis 
of the construction”;47 these possibilities about justice (such as slavery being wrong) 
exist before any construction takes place.
48
 To take the case of the fact that slavery 
is unjust, Rawls calls this a provisional fixed point, something we take as a basic 
fact. But, he says, such moral facts form part of a “fully philosophical political 
conception” only when they are “coherently connected together by concepts and 
principles acceptable to us on due reflection”.49 But principles, on Rawls’s account, 
come out from a reasonable procedure of construction. That the moral facts can be 
connected up by a principle which emerges from the constructivist procedure is not 
to say that the principle, or the construction, makes them true, but rather, that the 
constructivist procedure allows the “proof” of their reasonableness to be publicly 
stated.
50
  
Rawls’s comments about these two types of unconstructed, morally relevant 
facts are meant to reassure us that we can retain our commonsense notions of truth. 
We need not accept that even these facts are the products of some process of 
construction. At the same time, however, Rawls emphasises that the procedure of 
construction is indispensable, because in the case of the first category of facts, it 
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allows us to pick out which morally relevant facts get to count as reasons; and vis-à-
vis the second category of facts, it allows us to connect up the many moral facts that 
are implicit in the model-conceptions that we all accept (for instance, that ‘slavery is 
unjust’, ‘tyranny is unjust’, ‘exploitation is unjust’, etc.).51  
Does Rawls’s replacement strategy succeed?  
I think not. Rawls does not succeed in doing away with the need for truth. 
He does demonstrate that his notion of reasonableness achieves some measure of 
objectivity, but this is not enough to remove the need for a concept of truth. 
Certainly his notion of reasonableness succeeds admirably in separating wishful 
thinking from objectivity (see the fourth essential). But that is only one part of the 
role that the concept of truth plays in our mental life; reasonableness is not capable 
of replacing truth entirely. One might think that some notion of reasonableness is 
necessary, without agreeing with Rawls that it is sufficient. Even if one were to 
accept the objectivity of a reasonable political conception, it would still make sense 
to ask of it, when deliberating about whether one should adopt this conception as 
one’s own, “Is it true?” After all, it is perfectly coherent to think that a reasonable 
conception may be mistaken, because it relies on having false beliefs, even if we 
acknowledge that the conception is reasonable.  
What this begins to show us is that the concept of truth is so deeply 
embedded in our thought and reasoning that even by Rawls’s own lights, there may 
be reason to reconsider its exclusion from political justification. Consider Rawls’s 
first two essentials for a conception of objectivity. From these we can see that he is 
concerned with some shared basis for reasoning and judgement. But reasoning and 
judgement depends on a concept of truth. For instance, an account of reasoning 
requires the concepts of belief and meaning. But these in turn make use of the 
concept of truth. The relevant normative standard for belief is truth, not 
reasonableness – when we deliberate whether we should believe that p, we try to 
determine whether p is true. As for truth being implicated in the concept of 
meaning, Donald Davidson observes that how we often work out what someone’s 
utterances mean is by assuming that they are saying something true about the 
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publicly observable surroundings.
52
 Judging, one of the attitudes that Rawls is 
explicitly committed to preserving, is intimately tied up with judging whether p is 
true. Assertion, likewise, is commonly taken to involve presenting the asserted 
content as true.
53
 As mentioned before, agreement, too, is commonly understood as 
agreement that a proposition is true. To do without the concept of truth, then, 
involves a far more radical change in our notions of reasoning, judging, believing, 
meaning, asserting, and agreeing, than Rawls would himself want. I see Rawls’s 
acknowledgement of the two categories of unconstructed facts as revealing a crack 
in his argument. What are these facts, if not true? Without any concept of truth, it is 
hard to make sense of these facts.  
 Joshua Cohen suggests, in a Rawlsian vein, that, rather than doing without 
the concept of truth altogether in political justification, we could use instead a 
political conception of truth.
54
 Using much the same strategy as Rawls does for 
objectivity, Cohen proposes a non-metaphysical (rather than anti-metaphysical) 
conception of truth.  
Would a political conception of truth satisfy the moral realist? If we leave 
aside the issue of whether public reason is needed at all (which requires separate 
arguments on either side), it seems that Cohen’s extension of the Rawlsian 
framework of justification to include a concept of truth would at least keep Rawls’s 
moral realist (and other) interlocutors in the conversation for a while longer. They 
would no longer be able to say that Rawls is being incoherent by refusing to admit 
to using a concept of truth. Nonetheless, what this addition of a political conception 
of truth does, I think, is to push the debate to the metaphysical level, as I go on to 
explore. 
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The metaphysical disagreement about justification 
But perhaps one could understand Raz’s objection to epistemic abstinence as 
applying to Rawls’s conception of theory-justification. One can imagine Raz saying 
to Rawls: You (Rawls) say that truth is only one of the (multiple) things which are 
of value in a method of ethics, and that we value other things apart from truth, for 
instance, the social role of morality.
 55
 But by conceiving of justification as 
primarily a practical social task, you are claiming that the value of achieving the 
social role of justice (viz., enabling all members of society to make mutually 
acceptable to one another their shared institutions and basic arrangements, by citing 
what are publicly recognised as sufficient reasons, as identified by that 
conception
56
) is more valuable than the goal of basing a theory of justice on true 
principles. This amounts to a truth claim about what the project of theory 
justification should be. Without this claim being true, the Rawlsian constructivist 
project of justifying the theory of justice as fairness would be incoherent.  
How could Rawls respond to such an objection without arguing on Raz’s 
terms and appealing to truth? I think Rawls could acknowledge that he and Raz 
disagree at a metaethical level, but then he could also say the following: 
First, Rawls might try to demonstrate how it is that on his constructivist 
approach, epistemic abstinence is not incoherent. To do this, he would draw on the 
idea of wide reflective equilibrium as a theory of theory acceptance. The test of 
wide reflective equilibrium is the test of whether a moral theory “meshes with and 
articulates our more firm considered convictions, at all levels of generality, after due 
examination, once all adjustments and revisions that seem compelling have been 
made”.57 To show that his theory of justice as fairness would pass the test of wide 
reflective equilibrium, Rawls would point to how his proposed principles of justice 
are in accord with a set of relevant background theories (both moral and non-moral, 
including the conceptions of a “well-ordered society”, “moral persons”, “freedom” 
and “equality”), as well as our considered moral judgements (such as “slavery is 
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wrong”).58 Because of the wide reach of this web of belief, Rawls can explain that it 
is not the case that he needs to assert the truth of the overwhelming importance of 
the social role of morality. While this claim of the importance of the social role of 
morality gets to count as a background theory which feeds into wide reflective 
equilibrium and therefore contributes towards justifying the theory of justice as 
fairness, it is not immune to revision. For instance, the public culture could change 
such that people no longer feel the need for public justification of principles of 
justice. Thus it is not the case that the whole constructivist project of justification 
rests on the truth of the claim about the importance of the social role of morality. 
59
 
Moreover, Rawls could point out that his constructivist approach has the 
advantage of being able to accommodate Raz’s realist meta-ethics in his well-
ordered society. Thus Rawls might say to Raz, while my constructivism does not 
allow me to assert that the theory of justice as fairness is true, you are free to do so - 
my constructivist approach to theory-justification leaves it open for you, the meta-
ethical realist, to affirm justice as fairness as true by your lights, so long as you are 
able to justify it from within your comprehensive liberal worldview. In fact, that is 
precisely the attraction of the overlapping consensus – each citizen is able to affirm 
the conception of justice as true (according to whichever meta-ethical view he 
holds) from within his own comprehensive doctrine. Accepting your (Raz’s) meta-
ethics, on the other hand, would lead me to exclude from the justificatory project 
those who, for instance, do not share your meta-ethical theory, and thus undermine 
the success of justification. 
At this point, Raz might say to Rawls, if you think that the price of epistemic 
abstinence is truth, then you, Rawls, mistake the task of the philosopher. The 
philosopher’s task is to discern truth, not to find a way for people to get along. Part 
of what it means for someone to believe in an independent order of moral truth is for 
him to think that what is true is true for everyone, for the same reasons. What you 
(Rawls) are suggesting, is that I (the comprehensive liberal moral realist) engage in 
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a conversation about political legitimacy with my fellow-citizens, where I know in 
advance that we are going to be speaking at cross-purposes rather than having a 
genuine debate. You are asking me to accept that I cannot speak the same language 
as my fellow-citizens, and to assent to a surface agreement under the cover of what 
is “reasonable”.  
I think Rawls’s concluding remarks to A Theory of Justice, which address 
head-on the nature of justification, contain a possible response to Raz’s charge: 
 
 (J)ustification is argument to those who disagree with us, or to 
ourselves when we are of two minds. It presumes a clash of views 
between persons or within one person, and seeks to convince others, or 
ourselves, of the reasonableness of the principles upon which our claims 
and judgements are founded. Being designed to reconcile by reason, 
justification proceeds from what all parties to the discussion hold in 
common. Ideally, to justify a conception of justice to someone is to give 
him a proof of its principles from premises that we both accept, these 
principles having in turn consequences that match our considered 
judgements. Thus mere proof is not justification. A proof simply 
displays logical relations between propositions. But proofs become 
justification once the starting points are mutually recognised, or the 
conclusions so comprehensive and compelling as to persuade us of the 
soundness of the conception expressed by their premises. 
It is perfectly proper, then, that the argument for the principles of 
justice should proceed from some consensus. This is the nature of 
justification.”60  
 
Rawls’s contention is that finding agreement, under certain conditions, is precisely 
the philosopher’s task. Specifically, agreement has justificatory force in the context 
of a democratic society characterised by the fact of reasonable pluralism. The fact of 
reasonable pluralism is the result of the exercise of human reason in a context of 
free institutions, because reasonable people will disagree on their comprehensive 
doctrines due to the burdens of judgement (viz., the “many hazards” involved in the 
correct use of our reason and judgement, such as conflicting and complex evidence, 
differing views about the weight of various considerations, indeterminacy of 
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concepts, etc.
61
) The upshot of reasonable pluralism in a democratic society is that 
we cannot simply assume that those who disagree with us are wrong. They do not 
disagree with us because they are looking at the problem in the wrong way. Rather, 
reasonable disagreement persists even under the most favourable circumstances 
(absence of duress and stress, possessing all the relevant information, etc). Even 
looking at the problem of justice aright, reasonable people will disagree. And 
because they cannot be dismissed as irrational or unreasonable, we owe fellow 
citizens who reasonably disagree with us a justification for the principles of justice 
on which the basic structure is built.  
 For Rawls, then, justification looks for a set of reasons which reasonable 
citizens can share, even though they may (reasonably) disagree deeply. This is why 
Rawls wants a form of justification that is neutral with respect to people’s 
metaphysical commitments. Given the fact of reasonable pluralism, which goes very 
deep and extends into all areas of life, the shared set of reasons is relatively small in 
scope; it is limited to the political. What reasonable people who hold divergent 
comprehensive doctrines can agree on - the overlapping consensus - is limited to a 
purely political conception of justice. Because reasonable pluralism extends to 
people’s metaphysical commitments, the overlapping consensus also has “shallow 
foundations” (to use Raz’s term)62 – it does not attempt to enforce any one 
metaphysical view, but seeks to remain neutral by neither asserting nor denying any 
metaphysical view. On Rawls’s account, it is possible that there should be a true 
metaphysical view; but political liberalism as he conceives it stays out of that 
particular fray, for fear of compromising the project of justifying the principles of 
justice.
63
 Rawls says:  
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Many if not most citizens may want to give the political conception a 
metaphysical foundation as part of their own comprehensive doctrine; 
and this doctrine (I assume) includes a conception of the truth of moral 
judgements...These further claims political constructivism neither 
asserts nor denies. As I have said, here it does not speak. It says only 
that for a reasonable and workable political conception, no more is 
needed than a public basis in the principles of practical reason in union 
with conceptions of society and person.
64
  
 
For Rawls, therefore, the test for justifiability (of principles of justice) contains a 
requirement that candidates for principles of justice can be endorsed by reasonable 
people who do not share your conception of the good (call this the “reasonableness 
requirement”).  
Rawls’s device of the original position is meant to “reconcile by reason” by 
abstracting from the things on which reasonable persons disagree, and to find a 
common point of view from which to start a conversation. The fact of reasonable 
pluralism, combined with the need for justification, explains why the veil of 
ignorance in the original position is thick rather than thin; in particular, the thick veil 
of ignorance excludes knowledge of the parties’ comprehensive doctrines.65 Rawls 
elaborates: 
 
...And so we arrive at a thicker rather than a thinner veil of ignorance: 
the parties are to be understood so far as possible solely as moral 
persons and in abstraction from contingencies. To be fair, the initial 
situation treats the parties symmetrically, for as moral persons they are 
equal: the same relevant properties qualify everyone. Beginning with a 
state of no information, we allow in just enough information to make the 
agreement rational, though still suitably independent from historical, 
natural, and social happenstance. Considerably more information would 
be compatible with impartiality but a Kantian view seeks more than 
this.
66
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The common ground which the original position tries to model is “the fundamental 
idea of equality as found in the public political culture of a democratic society”67 – 
this is seen in the “symmetrical”68 situation of each party in the original position.  
 The original position does not guarantee actual agreement when the veil of 
ignorance is removed. Rather, it is a device of representation that, by bracketing 
disputed questions, allows the parties to “get on with the task of developing a 
substantive theory of justice”69 and making sure it is justifiable who those who 
reasonably disagree with us.
70
 It does this by delineating the class of relevant 
reasons which can be offered in justification, given the fact of reasonable pluralism. 
Thus, Rawls might say to Raz, the notion of “reasonableness” is not merely a notion 
of truth in disguise.
71
 Rawls adds: 
 
The advantage of staying within the reasonable is that there can be but 
one true comprehensive doctrine, though as we have seen, many 
reasonable ones. Once we accept the fact that reasonable pluralism is a 
permanent condition of public culture under free institutions, the idea of 
the reasonable is more suitable as part of the basis of public justification 
for a constitutional regime than the idea of moral truth. Holding a 
political conception as true, and for that reason alone the one suitable 
basis of public reason, is exclusive, even sectarian, and so likely to 
foster political division.
72
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Raz on well-being and the separation of justification from agreement 
In response to all this, Raz could say that in fact, Rawls makes a mistake by 
linking justification and agreement so closely together. Why think that justification 
requires agreement of any sort? If, as Raz elaborates in The Morality of Freedom, 
political legitimacy and consent can be dealt with separately, then there is no 
imperative towards seeking agreement. 
For Raz, an authority is legitimate if it meets the normal justification thesis 
(NJT). The NJT states that authority is only legitimate when complying with the 
authority’s directives improves one’s conformity with reasons which independently 
apply to one, compared to trying to respond to those reasons directly. Raz lists five 
types of considerations that make the NJT plausible
73
 – first, the authority is wiser; 
second, the authority has a steadier will and is less easily distracted from right 
reason by temptations or pressures; third, individuals directly acting in an attempt to 
follow right reason is likely to be self-defeating, and the best indirect strategy is to 
be guided by authority; fourth, deciding for oneself what to do involves a variety of 
costs in time or resources and in certain circumstances, it is appropriate to follow 
authority instead; fifth, in some cases, the authority would be in a better position to 
achieve what the individual has reason to want but could not individually achieve 
(this would especially apply to cases involving coordination problems). 
This notion of justification rests on a conception of dependent reasons. The 
authority’s directives should be based on reasons which already independently apply 
to the subject of the directives and are relevant to their action in the circumstances 
covered by the directive
74
 (Raz’s “dependence thesis”). In all the five scenarios 
listed in the previous paragraph, the authority is merely the best available means for 
the subject to comply with the reasons that she already has. What makes the 
legitimacy of a would-be authority even possible is the fact that its directives 
purport to reflect reasons which already independently apply to the subjects.  
For Raz, it is important that the NJT does not lead to any general 
justification of authority; what legitimacy is granted to an authority is piecemeal, 
depending on whether or not, in a particular area, an individual subject really does 
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better conform to reason by complying with the authority’s directives. For Raz, 
then, the test of justifiability consists in the question, “Does complying with the 
directives of this (would-be) authority help me to better conform to reason than if I 
tried to directly respond to reason on my own?”  
 Unlike Rawls, Raz does not think that anything like the reasonableness 
requirement is necessary for justifiability. Raz, unlike Rawls, is not interested in 
neutrality. Why is this, given that Raz would agree with Rawls on the fact of 
reasonable pluralism (though he would not cast it in those terms)? I think there are 
two aspects to answering this question.  
 First of all, Raz appears to be more pessimistic about the role neutrality could 
play, given the fact of reasonable pluralism. He says, “Rawls’s route seems barren 
in pluralistic societies, like ours. The degree of existing diversity is just too great.”75 
Raz’s assessment seems to be that neutrality cannot do the job of ensuring that the 
principles of justice are justifiable to people; they are too deeply divided by their 
various conceptions of the good. Contrary to Rawls’s claim, there are not enough 
shared intuitive ideas in the political culture of stable democracies to make 
agreement on a conception of justice possible. Yet this objection would seem to 
ignore the fact that the whole of Political Liberalism is an attempt by Rawls to 
demonstrate that an overlapping consensus around a political conception of justice is 
plausible. Raz would have to say quite a bit more in order to make this line of 
argument work, given that Rawls goes to some trouble in his work to try to show 
how an overlapping consensus might be feasible.  
 Second, and more fundamentally, I think Raz would say that Rawls is making 
a mistake as to the philosopher’s task in justifying the principles of justice. 
Justifiability, Raz might say, is not about trying to find a shared set of reasons. That 
is an approach that leads to a dead-end. Rather, the philosopher should be working 
hard to uncover the dependent reasons which could justify authority, since authority 
is only legitimate when complying with its directives improves one’s conformity 
with reasons which independently apply to one, compared to trying to respond to 
those reasons directly (the NJT). 
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 “Epistemic Abstinence,” 45. 
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 Raz does not use neutrality to obtain justifiability. Rather, he posits that the 
well-being of individuals is intrinsically valuable.
76
 With a fully fleshed out 
conception of well-being, Raz’s view no longer needs neutrality to get justifiability 
off the ground. The intrinsic value of well-being gives rise to reasons for certain 
types of actions;
77
 and these are the same sorts of reasons which constitute the 
dependent reasons that justify authority. To put this in Rawlsian terms, for Raz, the 
principles of justice which are justifiable are simply those which protect and 
promote the well-being of citizens. Because Raz sees the problem of legitimacy as 
separate from the question of stability, he would say that a Rawlsian overlapping 
consensus centring on a shared political conception of justice is simply not 
necessary for legitimacy.
78
 
 
Situating the conception of the good - another view of the two routes to 
justification 
Another way of seeing the two different routes taken to justifiability taken 
by Rawls and Raz is by looking at the placement of their conception of the good 
within their respective theories. In laying out his theory of justice, Rawls’s account 
of the well-ordered society and the way in which it is good comes in only after he 
has already established the principles of justice, although in order to get the 
principles of justice off the ground in the original position, he does need to 
presuppose a thin theory of the good.
79
 What Rawls terms the ‘thin theory of the 
good’ is a notion of goodness as rationality; the idea that citizens have (at least in an 
                                                          
76
 In his chapter on personal well-being in Morality of Freedom, Raz takes himself, in giving an 
explanation of personal well-being, to be describing “general features of human experience”; 
“pervasive and unshakeable feature of human practical thought” which “need no justification, though 
they call for an explanation” (Morality of Freedom, 288-9). 
77
 For instance, providing the conditions under which people will enjoy the basic capacities they need 
to engage with the opportunities available in their society for leading a successful life. (Joseph Raz, 
“Duties of Well-Being,” 18 in Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and 
Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994)) 
78
 In addition, Raz disagrees with Rawls on what is required to generate stability. Raz says, 
“Symbolic and affective identification and a partial cognitive overlap may be a very firm foundation 
for social unity and stability, especially when we remember that individuals find it both prudentially 
and morally undesirable to undermine the status quo, or even to try to evade its consequences, given 
the small chances of success...Rawls’s overlapping consensus...is neither necessary nor sufficient, 
and even were it to exist it would play only a partial, perhaps a merely subsidiary role in security 
unity and stability.” (“Epistemic Abstinence,” 31) 
79
 Theory of Justice, see Part Three, “Ends”. In Political Liberalism, Rawls addresses this under 
Lecture V, “Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good, especially §7,”The Good of Political Society”. 
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intuitive way), a rational plan of life in light of which they prioritise their main 
endeavours and allocate their resources over the course of their life.
80
 Goodness as 
rationality is then combined with a political conception of citizens as free and equal, 
in order to get the framework for an account of primary goods.
81
 The account of 
primary goods in turn provides a way for Rawls to talk about citizens’ needs in the 
original position, without relying on any particular fully-fleshed conception of the 
good.  
In contrast, for Raz, the conception of well-being is at the very centre of 
justifying authority. Raz’s NJT relies on the idea of a legitimate authority acting on 
dependent reasons. It is the subject’s well-being which provides the content of these 
dependent reasons. Raz explains that his notion of individual well-being concerns 
the evaluation of the success or failure of a person’s life from his point of view. On 
Raz’s account, personal well-being consists in the whole-hearted and successful 
pursuit of valuable activities.
82
 This conception of well-being sees life as active, and 
reckons that one’s evaluation of one’s life as a whole will be based on the quality of 
one’s activities. The idea is that for someone to count his life as an overall success, 
he must have been generally successful
83
 in engaging in valuable activities, without 
being mistaken as to their value,
84
 and without negative attitudes such as self-hatred, 
pathological self-doubt, and alienation from one’s life.85 
Rawls could quite rightly point out that reasonable people will disagree on 
Raz’s conception of well-being. Raz would, I think, readily agree. Raz says in one 
article, “Whether or not people care about their well-being depends partly on 
whether their culture made the concept available to them, and partly on whether 
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 Political Liberalism, 177.  
81
 Political Liberalism, 178. 
82
 Joseph Raz, “Duties of Well-Being,”3. This is also elaborated in Chapter 12, “Personal Well-
Being” of Morality of Freedom.  
83
 Raz says that failure detracts from and success adds to one’s well-being, and gives the example of 
a person who has set his heart on being a painter, and turns out to be a lousy one. This person has, 
says Raz, other things being equal, a lousy life (“Duties of Well-Being,” 5). 
84
 On Raz’s account, it is important not to be mistaken about the value of the activities one is engaged 
in, because such a mistake would undermine the reasons for engaging in that activity in the first 
place. (See Section 3, “Goals and Reason”, of Chapter 12 “Personal Well-Being” in Morality of 
Freedom, which explains in more detail how our goals are our goals only if we approve of them.  
85
 “Duties of Well-Being,” 5-6. Raz notes that his view of wholeheartedness departs from Frankfurt’s 
notion of second-order reflective endorsement, in that his view does not require such reflectiveness. 
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they came to focus their concerns in that way. Many people do not.”86  That is, Raz 
acknowledges that some people in certain cultures might not even possess the 
concept of well-being as Raz understands it. However, Raz can also say that making 
well-being the focus of discussion gives the philosopher a starting point for the task 
of rational persuasion, because whether or not someone has the conception of well-
being (as Raz describes it), everyone must acknowledge that having a good life is a 
good.
87
 And no part of this process of rational justification, Raz would say, requires 
the sort of neutrality that Rawls attempts. 
 
Taking stock  
Where does all this leave us? This chapter’s investigation of the 
disagreement between Rawls and Raz reveals that Rawls’s understanding of what 
justifiability requires lies at the root of his insistence on epistemic abstinence.  
In effect, the back and forth between Rawls and Raz about the question of 
the true metaphysical doctrine masks a deeper divergence about the correct 
approach to justification. My strategy for the remaining chapters is to take seriously 
these diverging views about justifiability, to examine the consequences of their 
different approaches, and ultimately to propose a reconciliation. The question of 
truth, as predicated of comprehensive doctrines, is set aside, since the study of 
justifiability does not require it.  
Rather than dwelling on the truth of any metaphysical doctrine, my focus is 
on what justifiability demands in terms of the permissibility of certain categories of 
reasons into public debate. Thus much of the rest of this thesis goes on to grapple 
with the question of whether justifiability indeed requires epistemic abstinence, as 
Rawls suggests. Ultimately my answer to this question is in the negative. Without 
pre-empting that conclusion, however, and because it is also my objective to 
highlight the shared ground between the political and the comprehensive liberal, it is 
useful at this stage to ask - to what extent are these two approaches to justification 
compatible? I sketch below some possibilities which are picked up in later chapters. 
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 “The Role of Well-Being,”in Philosophical Perspectives, vol.18 (2004), 269-294. See p.286. The 
article cited addresses a slightly different question (viz., whether people care about their well-being). 
87
 “The Role of Well-Being,” 286. 
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The first thing to say is that there is much that is intuitively appealing in each 
view. A common sentiment in both approaches is what Raz calls a “service 
conception” of authority.88 Both Rawls and Raz would hold that the governments 
are there to serve the governed – to protect their rights, to achieve collective goods 
which are beyond the ability of any single individual to achieve, and so on. The 
striking appeal of Raz’s NJT is that it lays this out in bold colours. Meanwhile, 
Rawls’s picture of justification is compelling for his description of reasonable 
pluralism as our modern predicament. It is to the extent that we agree with his 
description of modern democratic society that we find his approach to justification 
(via the original position) attractive, because it holds out the hope that we can, 
collectively, move past the deep reasonable disagreements that divide us. 
Can these two approaches to justification be combined? If we start with the 
fact of reasonable pluralism, one possibility is to say that justification should be 
neutral in Rawls’s sense but also meet the NJT. It is hard to see Rawls objecting to 
the principle that the role of government is to serve citizens. Raz, however, would 
probably object that such a starting point is ill-chosen, on the grounds that it sets as 
its ambition the (he would say) impossible task of reconciling our deep and 
reasonable disagreements. 
What if we flip things over and start with the NJT? Does Rawls’s conception 
of justifiability supply any missing gap in Raz’s conception of legitimacy? One 
possible way into this is to ask the question – “How are we to know the dependent 
reasons that legitimate authorities are supposed to help us act upon?” After all, on 
Raz’s account, there is an epistemic condition attached to being a legitimate 
authority – to be a legitimate authority, the legitimacy of the authority must be 
knowable to its subjects.
89
 Raz’s answer to this question seems to be that it is the 
philosopher’s role to think hard about well-being and its constituents, and to 
uncover the dependent reasons we have and to lay all that out for others to consider. 
On Raz’s account, deciding the scope of the government’s authority is the 
                                                          
88
 For Raz, the service conception of the function of authorities is just the dependence thesis 
combined with the normal justification thesis. (Morality of Freedom, 56) 
89
 The line of reasoning here goes: since the point of legitimate authority is to improve one’s 
conformity with reason, one can reliably conform only if one can reliably believe that an authority 
will help one conform better to reason than one can oneself. (See Joseph Raz, “The Problem of 
Authority: Revisiting the Service Conception,” in Minnesota Law Review 90:1003-1044, 2006, 1025-
6, for Raz’s detailed argument for this epistemic condition.   
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individual’s task, and would vary according to one’s stock of expertise, etc.90 In 
contrast, Rawls has the philosopher setting the stage for citizens to find out 
dependent reasons for themselves, by stepping into the original position to 
deliberate together. In A Theory of Justice he describes the question of justification 
as “settled by working out a problem of deliberation,” 91 viz., by choosing principles 
of justice in the original position. So perhaps we could say that the Rawlsian route 
to justifiability supplies a mechanism for collective discovery of the dependent 
reasons which justify authority.  
What of the metaphysical status of the resulting principles of justice? On a 
reconciled hybrid view, would they be true, as Raz would have it, or would they 
comprise a reasonable political conception of justice, with no settled metaphysical 
status? I confess that at the metaphysical level I find it harder to see how the two 
views could cohere – it is difficult to see how the metaphysical realist about truth 
could agree with the constructivist, if such is the reading of Rawls.
92
  
                                                          
90
 Thus, for instance, if I go to the trouble of making myself an expert in the domain of food safety 
regulations, then it may be the case that the government does not have legitimate authority over me 
in this area, because obeying government regulations on food safety would not improve my 
conformity with reason.  
91
 Theory of Justice, 16. Italics added. 
92
 It is surprisingly difficult to pin down Rawls’s meta-ethical views – sometimes he seems tempted 
to anti-realism, as when he says things like “…there are no such moral facts to which the principles 
adopted could approximate” (“Kantian Constructivism,” 350.). Elsewhere, and more usually, he 
seems to want to avoid the discussion altogether, which for the purposes of the project of justice, I 
think might be the best available strategy.   
2 
Two Approaches to Reasoning  
in the Public Sphere 
 
What is the mode of reasoning appropriate to the public sphere? This chapter 
traces out how the different approaches to justification taken by Rawls and Raz 
result in two quite different answers to this question. Rawls explicitly addresses this 
question in his work, terming his answer the ideal of public reason. In contrast, Raz 
does not set out to detail his positive view of the type of reasoning appropriate to the 
public sphere. This chapter thus tries to sketch the outlines of a Razian picture of 
what public reasoning might look like.  
In the previous chapter, we saw tests for justifiability which lie in the realm 
of reasons. That is, neither Rawls’s nor Raz’s test for justifiability requires that any 
actual conversation take place between citizens. Rather, the constraints with which 
we emerge from Chapter 1, are restrictions on the reasons one might marshall to 
justify principles of justice or their implementation. They do not require that actual 
citizens, having real conversations, come to any historical agreement on those 
reasons. In contrast, when dealing with the question of the appropriate mode of 
reasoning in the public sphere, we are forced to confront (at least some) actual 
instances of communication between citizens. Because reasoning in the public 
sphere necessarily implicates actual instances of communication among citizens, 
this is where we start to see the two approaches to justification worked out in 
practice. In other words, looking at the question of how we should reason together 
in the public sphere gives us one way to discern the first-order implications of the 
metaphysical disagreement we explored in Chapter 1. 
 
Rawls on public reason 
Rawls tells us that the reason of a political society is its “way of formulating 
its plans, of putting its ends in an order of priority and of making its decisions 
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accordingly”.1 He makes clear that his ideal of public reason has the same basis as 
his principles of justice – both have their roots in his principle of liberal legitimacy, 
which states that our exercise of political power is justifiable only when it is 
exercised in accordance with a constitution which satisfies the “reasonableness 
requirement”, that is, which can be endorsed by reasonable people who do not share 
the same conception of the good.
2
  
In Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness, this means that the parties in the 
original position, “in adopting principles of justice for the basic structure of society, 
must also adopt guidelines and criteria of public reason for applying those norms.” 3 
These guidelines and criteria of public reason are “companion parts” of the same 
political conception, needed to make it complete, since the principles of justice must 
be applied in a manner that does not undermine their justifiability.
4
 Specifically, 
these guidelines and criteria of public reason are “guidelines for public inquiry”; 
“principles of reasoning and rules of evidence in the light of which citizens are to 
decide whether substantive principles properly apply and to identify laws and 
policies that best satisfy them”.5  The same constraints of justifiability (viz., the 
reasonableness requirement) which applied to the choice of the principles of justice, 
also apply to the choice of the guidelines of public reason. Rawls argues that these 
justifiability constraints would result in the parties in the original position choosing 
only “presently accepted general beliefs and forms of reasoning found in common 
sense,”6 and “the methods and conclusions of science when these are not 
controversial”7 to be used in public reasoning. Equally, they would rule out appeal 
to “comprehensive religious and philosophical doctrines”, and to “elaborate 
economic theories of general equilibrium...if these are in dispute”.8  
                                                          
1
 Political Liberalism (Expanded Edition) (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005) 212. 
2
 Political Liberalism, 217. See page 28 of Chapter 1 for the introduction of the reasonableness 
requirement in the context of justifying principles of justice. Specifically for Rawls’s own theory of 
justice as fairness (which he sees as just one in the family of acceptable political conceptions of 
justice), the guidelines and criteria can be shown to be legitimate if the following question can be 
answered in the affirmative: would these be the guidelines and criteria for public reason adopted by 
parties in the original position? (Political Liberalism 225) 
3
 Political Liberalism, 225. 
4
 Political Liberalism, 224-5. 
5
 Political Liberalism, 224. 
6
 Political Liberalism, 224. 
7
 Political Liberalism, 224. 
8
 Political Liberalism, 224-5. 
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Thus it is because we want the exercise of political power within a 
democratic society to be legitimate, that 
 
the ideal of citizenship imposes a moral, not a legal, duty – the duty of 
civility – to be able to explain to one another on those fundamental 
questions how the principles and policies they advocate and vote for 
can be supported by the political values of public reason. This duty 
also involves a willingness to listen to others and a fair-mindedness in 
deciding when accommodations to their views should reasonably be 
made.
9
  
 
On Rawls’s account, practising the ideal of public reason involves citizens 
bracketing those reasons grounded in their comprehensive conceptions of the good, 
and instead conducting their fundamental discussions
10
 within the framework of 
what each regards as a political conception of justice which is based on values that 
the others can reasonably be expected to endorse.
11
 Rawls defines a political 
conception of justice as one which is framed to apply solely to the basic structure, 
presented independently of any wider comprehensive doctrine, and elaborated in 
terms of fundamental political ideas implicit in the public political culture of a 
democratic society.
12
 Moreover, as the quotation above indicates, the ideal of public 
reason also encompasses attitudes such as willingness to listen to others and a fair-
mindedness in deciding when accommodations to their views should reasonably be 
made.
13
  
 In shifting from a comprehensive doctrine of justice in A Theory of Justice to 
a “strictly political conception of justice”14 in Political Liberalism, Rawls is 
                                                          
9
 Political Liberalism, 217. 
10
 Specifically, discussions concerning “constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice” 
(Political Liberalism, 214-215, with the content of constitutional essentials spelt out on 226ff. 
11
 In “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” Rawls adds a proviso to the conception of public reason, 
which states that citizens are allowed to introduce into political discussion at any time their 
comprehensive doctrine, religious or nonreligious, provided that, in due course (viz., within a time 
frame to be worked out in practice), we give properly public reasons to support the principles and 
policies our comprehensive doctrine is said to support. (“The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” in 
Political Liberalism, 453,462.  
12
 Political Liberalism, 223. 
13
 Political Liberalism 217. 
14
 Political Liberalism, xv, xvi. 
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responding to an internal problem within  Theory -  that of congruence.
 15
 The final 
part of Rawls’s argument in Theory involved showing that there was congruence 
between a person’s conception of the good and affirming justice as fairness. In 
doing this, he encountered objections from Nagel and Scheffler
16
 which cast doubt 
on the possibility of congruence – they pressed that the original position was not, in 
fact, neutral between different conceptions of the good, and that the parties in the 
original position were in fact “Kantian people”.17 Rawls’s solution to these 
criticisms, in Political Liberalism, is to maintain that a thick veil of ignorance is 
needed – one that excludes both morally arbitrary information such as social status, 
as well as knowledge of one’s conception of the good,18 so that public justification 
for a society marked by reasonable pluralism may be achieved.
19
 
 
To what sort of society does public reason apply?  
Rawls sees the idea of public reason as being inherent in the idea of 
democracy, driven by the fact that reasonable pluralism is a permanent feature of 
modern democracies.  Democratic citizens desire to use their collective power 
legitimately, and understand that legitimacy requires that coercive power be used 
only according to principles that all could reasonably accept. At the same time, they 
realise that their (reasonable) comprehensive doctrines are irreconcilable, and can 
form no basis for the reasonable agreement that would render the exercise of power 
legitimate. They are therefore concerned with “what kinds of reasons they may 
                                                          
15
 Political Liberalism, xv, xvi. With Rawls, I take it that there is no dramatic shift in his position 
between A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism, as he explicitly states in the Introduction to 
Political Liberalism: “these lectures take the structure and content of Theory to remain substantially 
the same.” Political Liberalism, xvi. 
16
 Thomas Nagel, “Rawls on Justice,” in The Philosophical Review, Vol. 82, No. 2 (Apr., 1973), 220-
234 and Samuel Scheffler, “Moral Independence and the Original Position,” Philosophical Studies: 
An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, Vol. 35, No. 4 (May, 1979), 397-
403. Rawls refers to Scheffler at Political Liberalism, xxxii, and to Nagel in “Fairness to Goodness,” 
in John Rawls: Collected Papers, ed. Samuel Freeman (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 2001) 267. 
17
 This is Scheffler’s term, in “Moral Independence and the Original Position,” 400. 
18
  “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory,” in John Rawls: Collected Papers, 336. See also 
Political Liberalism, 24-25 and fn27. 
19
 Political Liberalism, 24-25, fn27.  
41 
 
reasonably give one another when fundamental political questions are at stake,”20 
and it is this concern that gives rise to the idea of public reason.   
 
To which fundamental questions does public reason apply? 
On the account Rawls offers, the application of public reason is specifically 
restricted to “questions of fundamental political justice”.21 He makes clear that these 
constitute only a subset (and possibly a minority) of all possible political questions 
which might need to be addressed by a democratic society, and clarifies that his is 
not meant to be a full account of public reason. A full account, he says, would take 
up questions outside of constitutional essentials, and explain how they are different 
from the constitutional essentials, and why restrictions imposed by public reason 
may not apply to them, or if they do, not in the same way, or so strictly.
22
  
The fundamental  questions to which public reason applies are of two kinds, 
namely:
23
 
i. Constitutional essentials. These are of two kinds, viz.,  
a. Fundamental principles specifying the general structure of 
government and the political process, e.g. the powers of each 
branch of government, etc.  
b. Equal basic rights and liberties of citizens, e.g. the right to vote 
and participate in politics, liberty of conscience, freedom of 
thought and of association, and protections of the rule of law.
24
   
and
25
 
                                                          
20
 “Public Reason Revisited,” 441, 445. Italics mine – phrases such as that italicised in this quotation 
indicate that Rawls had in mind some actual communication between citizens. 
21
 “Public Reason Revisited,”442. 
22
 Political Liberalism 214-5. In defence of his limited account of public reason, Rawls appears to 
think that so long as public reason is able to help a society come to firm agreement on just the 
fundamental questions, a sufficiently resilient system of social cooperation would be secured, such as 
to withstand  the pressures of having the many other social and economic issues discussed outside of 
the constraints of public reason. Political Liberalism, 230. 
23
 “Public Reason Revisited,”442, Political Liberalism, 214-215. 
24
 Political Liberalism, 227. 
25
 Rawls comments in a footnote (Political Liberalism, 229 footnote 10) that although the difference 
principle and the principle of fair equality of opportunity do not count, on his view, as constitutional 
essentials, they nonetheless remain questions of basic justice, and as such are to be decided by the 
political values of public reason. As far as I can tell, public reason does not prescribe different 
treatment for constitutional essentials compared with matters of basic justice. Rawls seems to make 
the distinction between the two only to point out that constitutional essentials are those matters which 
can be “reasonably included in a written constitution” (see “Public Reason Revisited,”442 footnote 
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ii. Matters of basic justice, which “relate to the basic structure of society, 
and concern questions of basic economic and social justice and other 
things not covered by a constitution.”26  
  
On what occasions, and to whom does public reason apply? 
Which fora? 
 Rawls further specifies
27
 that the idea of public reason does not apply to all 
political discussions of fundamental questions, but only to discussions of these 
questions in the “public political forum”, which is a subset of the public discussion 
as a whole. He divides the public political forum into three parts: 
a. the discourse of judges in their decisions, especially the Supreme Court;  
b. the discourse of government officials, especially chief executives and 
legislators; and  
c. the discourse of candidates for public office and their campaign managers.  
Laying out his taxonomy of the public sphere, Rawls distinguishes the public 
political forum
28
 from the background culture, which is “the culture of civil 
society”29 and which includes the culture of various types of associations such as 
churches, scientific societies, professional schools and universities,
30
 each of which 
would have their own way of reasoning about fundamental political questions. In the 
background culture, Rawls thinks that there should be full and open discussion, free 
of the constraints of public reason.
31
 Mediating between the public political forum 
and the background culture is the media, which Rawls terms the “nonpublic political 
                                                                                                                                                                   
7). He explains that another distinguishing characteristic between constitutional essentials and 
matters of basic justice is that the satisfaction of the former is easier to discern than the latter, and 
thus we can expect more agreement about whether they are realized. (see Political Liberalism 229-
230) 
26
 “Public Reason Revisited,”442 footnote 7. 
27
 He emphasises this distinction as “imperative”. “Public Reason Revisited,”442. 
28
 By “public political forum,” Rawls seems to want to refer to the same thing as what he terms the 
“public political culture of a democratic society” in Political Liberalism Lecture I, §2.3, 13-14, 
which is defined as follows: “This public culture comprises the political institutions of a 
constitutional regime and the public traditions of their interpretation (including those of the 
judiciary), as well as historic texts and documents that are common knowledge.” In Lecture I, the 
public political culture was also contrasted with the background culture.  
29
 “Public Reason Revisited,”443. 
30
 Political Liberalism 215, “Public Reason Revisited,”443. 
31
 “Public Reason Revisited,”444. 
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culture”.32 As in the case of the background culture, Rawls thinks that the media 
should not be subject to the limits of public reason.  
 
Which actors? 
 On Rawls’s account, public reason always applies to officers of the 
government speaking and acting in their official capacities. These would include 
judges, legislators, chief executives and other government officials.
33
 
The question of who is subject to public reason does not always line up 
neatly with his three-fold division of the public political forum, however. On 
Rawls’s account, non-government officers may sometimes stray into the public 
political forum. Thus in addition to government officials, he also counts candidates 
for public office and their campaign managers as falling under the ambit of public 
reason.
34
 Ordinary citizens, too, have the duty of civility, though it is worked out 
somewhat differently from the case of government officials and candidates (for 
whom it affects chiefly their official speech and conduct)
35
. The difference in what 
public reason entails in the various cases seems to be due to how democratic 
systems work – Rawls notes that ordinary citizens are unlikely often to be voting on 
constitutional essentials or matters of basic justice.  
In the case of citizens, adhering to the ideal of public reason involves: 
a. doing what they can to hold government officials to the idea of public 
reason. This involves “repudiat(ing) government officials and candidates 
for public office who violate public reason”.36 
b. On a constitutional essential or matter of basic justice, “think(ing) of 
themselves as if they were legislators and ask(ing) themselves what 
statutes, supported by what reasons satisfying the criterion of reciprocity, 
they would think it most reasonable to enact.”37 
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 “Public Reason Revisited,”444. 
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 “Public Reason Revisited,”444, Political Liberalism 215-6. 
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 “Public Reason Revisited,”443 and footnote 9, Political Liberalism 215. 
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 “Public Reason Revisited,”444, Political Liberalism 252. 
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 “Public Reason Revisited,”445. 
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 “Public Reason Revisited,”444-5, 448, 478. 
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c. On a constitutional essential or matter of basic justice, voting according 
to public reason rather than their own comprehensive doctrine.
38
  
i. Rawls’s argument in Political Liberalism for why public 
reason applies to how citizens vote appeals to the need to 
avoid hypocrisy, since otherwise citizens would be talking 
publicly one way and voting another.
39
 Note that this 
argument assumes that citizens are morally obliged to (d), 
below. 
ii. In “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” his argument 
for citizens voting according to the political values of 
public reason calls on the criterion of reciprocity 
instead.
40
 
d. On a constitutional essential or matter of basic justice, making their case 
before other citizens on the terms of public reason rather than their own 
comprehensive doctrine.
41
  
Conversely, citizens are not required to observe the limits of public reason in 
e. their “personal deliberations and reflections”42 about constitutional 
essentials and matters of basic justice; or 
f. their reasoning about constitutional essentials and matters of basic 
justice as members of associations such as churches and universities. 
Such reasoning, Rawls notes, is a “vital part of the background 
culture”.43  
But there is potential for tension between (b), (c), (d) on the one hand, and (e) and 
(f) on the other, which arises from trying to understand the relationship between a 
reasonable comprehensive doctrine and a reasonable judgement in its related 
political conception. This leads to the question of our next section.
44
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Why should citizens agree to appeal only to a public conception of justice and not to 
the whole truth as they see it?  
Rawls tells us that his proposal of public reason, with its idea of the 
politically reasonable addressed to citizens as citizens, is supposed to replace 
comprehensive doctrines of truth or right as a basis for discussions on fundamental 
matters.
45
 But this replacement proposal naturally gives rise to what Rawls in 
Political Liberalism terms a “paradox”.46 The nature of this paradox becomes clear 
when we consider Rawls’s definition of a comprehensive doctrine. A 
comprehensive doctrine, Rawls tells us, is a moral conception which “includes 
conceptions of what is of value in human life, and ideals of personal character, as 
well as ideals of friendship and of familial and associational relationships, and much 
else that is to inform our conduct, and in the limit to our life as a whole.”47 The 
paradigm case of a comprehensive doctrine is one of the major religions, such as 
Christianity or Islam. But comprehensive doctrines also include non-religious 
doctrines such as utilitarianism, which, like religious doctrines, would encompass 
both political and nonpolitical values and virtues.
48
  Comprehensive doctrines claim 
the authority to determine what is of value and how to conduct oneself in life, 
including in the political arena. Because of this general scope, comprehensive 
doctrines run into conflict with the ideal of public reason, which on Rawls’s 
account, requires that political values, independent of any comprehensive doctrine, 
should be the benchmark for deliberation in the public sphere. Public reason rules as 
irrelevant those reasons belonging to one’s comprehensive doctrine which cannot be 
cast as political reasons. This presents a problem because of the importance of 
comprehensive doctrines to those who hold them, combined with the importance to 
everyone’s life of the political issues which are supposed to be decided by public 
reason. If one considers the case of one of the traditional religions, we can see that 
the tenets of the faith would form the organizing principle for a believer’s life; the 
reasons which, on Rawls’s account of public reason, one is supposed to bracket, 
could very well be same ones that form the core convictions which make sense of 
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one’s life. Equally, the political issues which are to be decided by public reason are 
non-trivial ones – for instance, ones to do with our constitutionally protected 
liberties, which have deep implications for how we live together in society. Rawls 
expresses the paradox as follows: “Surely, the most fundamental questions should 
be settled by appealing to the most important truths, yet these may far transcend 
public reason!” 49 
Rawls’s solution to the paradox is his idea of the overlapping consensus. In 
explaining how the overlapping consensus is supposed to dissolve the paradox, he 
returns to the principle of reciprocity which undergirds legitimacy in a democratic 
regime. Recall that the liberal principle of legitimacy states that our exercise of 
political power is proper and justifiable only when exercised in accordance with a 
constitution the essentials of which all citizens may reasonably be expected to 
endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable and 
rational. Given a commitment to the liberal principle of legitimacy, there is no 
reason why any citizen, or association of citizens, should have the right to use state 
power to decide constitutional essentials as his/their comprehensive doctrine 
directs.
50
 Reasonable comprehensive doctrines, by definition, are those that 
acknowledge and uphold the liberal principle of legitimacy, and thus accept the 
limitations on public reason that follow on from it. Being committed to reciprocity 
means that adherents of reasonable comprehensive doctrines stand ready to offer fair 
terms of social cooperation between equals, and to abide by these terms if others do 
also, even should it be to their advantage not to (for instance, should the balance of 
power in society change).
51
   
The dissolution of the paradox that Rawls envisages comes about when 
citizens affirm the ideal of public reason not as a result of political compromise (as 
in a modus vivendi), but from within their own reasonable doctrines.
52
 Rawls’s claim 
is that “a true judgement in a reasonable comprehensive doctrine never conflicts 
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with a reasonable judgement in its related political conception” (call this the no-
conflict claim).
53
 One example he gives is the Roman Catholic argument for 
rejecting a right to abortion.
54
 This is a case where the Roman Catholic citizen can 
give a public argument against the right to abortion, in a form that accords with the 
constraints of public reason, while knowing that this argument is grounded in 
transcendent values. But because the Roman Catholic faith is a reasonable doctrine 
and can affirm “a constitutional democratic society whose principles, ideals and 
standards satisfy the criterion of reciprocity”,55 the Roman Catholic citizen would 
equally accept that the result of a vote which ends up permitting a right to abortion 
is legitimate law, and that forceful resistance is unreasonable. To illustrate the 
plausibility of his conception of public reason, Rawls gives the example of criminal 
cases, where we do not appeal to the whole truth, but abide by the rules of evidence, 
etc. 
Rawls’s no-conflict claim is critical, because if conflict were to occur 
between a true judgement in a reasonable comprehensive doctrine and a reasonable 
judgement in its related political conception, then commitment to reciprocity would 
mean that the political conception effectively trumps the comprehensive doctrine.  
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 True judgement in a 
reasonable
56
 
comprehensive 
doctrine (a) 
 
Can (a) be cast as an 
argument adhering to 
the demands of 
public reason, viz., as 
a reasonable 
judgement in its 
related political 
conception 
Rawls’s view of how 
the citizen should 
vote, and what the 
duty of civility 
requires (assume a 
vote is called for, 
and that this is a 
constitutional 
essential or matter 
of basic justice) 
“No conflict” 
scenario 
 
YES YES Vote in accordance 
with both. No 
conflict.  
“Conflict” 
scenario 
YES NO 
For instance, a case 
where the 
evidence/reasons are 
wholly based on 
revealed truth, and 
there is no known 
way of making the 
argument in a way 
that accords with the 
strictures of public 
reason 
Vote in accordance 
with public reason, 
which puts one in 
conflict with one’s 
comprehensive 
doctrine.  
 
Consider the second scenario in the table above. Such a “conflict” scenario would 
put citizens in a very difficult position. Either they vote in accordance with public 
reason, which puts them in a conflict of conscience with their grounding beliefs 
(part of their comprehensive doctrine), or else their comprehensive doctrine would 
be classified as “unreasonable” by political liberalism, on the issue in question.57  
Rawls might respond that even in such a “conflict” scenario, the reasonable 
comprehensive doctrine’s affirmation of the constitution would sustain stability -the 
citizen would still be bound to refrain from forceful resistance, because her 
comprehensive doctrine affirms the constitution along with its voting procedures, 
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etc. Yet the citizen’s cognitive attitude here would be one that is divided against 
itself, frustrated in expressing her transcendent beliefs in her political life.  
Perhaps it is in view of these potential cases of conflict between reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines and public reason that Rawls allows for an “inclusive 
view” of public reason.58 The inclusive view of public reason allows citizens, in 
certain situations, to present what they regard as the basis of political values rooted 
in their comprehensive doctrine, provided that they do this in ways that strengthen 
the ideal of public reason itself.
59
  This allows Rawls to classify the abolitionists and 
the leaders of the civil rights movement as on the side of public reason, because on 
reflection they could have given public reasons for their actions, in addition to the 
comprehensive reasons which they in fact cited.
60
  
In “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” Rawls extends the inclusive view, 
by adding what he calls the proviso to the conception of public reason. The proviso 
states that we are allowed to introduce into political discussion at any time our 
comprehensive doctrine, religious or nonreligious, provided that, in due course, we 
give properly public reasons to support the principles and policies our 
comprehensive doctrine is said to support.
61
 The time frame for the proviso to be 
satisfied, Rawls says, must be worked out in practice.
62
 Rawls acknowledges that 
there may be positive reasons for introducing comprehensive doctrines into public 
political discussion
63– for instance, citizens’ mutual knowledge of one another’s 
religious and nonreligious doctrines expressed in the wide view of public political 
culture recognises that the roots of democratic citizens’ allegiance to their political 
conceptions lie in their respective comprehensive doctrines, both religious and 
nonreligious, thus strengthening allegiance to the democratic ideal of public 
reason.
64
 
The addition of the proviso might decrease the cases of conflict between a 
true judgement in a reasonable comprehensive doctrine and a reasonable judgement 
in its related political conception, by giving the adherent of a comprehensive 
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doctrine
65
 more time and room to manoeuvre, but then it gives rise to problems of 
its own. But by allowing reasons grounded reasonable comprehensive doctrines 
‘free entry’, as it were, into the realm of public reason, one might worry that the 
proviso undermines Rawls’s account of public reason, by giving the citizen too 
much leeway to argue from his comprehensive doctrine, to the extent of 
compromising the duty of civility. Or, at the other end of the spectrum, one might 
worry that a strict adherence to the ideal of public reason, without the proviso, could 
undermine trust in fellow citizens, as citizens suspect their compatriots of hiding 
their true reasons behind a cloak of civility.  
 
Raz’s argument against Rawls’s ideal of public reason 
In line with Raz’s rejection of Rawls’s epistemic abstinence, I argue in this 
section that the Razian objection would be to the restricted content of Rawls’s ideal 
of public reason. Rawls’s ideal of public reason calls for epistemic abstinence, 
requiring that explanations that fall under public reason are to be based on only the 
political values of public reason rather than on one’s comprehensive doctrines. In 
contrast, nothing in Raz’s writings indicates that he would have any in-principle 
objection to the form of Rawlsian public reason. By this I mean to refer to Rawls’s 
description of the duty of civility as a democratic virtue, comprising the willingness 
to explain one’s reasons to others, willingness to listen, and fair-mindedness in 
deciding when accommodations to others’ views should reasonably be made.66  
 
The negative argument 
The Razian negative argument against Rawls’s account of public reason is of 
a piece with Raz’s disagreement with Rawls over the correct approach to 
justification. This is unsurprising, given that Rawls clearly states that his account of 
public reason and his principles of justice both have their source in his principle of 
liberal legitimacy,
67
 a principle which Raz would reject. Thus the principal Razian 
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objection against Rawls’s account of public reason would be that it is not needed. 
On Rawls’s account, the need for public reason arises from accepting the principle 
of legitimacy. But if legitimacy has to do with conformity to reason rather than with 
finding reasons which could be reasonably accepted by others, then Rawls’s chief 
argument for the duty of civility is undermined.  
Raz’s secondary charge against public reason would, I think, be that one 
possible
68
 cognitive attitude it presupposes is incoherent, and undermines personal 
well-being. We saw already in Chapter 1 that Raz thinks trying to maintain 
neutrality at the level of metaphysics is incoherent. With regard to the practice of 
public reason, which on Rawls’s account requires a “public point of view” that is 
“impartial... between the points of view of reasonable comprehensive doctrines,”69 
Raz could make a similar sort of argument. In his article “Liberalism, Scepticism, 
and Democracy,”70 Raz has a section entitled “Semi-Scepticism and Neutrality,” 
which I think fits as a depiction of what I have called the “Conflict” scenario in the 
previous section. Here, Raz looks in detail at the epistemic attitude presupposed by 
one conception of reasonable disagreement. This is how he describes it: 
 
Consider an example. John believes in a life of change, variety, and free 
experimentation. Joanna disagrees. She believes that people should be 
loyal to the traditions, tastes, and practices they were brought up on. But 
Joanna regards John’s view as a reasonable one. To be precise, she 
thinks that these are matters over which it is impossible to find 
conclusive arguments either way. John has strong arguments to support 
his view. Though she disagrees with him, she thinks that he is as likely 
to be right as she is. She does not think that anything follows from that 
by itself. But she also believes that all people are entitled to be 
respected. The combination of people’s right to respect with the fact that 
their views on the meaning of life, even those she believes to be wrong, 
are equally likely to be right, implies that they should be left to conduct 
their lives each by his or her own light.  
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Normally the proper reaction to such a situation is to suspend 
belief. If two mutually exclusive views are equally likely to be right, 
then we do not have adequate reason to accept either of them. One may 
argue, however, that given that one has to carry on with the business of 
life (we assume that suicide is not an acceptable option), one is more 
likely to have a good life if guided by some conception of the good than 
by none. Since one has no reason to change from the conception one 
has, it is best to remain faithful to it, even while realising that it is not 
more likely to be correct than the next person’s.  
Is this cognitive attitude logically possible? The difficulty is that 
having a certain belief commits one to disbelieving its contradictory. 
Joanna is supposed to believe in a certain conception of the good but 
also to believe that its contradictory is as likely to be true as it is. To 
assume that one believes a proposition (i.e. believes it to be true while 
one regards it as no more likely to be true than its contradictory is to 
allow a radical rupture between belief and belief that one’s belief is 
justified. This may be logically impossible. The best way to understand 
Joanna’s attitude is to say that she acts as if a certain conception of the 
good is correct, but without believing it to be correct.  
This is an unstable state of mind, full of internal tensions.”71 
 
Note that, given Raz’s account of well-being as the whole-hearted and successful 
pursuit of valuable activities, the problem with the cognitive attitude described 
above is that it undermines well-being, by violating the wholeheartedness condition. 
Wholeheartedness, on Raz’s account, requires the absence of negative attitudes such 
as self-hatred, pathological self-doubt, and alienation from one’s life.72 In the 
scenario described, Joanna’s well-being is undermined because she is unable 
wholeheartedly to identify with her conception of the good, because she seems to be 
forced into holding at the same time the belief that another conception is just as 
likely to be true.  
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Clearly, this is not the cognitive attitude to which Rawls would want his 
theory to entail. After all, the whole point of the overlapping consensus is that it is a 
device to preserve wholeheartedness,
73
 to use Raz’s terminology of well-being – so 
it would be a rich irony if practising public reason resulted in the alienation of the 
citizen from her conception of the good.  
So what could Rawls say about Joanna, assuming that we take her as an 
example of a citizen of a well-ordered society trying to adhere to the ideal of public 
reason? In order to give the example some bite, let us assume that the set-up of this 
description is a prelude to a vote that Joanna is preparing to make on a constitutional 
essential that would have impact on John’s freedom to live out his conception of the 
good. We might begin by observing that Rawls’s account of public reason is 
compatible on many points with Raz’s description of Joanna. Rawlsian public 
reason would happily accommodate Joanna’s classification of John’s conception of 
the good as “reasonable”, although she disagrees. On Rawls’s account, this would 
mean that Joanna grasps the distinction between truth, which is singular, and 
reasonableness, which is plural. Joanna’s thinking that “these are matters over which 
it is impossible to find conclusive arguments either way” is, on Rawls’s terms, an 
acknowledgement of the burdens of judgement. Rawlsian public reason is also 
entirely compatible with Joanna’s belief that all people are entitled to respect. To 
put this in Rawlsian terms, Joanna would be demonstrating her understanding of the 
notion of “equality” implicit in the public culture of her society.  
The point at which Rawls could, I think, seek to resist Raz’s description of 
Joanna’s cognitive attitude is where Raz describes Joanna as believing that John’s 
conception of the good is as likely to be true as her own. Rawls could deny that 
accepting the burdens of judgement entails this step. What he might want to say 
instead, is this: The burdens of judgement put limits on is what Joanna considers 
reasonably justifiable to John. As far as judgements of truth go, however, Joanna is 
free to judge John’s conception of the good however her own beliefs lead her. For 
instance, she could quite reasonably believe that, based on her own individual 
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experience, her way of life is the true one, and John’s is false, and that he would be 
better off following her conception of the good.  
But these judgements are ruled out for use as relevant reasons in the public 
sphere, because they could not be reasonably endorsed by John. At this point, the 
principle of liberal legitimacy kicks in. Joanna, from within her own conception of 
the good, is committed to the principle of liberal legitimacy (in keeping with the 
scenario as described by Raz, she might believe that this principle has a long and 
venerable tradition in her society which should be respected), and accepts that the 
principle sets limits on how she makes use of her vote to exercise coercive power 
over fellow citizens.  
Thus the commitment to the principle of liberal legitimacy effectively rules 
out some of what Joanna considers true judgements (e.g., “John’s conception of the 
good is false, and he would be better off following my way of life”). Since Joanna 
cannot find an argument that John could reasonably accept, she should therefore not 
make use of the coercive force of law to compel him to give up his way of life, or to 
make its practice harder.  
This description of Joanna, unlike Raz’s original one, seems much more 
plausible. But Raz is right about it being “full of internal tensions”.74 Joanna’s 
conception of the good gives rise to two conflicting prescriptions. On one hand, the 
judgement that John’s conception of the good is false, and he would be better off 
following Joanna’s way of life, might give rise to the conclusion that he should 
therefore be encouraged, including using legal sanctions, to abandon his way of life. 
On the other hand, Joanna’s commitment to the principle of liberal legitimacy is 
forbidding her to draw that practical conclusion in her decision on which way to 
vote. Notice the critical role of the principle of liberal legitimacy in this scenario. It 
plays the role of a trumping argument, a sort of higher-order policy, in Joanna’s 
practical reasoning.  
Rawls gives two considerations for why this trumping takes place.
75
 First, he 
tells us that “the values of the political are very great values and hence not easily 
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overridden”76 – they govern the basic framework of our social life together.77 The 
idea is that, these political values, like the virtues of reasonableness and fairness, 
constitute the conditions that make fair social cooperation possible,
78
 so other values 
which conflict with them tend to be outweighed. Second, he points to history as 
demonstrating that reasonable comprehensive doctrines are such as to make an 
overlapping consensus possible. Specifically, this is because there is enough 
“slippage”79 in most comprehensive views to allow them to cohere with liberal 
principles of justice. This in turn means that severe conflicts between political and 
other values are much reduced.  
 
Raz’s positive picture 
For the sake of argument, take it that we accept Raz’s approach to 
justification, and hence accept that political legitimacy does not result in a moral 
duty to practise public reason. Still, one might ask – what is Raz’s positive account 
of how a society is supposed to deal with reasonable disagreement? At the very 
least, Rawls’s account of public reason offers guidelines for how citizens could 
learn to speak to one another in terms of mutual respect. What does Raz propose 
instead? 
One key difference in the thinking of Raz and Rawls, which in turn shapes 
their conception of the appropriate mode of reasoning in the public sphere, is that 
for Raz, there is no partition between the political and the rest of morality. This 
means that when arguing for and deciding on public policies, there is no higher-
level filter operating to rule out certain reasons as inadmissible for public debate 
because they cannot reasonably be endorsed by other citizens. Raz’s view of what is 
appropriate to reasoning in the public sphere falls out of this picture:  
 
(T)he true grounds of [political] decisions...are considerations of what 
does and what does not contribute to people’s well-being, which options 
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and what aspects of the common culture are valuable and to be 
encouraged and which are ignoble and to be discouraged. No value 
judgements are discounted. In voting for political measures one gives 
full weight to all one’s beliefs. The idea that I should apply my beliefs 
about the good life to the conduct of my own life, but not to public 
policies which affect the fortunes of others, does not find any support in 
the arguments we have canvassed.
80
 
 
To what sort of society does this approach apply?  
Because Raz’s account of legitimacy, unlike Rawls’s theory of justice, is not 
meant to apply only to constitutional democracies, a Razian account of the right way 
to reason in the public sphere also is not limited to democratic societies, but rather is 
applicable to any society for which the question arises. 
 
The content of public reasoning 
Instead of a family of political conceptions of justice being the content of 
public reason, for Raz, well-being is both the substance and the goal of reasoning in 
the public sphere. Having looked in the previous section at the potential for internal 
tensions in the “conflict” scenarios on Rawls’s account of public reason, the 
immediate appeal of the Razian picture is that there is no inherent potential for 
conflict. A citizen’s reasons might pull in different directions (a familiar feature of 
any sort of reasoning), but on Raz’s picture there is no structural reason for tension 
to arise within the cognitive attitude of a citizen, because all of one’s beliefs about 
what well-being consists in come into play when one reasons in the public domain.  
 
Who should take part in public reasoning 
 It is significant that for Raz, the government is as much a party to this no-
holds-barred public debate about well-being as any citizen. On his account, the 
government is not meant to just ‘hold the ring’, but rather must act to protect and 
promote citizens’ well-being, by acting on its conviction of what that is. Raz himself 
starts the ball rolling by proposing a conception on well-being on which he thinks 
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government should be based. In his autonomy-based account of well-being, he 
fleshes out in detail what well-being consists of, and the resulting duties that 
government and citizens have to (fellow) citizens.  
At the same time, Raz addresses head-on the two fears that this picture of 
no-holds-barred debate might give rise to.
81
 The first fear is that the government 
taking a stand on well-being will lead to “a government fired by ideals trying to 
reshape people for their own good and imposing a uniform pattern on life on all”; 
the second is the “fear of a bureaucratic, dogmatic, insensitive, and inefficient big 
brother trying to lead our lives for us”. Raz’s answer to these two fears, in a 
nutshell, is to say that “(a)utonomy...is incompatible with any vision of morality 
being thrust down people’s throats.” 82 In addition, autonomy grounds the harm 
principle, which provides principled limits to when the government can infringe 
upon individuals’ autonomy.83  
As for how Raz’s picture deals with the problem of reasonable disagreement, 
there are a couple of things to say. First, if the worry about reasonable disagreement 
is to do with the fear that disagreement renders a regime illegitimate, then Raz’s 
normal justification thesis (NJT)
84
 contains a separate argument for legitimacy 
which does not require agreement of any kind, but rather conformity to reason. 
Second, if the worry is anarchy, and the annihilation of ways of life because people 
disagree, then Raz’s solution is strong value pluralism, which gives him a principled 
basis for toleration. Strong value pluralism holds that there are many ways of life 
which are both incompatible and valuable. Because ways of life are incompatible, 
they are inevitably going to come into conflict with one another. To return to the 
example of Joanna, it is an intrinsic part of holding to her conception of the good of 
upholding traditional practices – that she must reject John’s way of life (that of 
change, variety, and free experimentation). This is why Raz is not overly troubled 
by the presence of conflict, in contrast to Rawls, for whom disagreement raises the 
spectre of illegitimacy. Furthermore, strong value pluralism also holds the solution 
to this inevitable conflict. Because different ways of life are valuable, a principle of 
toleration is needed.  The principle of toleration regulates collective life, ensuring 
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that different valuable ways of life can flourish in society. I will discuss the 
derivation of the principle of toleration in more detail in Chapter 6.  
 
The form of public debate 
A final reservation about the Razian account might be that the conversation 
we imagine is of something resembling a fishmarket, where voices shout across the 
room, trying to drown out other voices without real engagement in conversation. 
Raz could, I think, reject this picture. Raz could acknowledge that allowing 
everyone to marshall the whole complement of their beliefs in engaging in public 
debate makes for a messier conversation than that which Rawls envisages.
85
 But 
messiness does not rule out engagement with reason.  
I think Raz might point out that there are natural forces within the democratic 
process which would help to regulate the discussion. Given that the public debate is 
supposed to be about society’s understanding of well-being and what it consists in, a 
key objective would be to persuade others to come round to one’s way of thinking 
about well-being. This may well involve trying to find ways of arguing one’s case 
that are able to appeal to shared premises.  
Also, nothing in Raz’s theory rules out the other attractive aspects of Rawls’s 
duty of civility, such as the willingness to listen to others, or fair-mindedness in 
deciding when accommodations to others’ views should reasonably be made.86 
Indeed, Raz’s comments on the appropriate attitude of critical rationality points 
squarely in the direction of reasoned debate à la Rawls. He says:  
 
Recognition that fallibility is part of the conditions of ordinary 
knowledge underpins the attitude of critical rationality. It includes 
realisation of the corrigibility and revisability of all ordinary beliefs, 
precisely because of our fallibility, and a readiness to re-examine our 
beliefs as necessary. Critical rationality has political implications. Its 
desirability argues for political institutions which adopt that attitude, and 
                                                          
85
 That is, without the proviso at work. It is not clear that, with the proviso, Rawls’s picture is any 
neater than Raz’s. 
86
 Political Liberalism 217. 
59 
 
which allow adequate opportunities for periodic re-evaluation of public 
policies.
87
  
 
The sort of recognition of fallibility which leads to re-examine our beliefs as 
necessary would, one imagines, be conducive to the give-and-take of honest 
debate in the public sphere.  
 
So what?  
Having taken a quick tour of these two approaches to reasoning in the public 
sphere, one might ask, what hangs on the different views of the appropriate mode of 
reasoning in the public sphere? Consider the following two quotations, which 
provide some indication of how Rawls and Raz respectively regard the significance 
of this debate: 
 
Rawls: 
The answer we give to the question of whether a just democratic society 
is possible and can be stable for the right reasons affects our background 
thoughts and attitudes about the world as a whole....will shape the 
underlying attitudes of the public culture and the conduct of politics. If 
we take for granted as common knowledge that a just and well-ordered 
democratic society is impossible, then the quality and tone of those 
attitudes will reflect that knowledge.
88
  
 
Raz:  
Fear of uniformity and of the denial of individual autonomy has led 
many liberal writers to insist that the state should have nothing to do 
with the promotion of ideals of the good life. This in turn has led to the 
impoverishment of their understanding of human flourishing and of the 
relations between individual well-being and a common culture. Instead, 
one should denounce the rejection of autonomy and the embracing of 
uniformity as misguided conceptions of individual well-being. Only 
through a conception of well-being based on autonomy and value 
pluralism can we restore the true perspective of the role of morality in 
politics.
89
  
                                                          
87
 “Liberalism, Scepticism, and Democracy,” 101. Italics added. 
88
 Political Liberalism, Introduction to the Paperback Edition, lix. Italics added. 
89
 “Liberalism, Scepticism, and Democracy,” 118. Italics added. 
60 
 
 
Rawls seems to be hinting that the consequence of giving up on agreement for 
the right reasons, symbolically expressed in a commitment to practise public 
reason, is the risk that our society collapses into an unprincipled struggle for 
power. For Raz, on the other hand, Rawls’s approach – to justification and to 
public reason – entails giving up the rightful place of morality in political 
matters. He is arguing, in effect, that if we let Rawls convince us to carve out 
the political sphere as freestanding, we thereby do violence to our 
understanding of the proper role of morality. 
Where Rawls and Raz agree, is that what is at stake in this issue of 
how to reason in the public sphere, is our common understanding of the public 
culture. Specifically, what is at stake is society’s shared conception about 
what it is right for people to argue about. Do we see the most important public 
debates about fundamental questions as a very specifically defined debate over 
political conceptions, with clear rules of engagement where only a specified 
class of relevant reasons are admissible? Or do we plump for a wider and 
messier debate, where all our “baggage” of beliefs is let into the fray and we 
argue about morality as of a piece with politics?  
3 
The Overlapping Consensus and  
Shared Intention 
 
This chapter looks at two aspects of Rawlsian political justification, as 
modelled in the original position and the overlapping consensus. Using Michael 
Bratman’s intention-based theory of shared agency,1 I argue that the overlapping 
consensus is best understood in terms of the practical matter of living together in a 
political community. The chapter ends with a puzzle about why Rawls thinks 
justification intrinsically requires the sharing of reasons, given that the intention 
model satisfies the functions Rawls wants the overlapping consensus to play.  
 
The original position and political conceptions  
As we have seen already in Chapter 1, justification, on Rawls’s account, 
requires that reasons be shared. The original position isolates those reasons which 
are relevant to generating fair terms of social cooperation. This ‘sifting’ of reasons 
is achieved by means of the veil of ignorance, which removes distorting 
considerations such as knowledge of one’s social and economic position inside 
one’s society, thus ruling out inadmissible reasons and arriving at fair conditions 
under which to derive principles of justice.
2
 Rawls says that the original position 
models “what we regard as acceptable restrictions on reasons available to the parties 
for favouring one political conception of justice over another”.3 The original 
position does not merely sift out relevant reasons, however; it also ensures that the 
reasons arrived at in the original position are shared by the parties – Rawls tells us 
that the reasoning of each party behind the veil of ignorance is the same as any 
other.
4
 He says: 
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it is clear that since the differences among the parties are unknown to 
them, and everyone is equally rational and similarly situated, each is 
convinced by the same arguments. Therefore, we can view the 
agreement in the original position from the standpoint of one person at 
random.
5
 
 
The fact that the reasons in the original position are shared is crucial to Rawls’s 
project of justifying his theory of justice. It is because the reasons are shared that the 
principles of justice pass Rawls’s “reasonableness requirement” of justifiability, 
viz., the candidate principles are capable of being endorsed by reasonable people 
who do not share your conception of the good.
6
 
In Political Liberalism, where Rawls sets himself the task of explaining how 
a just and stable society is possible, given that citizens remain profoundly divided 
by reasonable religious, philosophical and moral doctrines,
7
 the picture of 
justification becomes somewhat more complicated.
8
 Because of the casting of the 
problem in terms of reasonable pluralism, the sifting of reasons modelled in the 
original position needs to be repeated for each reasonable person in that society. 
This is the process by which citizens, who hold a variety of different reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines,
9
 formulate political conceptions of justice. Political 
conceptions of justice have three features – their principles apply to society’s basic 
structure; they can be presented independently from comprehensive doctrines of any 
kind; and they can be worked out from fundamental ideas implicit in the public 
political culture of a constitutional democracy, such as the conception of the citizen 
                                                                                                                                                                   
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999) 121, Chapter III, “The Original Position,” §24, 
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as free and equal, and of society as a fair scheme of cooperation.
10
 Political 
conceptions are thus ‘modules’11 that fit into and can be supported by various 
reasonable doctrines, though they are presented without referring to their connected 
comprehensive doctrines.  
What pushes citizens to formulate political conceptions? Rawls gives two 
sorts of answer to this question – one normative, and the second, pragmatic.  
The first, normative, answer, is that reciprocity requires that reasons be 
shareable. This goes to the heart of Rawls’s understanding of the reasonable person 
– the reasonable person is ready to propose, and willingly to abide by, principles 
that specify fair terms of cooperation, if they are assured that others will likewise 
comply. Crucially, the reasonable person believes that principles specifying fair 
terms of cooperation are those that are “reasonable for everyone to accept and 
therefore... justifiable to them”.12 That is, the reasonable person accepts the criterion 
of reciprocity, or as I have termed it, the reasonableness requirement on 
justification. Political conceptions meet the criterion of reciprocity because political 
conceptions, by their nature, are expressive of reasons that you think others who are 
free and equal citizens might reasonably endorse along with you.
13
 Rawls’s picture 
of public reason in a well-ordered society is that of citizens appealing to political 
conceptions when debating fundamental questions. He says that “the limiting feature 
of these forms [of public reason] is the criterion of reciprocity”.14 Rawls presents the 
original position as just one way to identify reasons which meet this criterion of 
reciprocity; he does not rule out the possibility that there might be other means to 
the same end.
15
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The second, pragmatic, reason for formulating political conceptions can be 
found in Rawls’s narrative of how a constitutional consensus might become an 
overlapping consensus over time. Rawls starts by imagining a constitutional 
consensus arising as a modus vivendi. A constitutional consensus exists when a 
society has a constitution establishing electoral procedures for dealing with political 
rivalry, and there is agreement on certain basic political rights and liberties 
necessary for democratic procedures to take place, but where there is still 
disagreement as to the precise content and contours of the scheme of rights and 
liberties.
16
 He then says that because political groups must enter the public forum to 
try to persuade others who do not share their comprehensive views to back their 
preferred policies, they will be led to formulate political conceptions of justice 
which function as the “common currency of discussion” between disparate groups.17  
That is, the pragmatic pressures for an overlapping consensus are constituted by the 
need to persuade others to one’s point of view, as part of the democratic process of 
decision-making. 
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The overlapping consensus 
With the different political conceptions and their associated, potentially 
shareable reasons in place, there is another sifting of reasons, which results in the 
overlapping consensus. As the name indicates, Rawls thinks that that which will 
yield the family of political conceptions to regulate a constitutional democracy will 
be constituted by the area of overlap of citizens’ political conceptions (see diagram 
above). Specifically, the focus of the overlapping consensus is “a class of liberal 
conceptions that vary within a certain more or less narrow range,”18 determined by 
the range of views that can be plausibly elaborated from the fundamental ideas of 
person and society.
19
 Rawls considers it a necessary condition for an adequate 
political conception of justice for a society that it can gain the allegiance of 
reasonable citizens who affirm reasonable comprehensive doctrines, i.e., that it is 
able to win the support of a reasonable overlapping consensus within that society.
20
 
Again, the reasoning behind this goes back to Rawls’s conception of what justifying 
a conception of justice requires. What Rawls is after is a political conception of 
justice capable of serving as a “public basis of justification”.21 Given the persistence 
of a diverse set of reasonable but irreconcilable doctrines, however (the fact of 
reasonable pluralism), and given that imposing (by force) any one comprehensive 
doctrine is off the table, Rawls thinks that “an enduring and secure democratic 
regime” can only exist when it is regulated by a family of conceptions of justice 
which form the focus of an overlapping consensus.
22
 For now, focus on the role of 
the overlapping consensus in justification.  
Here is Rawls’s description of successful public justification of a political 
conception by a political society: 
 
Public justification happens when all the reasonable members of 
political society carry out a justification of the shared political 
conception by embedding it in their several reasonable comprehensive 
views. In this case, reasonable citizens take one another into account as 
having reasonable comprehensive doctrines that endorse that political 
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conception, and this mutual accounting shapes the moral quality of the 
public culture of political society. A crucial point here is that while the 
public justification of the political conception for political society 
depends on reasonable comprehensive doctrines, this justification does 
so only in an indirect way. That is, the express contents of these 
doctrines have no normative role in public justification; citizens do not 
look into the content of others’ doctrines, and so remain within the 
bounds of the political. Rather, they take into account and give some 
weight to only the fact – the existence – of the reasonable overlapping 
consensus itself.
23
 
 
Given that each citizen affirms both a political conception and a comprehensive 
doctrine to start with,
24
 the process of public justification would involve the 
individual citizens engaging in the process of reflective equilibrium for themselves, 
since the shared political conception of the society may not be identical with their 
own starting political conception.
25
 Thus Rawls describes this process of coming to 
the “common ground” of the “shared political conception” as “general and wide 
reflective equilibrium”.26 The focus of the overlapping consensus, then, would 
exclude some parts of various individuals’ initial political conceptions and their 
supporting reasons. That is, the overlapping consensus would exclude even some of 
those reasons that already met the criterion of reciprocity.  
 
Focussing on the overlap 
It is clear that the subset of reasons picked out by the overlapping consensus 
has a special status, for Rawls.  But what is special about them? In particular, are the 
reasons represented by the overlapping consensus special because they are shared 
by reasonable citizens? Or is it the other way round - are these reasons shared 
because they are special?  
At one level, Rawls is fairly clear - it is the former. Consider the passage on 
public justification quoted above. Rawls says explicitly that “the express contents of 
these doctrines have no normative role in public justification” – the important thing 
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is the fact of, the existence of, the overlapping consensus – in short, that it is shared. 
On the other hand, we are also told in the same passage that public justification 
depends “in an indirect way” on the content of citizens’ comprehensive doctrines 
being reasonable.   
In this section, I wish to attempt to explain why it is the case that we should 
choose the first option (viz., that the reasons represented by the overlapping 
consensus are special because they are shared). Specifically, I argue that the most 
helpful way of conceiving of Rawls’s overlapping consensus is by considering its 
role in the practical matter of living together as a political community.  
Consider it this way. Instead of thinking of the overlapping consensus as a 
special sub-set of shared reasons with particular justificatory significance (a 
common reading of Rawls’s view), think of it as representing a Bratman-style 
shared intention
27
 instead. This suggestion places the emphasis on figuring out the 
practical matter of getting along together, rather than on the sharing of reasons.  
To see how this would work, let us start a step before the overlapping 
consensus, where Rawls himself starts. In the remainder of this section, I try to show 
that a Rawlsian constitutional consensus is a near perfect fit for a Bratman-style 
shared intention/policy. 
In a constitutional consensus, there is, plausibly, already a shared 
cooperative activity in place.
28
 The shared cooperative activity citizens would be 
engaged in is something like “living in a political society together”. This 
characterisation of the state appears to be in line with what Rawls calls the 
“fundamental idea” of “society as a fair system of cooperation over time”.29  
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In such a context of shared cooperative activity, the constitutional consensus 
would be a shared policy about weights regulating the deliberation of the political 
society in question. On Bratman’s account, shared policies about weights are 
general intentions in favour of giving weight to certain considerations
30
 (or in 
favour of discounting certain considerations)
31
 which are public, interlocking and 
inter-dependent, and which normally extend over time rather than only being 
applicable to a one-off action.
32
 Some examples Bratman gives of such shared 
policies include – an admissions committee having a shared policy of giving weight 
to legacy considerations in its admissions decisions; a group building a house 
together, who deliberate about sub-plans in a way that reflects their shared policy of 
giving weight to specified standards of earthquake safety; a gang having a shared 
policy of giving weight to terrorizing the local population.
33
 Having shared policies 
about weights helps unite a group in the face of divergent opinions concerning 
particular courses of action,
34
 and provides a stable common framework for the 
group’s thought and action.35  
On a Bratman-style account, the content of the shared policy represented by 
the constitutional consensus would involve giving weight to democratic electoral 
procedures, including basic political rights and liberties including the right to vote, 
to free political speech and association as well as other substantive political rights 
required for running a democracy.
36
 Such shared policies help us coordinate our 
lives together so that we can be said to be participating in a shared activity – in this 
case, living together in a democratic society. Having a shared policy about weights 
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defines the identity of the group, making it possible to explain what ‘we’ as a polity 
stand for, without positing a metaphysically mysterious corporate body.
37
 
Bratman’s account of how a shared policy about weights might come about 
looks very similar to Rawls’s account of how a constitutional consensus might 
evolve (see Rawls’s account of the historical emergence of the principle of religious 
toleration
38
 as an example of how pragmatic pressures might lead to a constitutional 
consensus, or, in Bratman’s terms, to the acceptance of a shared policy in favour of 
giving weight to religious toleration). 
 
From constitutional consensus to overlapping consensus: comparing the two 
approaches   
So far, we have seen that Bratman’s account of shared policies about weights 
seems to fit neatly into Rawls’s description of a constitutional consensus. The next 
question to ask is this: given a constitutional consensus, why does Rawls think that 
an overlapping consensus is still needed? Further, can the overlapping consensus, 
too, be described as a shared policy about weights? 
An important difference between conceiving of the overlapping consensus as 
a shared policy about weights rather than thinking of it as a set of shared reasons, is 
that on the shared policy view, there is no restriction on the sort of reasons people 
may bring to the shared intention
39
 (though even on the Bratman account citizens 
would need, minimally, some sort of pro-judgement in favour of the shared political 
conception of justice). Bratman’s shared intention view does not require, as Rawls 
does, that the affirmation of the political conception of justice at the heart of the 
overlapping consensus be affirmed on moral grounds.
40
 Rather, that which gives rise 
to shared policies on weights are simply practical pressures for interpersonal 
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convergence on modes of shared reasoning,
41
 against the backdrop of what is 
possible.
42
  
In making the case for the need to move from constitutional consensus to 
overlapping consensus, Rawls argues that a constitutional consensus would be 
unstable. His first set of arguments for moving from the constitutional consensus to 
the overlapping consensus has to do with the depth of the overlapping consensus. 
The overlapping consensus, according to Rawls, requires agreement deep enough to 
reach such fundamental ideas as those of society as a fair system of cooperation and 
of citizens as reasonable, rational, free and equal.
43
 Rawls thinks that a 
constitutional consensus, where such fundamental ideas are not shared, is unstable 
because it is too shallow. The shallowness of a constitutional consensus results in 
three lacunae, all of which push the society towards overlapping consensus. Rawls 
claims: 
(a) A constitutional consensus lacks a “common currency of discussion”. 
The society in question is a democracy, committed to democratic 
procedures. Groups within the society thus need other citizens who do 
not share their comprehensive doctrine to be persuaded of their preferred 
policies in order to put together a majority and successfully implement 
their preferred policies. This moves groups to formulate political 
conceptions of justice, which are underpinned by reasons which other 
citizens who have divergent comprehensive doctrines can share.  
(b) Linked to (a), a society with a constitutional consensus “lacks the 
conceptual resources to guide how the constitution should be amended 
and interpreted.”44 Rawls cites the example of the Reconstruction 
amendments to the US Constitution following the Civil War as an 
example of how competing groups were forced to go deeper in their 
search for a shared basis for amending the Constitution. He describes this 
as follows “Debate over those and other fundamental amendments forced 
competing groups to work out political conceptions that contained 
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fundamental ideas in the light of which the constitution as so far 
understood could be changed”.45 
(c) In a constitutional consensus which has some form of judicial review, 
those doing the reviewing would not have “a reasonable basis for their 
interpretation of the values and standards the constitution ostensibly 
incorporates”.46 This would push them to develop a political conception 
of justice according to which they would interpret the constitution and 
decide cases.
47
  
(a), (b) and (c) have in common the assumption that only shared reasons can serve 
as the benchmark for societal decision-making about important matters concerning 
how to live together.  
Rawls’s second set of arguments for the movement to the overlapping 
consensus has to do with breadth. He thinks that a constitutional consensus will be 
too narrow, because it is “purely political and procedural”.48 He therefore predicts 
that this will lead to conflict regarding the remaining constitutional essentials and 
basic matters of justice which are not covered by the constitutional consensus. The 
argument seems to be that, because the society with only a constitutional consensus 
is insufficiently “unified and cohesive”, it will not be able to enact the legislation 
that will plug these gaps. This lack will push groups in that society to develop 
broader political conceptions which cover the basic structure as a whole, which both 
builds the requisite unity (because it involves constructing a set of shareable 
reasons), and which is a key first step towards an overlapping consensus.
49
  
In response to Rawls’s arguments from depth and from breadth, we can 
question the truth of his assumption that only shared reasons will serve the twin 
purposes of serving as the standard for societal decision-making about how to live 
together, and sufficiently unite society to address conflicting claims regarding 
constitutional essentials and basic matters of justice which are not addressed by a 
constitutional consensus. Specifically, I want to ask the question: can a set of 
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Bratman-style shared policies fulfil the purposes which Rawls thinks only an 
overlapping consensus of shared reasons succeeds in addressing? 
Suppose we are in a constitutional consensus. For the sake of argument, 
regard the constitutional consensus as a set of shared policies to give weight to 
democratic procedures and protected rights. 
Consider first Rawls’s ‘depth’ arguments for the overlapping consensus. 
Instead of constructing a “common currency of discussion” out of shared (political) 
reasons, one might imagine the constitutional consensus (understood as a set of 
shared policies to give weight to democratic procedures and protected rights) as 
being extended to include a commitment to exclude evaluative judgements about the 
right and the good.
50
 To take one of Rawls’s favourite examples, a train of historical 
events such as the European religious wars of the 16
th
 and 17
th
 centuries might well 
lead to practical convergence on such a policy, which rather than being about 
sharing reasons, is much more focused on the practical necessity of getting along as 
a society without bloodshed.  
As for Rawls’s claim (b), that a constitutional consensus, because of its 
shallowness, will lack the conceptual resources to (re-)interpret the constitution, the 
key question here is whether a shared policy about weights may successfully be 
extended. Rawls’s own solution to the problem is to work out shared reasons based 
on fundamental ideas in the public culture. We can accept that this is one way to 
arrive at a further agreement concerning what should have weight within the context 
of shared deliberation, without admitting that it is the only way for this to happen. 
Whether this sort of agreement on substantive reasons which Rawls describes is 
feasible will depend on the historical circumstances of the society in question. Take 
his example of the Reconstruction amendments to the US Constitution following the 
Civil War. In a nutshell, Rawls’s take on how these amendments came into being is 
that political groups with divergent comprehensive views were forced to look deeper 
for shared ideas of society and persons in the light of which the Constitution could 
be amended. The amendments were thus supported by shared reasons – in this case, 
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based on the value judgement that ethnic extraction should not be a relevant factor 
in determining citizenship. Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that this is this 
is the correct account of history. Even so, it is entirely possible to imagine that 
America might have come to the Reconstruction Amendments by way of a modus 
vivendi instead
51
 - particularly if the Civil War had lasted for longer than the four 
years it did. Similarly with judicial review (c), there may be agreement on hard 
cases even if judges do not agree on the reasons for their judgement.
52
 
On Bratman’s account, what is essential to continuing to engage in shared 
cooperative activity is only the acceptance of shared policies on weights. While 
having shared reasons for that acceptance might prove an advantage in settling 
disputes on hard cases, the bare fact of sharing a policy on weights will already 
satisfy the demand to get along together, and there is nothing to stop such policies 
on weights from being extended to cover different substantive areas of concern.  
Thus far, considering the overlapping consensus as a Bratman-style set of 
shared policies on weights seems to allow us to achieve all the same functions 
served by Rawls’s account, but without the need for the sharing of reasons.  
Firstly, the shared intention narrative allows us to explain the role of the 
overlapping consensus in getting on with the practical task of living together, and 
choosing principles/policies by which to govern our lives together.  
Secondly, the intention-based account models a non-moralised form of 
reciprocity. Sharing policies about weights effectively gives us rules which allow 
citizens to demonstrate reciprocity, while diverging on the reasons they have.
53
 One 
aspect of reciprocity is a doing-likewise to others. This is reflected in the 
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 Such a story could be told in much the same way as Rawls tells the story of the European wars of 
religion ending in a consensus about toleration - sheer weariness of devastating civil conflict leading 
to a consensus that allows disparate groups to coexist peacefully. 
52
 Bratman refers to a Cass Sunstein article on incompletely theorized agreements, fn305 on 191, 
Chapter 7. Cass R. Sunstein, “Incompletely Theorised Agreements,” 108 Harvard Law Review 1733, 
1994-1995. 
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 Bratman 183,  where he notes the importance of modelling forms of shared agency and 
deliberation that do not require convergence in belief or judgement. Bratman (fn 292)  refers to an 
unpublished manuscript by Blain Neufeld, which touches on the same idea. See also Sunstein 1741, 
fn23, where she quotes Raz, Morality of Freedom, 58, where he says, “[T]he practice [of proceeding 
through the mediation of rules] allows the creation of a pluralistic culture. For it enables people to 
unite in support of some ‘low or medium level’ generalisations despite profound disagreements 
concerning their ultimate foundations, which some seek in religion, others in Marxism or Liberalism, 
etc.” 
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interdependence of shared intention. Take, for instance, the example of sharing a 
commitment to giving weight to a principle of toleration. This would only be 
feasible if I knew that others shared this commitment.
54
 So my intention to give 
weight to toleration depends on your intention to similarly weight the same. Another 
aspect of reciprocity is an acknowledgement of the other(s) as (an) intentional 
agent(s). This, too, is modelled in the structure of shared intention, which does not 
simply treat others with whom we engage in shared activity as objects in the world 
which need to be accounted for, but also as intentional agents who are partners in a 
shared activity.
55
 This is seen in the way it matters, for shared intention, that we 
intend for the shared policy to function via one another’s intention.56 To pick up on 
the toleration example, in intending a policy of toleration, we would be intending for 
a principle of toleration to be worked out through the intentional activity of others 
committed to the same principle.  
Notice also that while the intention account does not require it,
57
 mutual 
respect is also not precluded by this view. One of Bratman’s examples is that of an 
academic department with a shared commitment to giving weight to collegiality in 
making new faculty appointments.
58
 This shared commitment does not require 
agreement in judgements about what makes a good department. Conceivably, some 
members of the department might think that collegiality ranks quite low on the 
criteria for hiring, and that the quality and originality of a candidate’s research work 
should be the deciding factor for new hires. Moreover, this disagreement can be out 
in the open, without undermining the shared policy. Disagreement notwithstanding, 
members of the department can both share a policy about how to weight collegiality 
in making hiring decisions, and respect one another as people.  
We had started the previous section (“Focussing on the overlap”) puzzling 
about the subset of reasons picked out by the overlapping consensus, asking the 
question of whether these reasons were special because they are shared by 
reasonable citizens, or whether they were shared because they are special. The 
foregoing exploration of the overlapping consensus via Bratman’s shared intention 
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 Bratman, 91. This is what Bratman calls feasibility-based persistence interdependence. 
55
 Bratman, 65. 
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 Bratman, 67. This feature of shared intention, Bratman calls “interlocking”. 
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 One might imagine chess masters who in fact despise each other engaged in a chess game together.  
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 Bratman, 175-6. 
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narrative reveals that the significance of the overlapping consensus is in its being 
shared; the most helpful way to understand the overlapping consensus is in terms of 
the first option, and by focussing on the practical task of living together. 
Now, this conclusion – that the overlapping consensus should be understood 
as a shared intention - leads us to a puzzle, which is this: why then does Rawls insist 
on an overlapping consensus which is underpinned by shared reasons? As we have 
just seen, a Bratman-style account allows us to explain how a group might accept a 
shared policy of weighting certain considerations in their shared deliberation, in a 
way that supports reliable, predictable, explanatorily intelligible action by the 
group.
59
 All without any need for shared reasons. In contrast, recall that Rawls’s 
emphasis has been on shared reasons all along – both the formulation of political 
conceptions (modelled in original position) and the overlapping consensus require 
sifting out shared reasons. Connected to this, remember that Rawls thinks that 
public justification depends, albeit indirectly, on reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines,
60
 where the definition of reasonableness incorporates the idea of sharing 
reasons. Observe as well that for Rawls, justifiability constitutively involves sharing 
reasons; the test for the justifiability of principles of justice requires that candidates 
for principles of justice pass what I have called the reasonableness requirement, that 
is, that they can be endorsed by reasonable people who do not share your conception 
of the good.  
Given that the practical task of living together seems achievable with 
something less than the sharing of reasons, what are we missing?  
 
What is missing?  
In order to try to pinpoint what lies at the heart of Rawls’s insistence on 
shared reasons, I propose to ask the question, “If we view the overlapping consensus 
as a Bratman-style set of shared policies on weights rather than a set of shared 
reasons, do we lose anything?” 
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 Bratman, 179. Bratman refers to J. David Velleman’s and Adam Morton’s emphasis on 
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60
 Political Liberalism, 387. 
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One way to start to get a grip on what it is we are missing about Rawls’s 
insight into justification, is by comparing accounts of justification and reason-giving 
across different theories. Consider how the (classical) utilitarian thinks about the 
issue of justification and reason-giving. Because utilitarianism is a teleological 
theory, the right policy for a utilitarian government to take is just that policy which 
maximises the utility of the largest number of people; this policy is justified. The 
standard against which the legitimacy of a policy decision is measured is the 
standard of utility. The question of justification is answered with reference to the 
teleological standard, and is, in principle, separable from any need to give reasons to 
those affected by the policy. There might be utility-based reasons for offering 
justification for the policy to those affected by it - for instance, the effectiveness of 
the policy in maximising utility might be compromised if people become unhappy 
about not having the policy explained to them, and perhaps such discontent might 
result in a democratically-elected government being voted out of power which (such 
a government would consider) would decrease utility overall. But apart from 
considerations like these, which undermine the maximisation of utility, there is no 
independent reason to offer reasons in justification to those affected. Strictly 
speaking, Plato’s noble lie would not be ruled out by the standard of utility, 
assuming that it could be promulgated without being found out. Such potentially 
manipulative results should, prima facie, be a source of concern for us.  
Now consider Raz’s normal justification thesis (NJT). In principle, on Raz’s 
theory, justification on its own does not require that reasons be offered to those 
affected by a policy. There may be pragmatic, or perhaps autonomy-based 
considerations in favour of some sort of publicity about reasons, but this is a 
separate question. Justification, on Raz’s account, goes through just on the basis of 
the existence of dependent reasons which apply to those affected by a policy.  
Contrast this with Rawls’s account, where his publicity condition effectively 
mandates transparency of justification to those affected, ruling out ‘noble lie’ cases. 
Rawls’s well-ordered society is effectively regulated by a public conception of 
justice:  
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Conceptions that might work out well enough if understood and 
followed by a few or even by all, as long as this fact were not widely 
known, are excluded by the publicity condition.
61
 
 
(P)ublicity can be explained as insuring that the process of justification 
can be perfectly carried through (in the limit so to speak) without 
untoward effects. For publicity allows that all can justify their conduct 
to everyone else (when their conduct is justifiable) without self-
defeating or other disturbing consequences.
62
 
 
On Rawls’s account, publicity about reasons, or a certain transparency in 
justification, is intrinsic to the nature of justification in a way it is not for 
either the utilitarian or for Raz. The task of the next chapter is to try to pin 
down Rawls’s argument for thinking that justification requires sharing 
reasons. 
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Justification and the Sharing of Reasons 
 
This chapter attempts to pin down Rawls’s argument for why justification 
intrinsically involves the sharing of reasons, or more precisely, the existence of 
mutually acceptable reasons. In order to do this, I take us through Rawls’s argument 
for the difference principle, which brings us to mutual respect being at the heart of 
why justification needs to be in the form of reasons others could accept. In contrast 
with readings of Rawls on which this condition on the mutual acceptability of 
reasons leads to various forms of epistemic abstinence, I argue that mutual 
acceptability should be understood as a heuristic device, which helps us to see and 
to take account of the reasons that others have and thus to respect the moral 
personality of those with whom we disagree, without needing, as a requirement of 
justifiability, any sort of epistemic abstinence.
1
  
 
Justification and Rawls’s argument for the difference principle  
In arguing for his two principles of justice, Rawls takes his readers through 
two “fundamental comparisons”2 - with the principle of average utility, and the 
principle of restricted utility, respectively. The first comparison gives the reasoning 
for the first principle, and the second comparison gives the reasoning for the 
difference principle.
3
 I want to look closely at the second comparison, by way of 
getting to the heart of why Rawls thinks justification constitutively involves being 
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 In making my arguments in this chapter, I draw on Rawls’s work from a variety of eras. As I have 
mentioned previously, to my mind, there is no dramatic shift in his position between Theory of 
Justice and Political Liberalism; the changes are in response to an internal inconsistency in Theory 
(to which I have earlier referred – see Chapter 2, pages 39-40). Rawls also explicitly states in the 
Introduction to Political Liberalism that “these lectures take the structure and content of Theory to 
remain substantially the same.” Political Liberalism (Expanded Edition) (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2005), xvi. 
2
 John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, ed. Erin Kelly (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2001), 94. See fn 16, which traces this way of organizing 
the reasoning for the two principles to Rawls’s “Reply to Alexander and Musgrave,” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 88 (November 1974), Sections III-IV, 639-653, reprinted in Collected Papers.  
3
 Justice as Fairness, 95. 
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able to offer one another mutually acceptable reasons; I believe that Rawls’s 
argument for the difference principle sheds some light on this.
4
  
The second comparison compares Rawls’s two principles with an alternative 
formed by substituting for the difference principle the principle of average utility, 
combined with a stipulated social minimum.
5
 According to Rawls, the second 
comparison is supposed to bring out the advantage of the two principles with respect 
to reciprocity.
6
 Reciprocity is highlighted, it seems, because distribution is arranged 
such that those who gain more do so “on terms acceptable to those who gain less, 
and in particular to those who gain the least”.7 The element of reciprocity, then, has 
to do with justification, and in particular justification to the least advantaged.  
Rawls tells us that the difference principle is arrived at by “taking equal 
division as the starting point, together with an idea of reciprocity”.8 But, first of all, 
why take equal division as a starting point? Why not start, for instance, with an 
assessment of needs, or rights, and use that as the benchmark for distribution? 
Second, one might reasonably ask, why should we be so concerned with the least 
advantaged? Why is justification owed to this group, particularly?  
At this point it is important to clarify that Rawls does not make use of a 
consequentialist argument to argue for his conclusion that justification is owed to 
the least advantaged. Rawls is unambiguous about the good for society that would 
be achieved as a consequence of adopting the difference principle, but it does not 
constitute his argument for the difference principle. The good in question is the 
good of fraternity. Rawls says,  
 
                                                          
4
 It may seem, at first glance, somewhat odd that a work concerned with public reason should contain 
an extended discussion of the difference principle. As the reader will discover, I proceed by breaking 
down Rawls’s argument for the difference principle into two parts – what I shall call the Argument 
from Social Cooperation and the Argument from Mutual Respect. While my concern in this thesis is 
not distributive justice, I have chosen to work through both parts of Rawls’s argument rather than 
extracting the Argument from Mutual Respect from its context because Rawls presents his second 
comparison as one argument in which the two strands that I identify are inter-dependent. Rawls’s 
discussion of reciprocity and fraternity in the context of this argument would, as well, I think, lose 
much of its richness if only the Argument from Mutual Respect were highlighted. 
5
 Justice as Fairness, 96. 
6
 Justice as Fairness, 123, Theory of Justice, 88. 
7
 Justice as Fairness, 123. 
8
 Justice as Fairness, 123. 
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 A further merit of the difference principle is that it provides an 
interpretation of the principle of fraternity…fraternity is held to 
represent a certain equality of social esteem manifest in various public 
conventions and in the absence of manners of deference and 
servility…The difference principle…does seem to correspond to a 
natural meaning of fraternity: namely, to the idea of not wanting to have 
greater advantages unless this is to the benefit of others who are less 
well off.
9
 
 
This is closely linked to Rawls’s picture of the quality of relationships within a just 
society. He envisages a just society as being one where “the least advantaged feel 
that they are a part of political society, and view the public culture with its ideals 
and principles as of significance to themselves”.10 This means that the least 
advantaged do not experience excessive strains of commitment which lead them 
either to become bitter and thus prepared to take violent action against their 
oppression, or to exhibit the milder symptoms of alienation from one’s own society. 
Rawls describes the latter state as follows: 
 
we grow distant from political society and retreat into our social world. 
We feel left out; and, withdrawn and cynical, we cannot affirm the 
principles of justice in our thought and conduct over a complete life. 
Though we are not hostile or rebellious, those principles are not ours and 
fail to engage our moral sensibility.
11
  
 
In a just society, the least advantaged feel a sense of ownership of their society and 
its principles of justice and experience a sense of belonging to the group. Given that 
political apathy is a malaise that afflicts many actual developed democracies, Rawls 
is setting a high bar for justice. Indeed his goal is nothing less than “social concord 
and civic friendship”.12 Despite the winsomeness of the picture Rawls paints of a 
society regulated by the difference principle, this vision of social unity does not 
constitute Rawls’s argument for it.  
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 A Theory of Justice (Revised Edition) (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 1999), 90. See also Theory of Justice, 91, where Rawls says, “liberty corresponds to 
the first principle, equality to the idea of equality in the first principle together with equality of fair 
opportunity, and fraternity to the difference principle.” 
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 Justice as Fairness, 129. 
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 Justice as Fairness, 128. 
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 So what is Rawls’s argument for why justification is owed to the least 
advantaged in particular, and why must this justification be in the form of reasons 
they can accept? I argue that Rawls has a two-pronged argument for this. Call the 
first prong the Argument from Social Cooperation. This addresses the question of 
why justification is owed to the least advantaged. The second prong is the Argument 
from Mutual Respect, which addresses the requirement on the form of justification 
being in terms of reasons others can accept. Both are justificatory arguments, which 
use only information available to the parties behind the veil of ignorance.   
 
The Argument from Social Cooperation 
 
The difference principle represents, in effect, an agreement to regard the 
distribution of natural talents as in some respects a common asset and to 
share in the greater social and economic benefits made possible by the 
complementarities of this distribution.
13
  
 
For even if these assets [viz., capital and scarce natural assets such as 
land and forests] should fall out of the sky without human effort, they 
are nevertheless productive in the sense that when combined with other 
factors a greater output results.
14
  
 
This idea of reciprocity is implicit in the idea of regarding the 
distribution of native endowments as a common asset.
15
 
 
We try to specify an idea of reciprocity appropriate to the relation 
between citizens as free and equal…namely, that everyone as a citizen 
should gain from its policies.
16
  
 
Justification is owed to the least advantaged because they are materially 
affected by a departure from equal division of the fruits of social cooperation. To 
understand why equal division is the appropriate starting point for justice as 
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 Theory of Justice, 87. Italics added. 
14
 Theory of Justice, 241. Italics added. This quotation is in the context of Rawls demonstrating that 
his two principles of justice do not rule out socialist institutions.  
15
 Justice as Fairness, 124. Italics added. 
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 Justice as Fairness, 133. Italics added. 
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fairness, we have to look at Rawls’s argument for considering the distribution of 
natural talents a “common asset”.  
Here we immediately encounter an exegetical difficulty – what Rawls means 
by saying that ‘the distribution of natural talents/endowments is a common asset’ is 
ambiguous. The first possible reading is that he means to say that the sum total of 
natural talents/endowments of all the individuals in a society belongs to all members 
of that society in common, rather than to each individual. A second possible reading 
is with the following emphasis – ‘the distribution of natural talents/endowments is a 
common asset’, which would put more weight on (as Rawls puts it), the 
complementarities of the distribution of natural assets rather than the natural assets 
themselves.  
Robert Nozick and Michael Sandel both put pressure on the first reading. 
Nozick observes that regarding the sum of natural talents as a common asset does 
not take seriously the distinction between persons, echoing, he notes, Rawls’s own 
charge against utilitarianism that it does not respect the distinction between persons. 
Nozick thinks that, if Rawls tries to escape this charge by distinguishing between 
men and their talents and other traits, no coherent conception of a person remains.
17
 
Sandel picks up on Nozick’s objection (which he thinks succeeds), and charges 
Rawls with thinking of people as “radically disembodied” subjects.18 
The availability of the second reading removes the need for Rawls to choose 
between conceding that he has neglected the distinction between persons and 
admitting that he has a dubious metaphysics of the person. According to the second 
reading, it is the complementarity of natural endowments which is a common asset, 
rather than the sum total of natural talents. To see how this is so, begin with the 
fruits of social cooperation. Rawls argues that these are only possible because of the 
complementary nature of the means of production and human talents. Consider a 
very basic closed economy. Take the talent and effort of a skilled baker. Without his 
raw materials – flour, yeast, salt, water – he would be unable to produce any bread, 
regardless of how talented he was. Moreover, without other people such as the 
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 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (Oxford: Blackwell reprint, 2006 of 1974 Basic Books), 
228. 
18
 Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1982), 79. The only way out, Sandel goes on to argue, is if Rawls acquiesces instead to Sandel’s 
“intersubjective conception of the self”. 
83 
 
farmer to grow the wheat and the miller to grind it into flour, or the salt-farmer to 
harvest the salt from the sea, or the whole village to buy and eat his bread, he would 
not be able to sustain a livelihood from making bread. The argument extends fairly 
naturally to modern jobs – a lawyer, for instance, depends on the social practice of 
law as well as numerous transactions between people, to make his livelihood 
possible.
19
 Whatever one may think about whether one owns one’s talents and one’s 
labour, it is hard to deny that these would not be as productive on their own as when 
they are combined with other factors of production, to which we do not stand in any 
relationship of ownership or entitlement.
20
 To the complementarity of talents which 
makes the fruits of cooperation possible, no individual has title. Rawls thus 
concludes that the complementarity which makes social cooperation fruitful should 
be conceived as a “common asset”. 
At this point one might accept this first step - that we all benefit from the 
complementarity of talents - but still think that if society is a scheme of cooperation, 
then it is surely appropriate that the benefits we get from that scheme of cooperation 
should be proportionate to the talents and effort we put into it – you reap what you 
sow, so to speak.  
This is where Rawls’s second step comes in. Rawls argues that no one 
deserves his natural talents or starting position in society. Even the amount of effort 
we are willing to put into our endeavours is influenced by our natural talents and the 
options which we have had available to us each step of the way. Rawls observes, as 
a matter of fact, that “(t)he better endowed are more likely, other things equal, to 
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 Samuel Scheffler makes similar points about human talents in particular, in arguing for conceiving 
of distributive justice in holistic terms. He lists three ways in which people’s prospects are 
connected: first, each person’s capacity to contribute depends on the contributions of others. Second, 
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with similar talents and on the needs, preferences and choices of others. Third, any decision to assign 
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 In many cases, they would not be productive at all unless combined with other factors – a lawyer’s 
knowledge and ability to apply the law to particular cases, for instance, is of no use when separated 
from the legal system and the social practice of law.  
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strive conscientiously”,21 but attributes this to their good fortune in the natural 
lottery, rather than being due to their intrinsic worth.
22
  
This point is modeled in the original position by Rawls’s distinction between 
legitimate expectations and moral desert. Desert, according to Rawls, kicks in only 
after background justice is achieved; after the principles of justice are chosen in the 
original position.
23
 It is not possible that parties in the original position would 
choose a principle of distribution that said the fruits of social cooperation should be 
distributed according to moral desert, because the idea of moral desert would have 
no content behind the veil of ignorance, since parties would know neither their place 
in society nor their fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities.
24
 In 
contrast, legitimate expectations are the functional output of a just scheme of social 
cooperation. Once principles of justice have been chosen behind the veil of 
ignorance, a citizen can have legitimate expectations of what she can expect to 
receive from her society, in accordance with those principles of justice. A just 
scheme “satisfies [men’s] legitimate expectations as founded on social 
institutions.”25 The content of one’s legitimate expectations would be one’s fair 
share of the fruits of social cooperation, as defined by the outcome of the operation 
of the principles of justice. 
With these two steps established, Rawls can conclude, against an 
interlocutor who believes that moral desert should form the basis for distribution, 
that mere possession of superior talents and/or effort does not entitle a person to a 
correspondingly larger share of the fruits of social cooperation. In the original 
position, therefore, the starting point of discussion is equal division of the fruits of 
social cooperation. Departure from equal division thus requires justification to each 
person who is materially disadvantaged. In particular, the least well-off, who are 
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 Theory of Justice, 274. 
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 Rawls neatly summarises this at Theory of Justice, 89: “We do not deserve our place in the 
distribution of native endowments, any more than we deserve our initial starting place in society. 
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 Theory of Justice, 275. 
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 Theory of Justice, 118. “[A principle of distribution according to moral desert] would not be 
chosen in the original position. There seems to be no way of defining the requisite criterion in that 
situation.” (Theory of Justice, 273, §48 “Legitimate Expectations and Moral Desert”) 
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 Theory of Justice, 273, §48. Rawls goes on to say, “But what they are entitled to is not proportional 
to nor dependent on their intrinsic worth.” 
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most adversely affected, are those to whom justification is principally addressed. As 
we shall see below, the Argument from Mutual Respect provides further elaboration 
of the form this justification must take, on Rawls’s account.  
 
An objection: Nozick’s entitlement theory 
What of an entitlement theory like Nozick’s, which does not rely on the 
concept of moral desert? Nozick has no problems accepting both Rawls’s first step - 
that the fruits of social cooperation depend on the complementarity of talents - and 
Rawls’s second step, that we do not deserve our natural abilities.26 But he would 
certainly reject Rawls’s conclusion, viz, that therefore the correct starting point is 
equal division. 
Nozick starts by pointing out that it need not be that “the foundations 
underlying desert are themselves deserved, all the way down”. Then, he applies this 
to entitlement, concluding that people can be entitled to their natural assets even if it 
is not the case that they can be said to deserve them. What emerges from this is the 
following argument:
27
 
 
1. People are entitled to their natural assets. 
2. If people are entitled to something, they are entitled to whatever flows from 
it (via specified types of processes).  
3. People’s holdings flow from their natural assets. 
Therefore, 
4. People are entitled to their holdings. 
5. If people are entitled to something, then they ought to have it (and this 
overrides any presumption of equality there may be about holdings). 
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At first glance, it looks like Rawls could deal with this argument simply by 
distinguishing between legitimate expectations that kick in after principles of justice 
are chosen, and any prior conception of entitlement (an analogue of the earlier 
distinction between moral desert and legitimate expectations).  
Rawls can agree with Nozick that the bases of desert need not be themselves 
deserved, all the way down. He can agree with Nozick’s Premise 1 – that people are 
entitled to their natural assets, on the basis that the right of each to his or her natural 
assets is covered by his first principle’s protection of the integrity of the person.28 
But Rawls would deny Nozick’s premise 2 - that if people are entitled to something 
then they are entitled to whatever flows from it (Nozick’s Premise 2), because he 
has a holistic account of distributive justice. The justice (or lack thereof) of a 
distributive scheme must be assessed as a whole. In the same way that the justice of 
a distribution of goods cannot be assessed independently of the institutions of the 
basic structure, so also the claim of entitlement cannot be assessed independently of 
the legitimate expectations established by a scheme of social cooperation. Put a 
different way, entitlement presupposes the existence of an ongoing cooperative 
scheme.
29
 And since it is the precisely the justice of the cooperative scheme that the 
parties in the original position are trying to work out, there can be no entitlement 
rights to appeal to, prior to the choice of principles of justice. And Rawls thinks that 
the parties in the original position would not choose principles of justice that give 
people title to whatever flows from their natural assets, because they conceive of 
society as a fair scheme of social cooperation, and allowing the arbitrary distribution 
of natural assets to determine holdings would not be fair.  
Nozick, however, does not think this argument from holism works. At the 
heart of his criticism of Rawls’s difference principle is his charge that the set-up of 
the original position is biased against historical entitlement theories such as his. The 
architecture of the original position “guarantees that end-state principles of justice 
will be taken as fundamental”,30 thus ruling out historical views like Nozick’s. 
Because knowledge of one’s natural assets is excluded behind the veil of ignorance, 
the parties in the original position are forced to treat the problem of distribution as a 
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 Theory of Justice, 89, § 17. 
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“manna-from-heaven” case, which turns out to be the only reason for the difference 
principle which Nozick would consider compelling. Nozick says: 
 
If things fell from heaven like manna, and no one had any special 
entitlement to any portion of it, and no manna would fall unless all 
agreed to a particular distribution, and somehow the quantity varied 
depending on the distribution, then it is plausible to claim that persons 
placed so that they couldn’t make threats, or hold out for specially large 
shares, would agree to the difference principle rule of distribution.
31
  
 
If this is indeed the case, it means that Rawls is begging the question against 
Nozick’s historical-entitlement theory, by ruling out any historical principle from 
the get-go.
32
 
At this point, I will simply state my agreement with an argument made by 
Scheffler, to which I do not devote sufficient attention, but which I raise nonetheless 
because I think it helps us see off the challenge raised to Rawls’s argument by 
Nozick’s entitlement theory. Scheffler gives two reasons for thinking Nozick is 
wrong about Rawls’s being an end-state view: 33 
(1) First, Rawls’s first principle has lexical priority over his second principle; 
and 
(2) Rawls treats the question of distributive shares as a matter of pure procedural 
justice.  
On (1), Rawls’s first principle of justice, even on Nozick’s criteria, is not a patterned 
end-state principle.
34
 As for (2), Scheffler seems to be suggesting that because the 
difference principle allows different distributions to come out ‘justified’, therefore it 
is not an end-state view. I take it that some defence along these lines can be made to 
work, and move on to the second prong of Rawls’s argument, which is where I think 
the payoff for justification lies.  
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Summary of Argument from Social Cooperation (why justify to the least well-off) 
1. The fruits of social cooperation are only possible because of the 
complementarity of talents. The complementarity of talents is something we 
own in common in a society, not somethingto which each individual has a 
right. 
2. We do not deserve our natural abilities. (Modelled in the original position, 
where, prior to the choice of principles of justice, there is no concept of 
moral desert.) 
3. From (1) and (2), mere possession of a superior set of talents is therefore an 
insufficient reason for a bigger share of the fruits of social cooperation.  
4. Therefore the starting point is equal division, with justification being owed 
to each for deviation. Because the least well-off are the most disadvantaged, 
they are the particular targets of justification.   
 
The Argument from Mutual Respect 
The second prong of Rawls’s argument for the difference principle brings us 
finally to the question of why justification to the least advantaged must be in the 
form of reasons they could accept. Call this the Argument from Mutual Respect.  
Rawls thinks that there are natural duties, such as the duty of mutual aid, or 
the duty not to cause unnecessary suffering.
35
 Natural duties apply to us regardless 
of our voluntary acts; there is no need to “opt-in” to these in order for them to bind 
us.
36
 Their content is independent of the existence of institutions or social practices, 
and they obtain between all as equal moral beings, simply in virtue of our common 
humanity. On Rawls’s account, one important natural duty is the duty of mutual 
respect. This duty consists in showing a person the respect due to him as a moral 
being, that is, one with the two moral powers of having the capacity for a sense of 
justice and a conception of the good.  
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We are given two ways in which this duty of mutual respect is cashed out – 
first, by being willing to see the situation of others from their point of view, from 
the perspective of their conception of the good; and second, by “being prepared to 
give reasons for our actions whenever the interests of others are materially 
affected,”37 so as to enable them to accept the constraints on their conduct. 
Crucially, Rawls thinks that the reasons appropriate to the case must be “sound 
reasons as defined by a mutually acceptable conception of justice which takes the 
good of everyone into account.”38  
Rawls argues that a natural duty of mutual respect would be acknowledged 
by the parties in the original position because they recognize the need for the respect 
of others in order to support their own self-respect.
39
 It is this social utility that 
justifies the duty. (This is related to the earlier point made about the Rawls’s vision 
of the good brought about by the difference principle in the form of relationships of 
fraternity and civic friendship among citizens.) 
The natural duty of mutual respect is the finishing piece of Rawls’s 
argument for the difference principle. It explains why it is that justification to the 
least advantaged must take the form of mutually acceptable reasons.  
Now, suppose we accept that there is a natural duty of mutual respect. 
Suppose, further, that we agree with Rawls that this duty is justified because human 
well-being requires the social bases of self-respect. Even so, we could disagree with 
the details of what such a duty requires - why think that the social bases of self-
respect would only be secured by being given mutually acceptable reasons? 
Assuming that there are issues on which people are so deeply divided that there 
cannot be common ground, surely reason-giving in itself is showing respect 
already? Take for instance the contentious issue of abortion. Some of those who 
oppose abortion think it is murder. On the other side of the debate, proponents 
conceive the issue as one involving the right to bodily integrity. This is a case 
where, no matter what policy is chosen (to ban/allow abortion), justification offered 
would not be acceptable to the losing side. Disagreement goes all the way down, in 
such cases. Yet to acknowledge this is not to give up on the duty of mutual respect, 
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which, whatever else it involves, surely requires the offering of reasons to the losing 
side. 
Rawls gives the example of Calvin burning Servetus at the stake.
40
 He says,  
 
if we argue that the religious liberty of some citizens is to be denied, we 
must give them reasons they can not only understand – as Servetus 
could understand why Calvin wanted to burn him at the stake – but 
reasons we might reasonably expect that they, as free and equal citizens, 
might reasonably also accept.
41
  
  
This example is intuitively compelling, perhaps because we do not, today, believe 
that disagreement over religious belief is a sufficient reason to put someone to 
death. Yet I do not think that even this example rules out mutual respect, unless we 
accept that killing someone is constitutive of disrespect.
42
 That, however would be 
implausible, as there are many examples of killing people which do not necessarily 
require an attitude of disrespect. Consider the case of war – killing the enemy in war 
is a human tragedy, but it does not mean that one cannot respect the enemy as a 
human being. Again, think of the case of the death penalty. One might think that 
holding someone responsible for his actions in this way is, precisely, treating him as 
a moral being.  
This brings us back to our initial question – what argument might one have 
for thinking that the duty of mutual respect requires justification in the specific form 
of giving mutually acceptable reasons?  
 
The path to epistemic abstinence? 
There is a way to understand Rawls on justification requiring mutual 
acceptability such that it results in an extreme form of epistemic abstinence. In this 
section, I sketch out this interpretative path, by way of fixing ideas about the sort of 
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 Political Liberalism, 447. This refers to John Calvin’s Geneva burning Michael Servetus at the 
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route I think should be avoided. In the sections that follow, I argue that this is not 
the best way of understanding Rawls’s insight about justification, even though there 
is textual evidence in Rawls’s writings to support this reading.  
In a recent article on the logical consequences of demanding reciprocity in 
political justification, R. J. Leland and Han van Wietmarschen suggest that the 
demand that political decisions should be justifiable to each citizen leads political 
liberals to a principle of deliberative restraint which commits reasonable citizens to 
appeal only to considerations they can expect all other reasonable people to accept.
43
 
This principle leads reasonable citizens to segment their views between “non-public 
considerations” and “public considerations”.44 Leland and van Wietmarschen argue 
that in order to support such deliberative restraint, political liberalism must require 
“a very strong form of intellectual modesty”.45 This is an attitude towards one’s 
non-public convictions which recognises that the most competent reasoners disagree 
about it.
46
 For any given belief, for instance, the belief in the “ensoulment of the 
unborn,”47 citizens are supposed to recognise that there is disagreement about it 
even among the most competent reasoners - that “there is no level of competence 
above which people converge on a single answer”48– and therefore refrain from 
relying on that belief in political deliberation, because it is not justifiable to others.
49
 
They claim that views which do not include such strong intellectual modesty “lack a 
plausible story of why citizens should take the demand to refrain from appeal to 
nonpublic views seriously when they face high stakes situations where this civic 
demand conflicts with core nonpublic commitments.”50 
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Another instance of a reading of Rawls’s requirement of mutual 
acceptability of reasons that leads to epistemic abstinence is made by Jonathan 
Quong in Liberalism without Perfection. Quong’s understanding of Rawls’s mutual 
acceptability condition on justification leads him to conclude in favour of a political 
liberalism that is neutral between conceptions of the good. Quong’s chief reason for 
why neutrality is demanded is that anything else would be, prima facie, paternalist. 
Quong argues that paternalism is wrong because it is “motivated by a negative 
judgement about the ability of others to run their own lives”.51 Such a negative 
judgement is inconsistent with treating others as their “moral status as a free and 
equal citizen” requires.52 Specifically, paternalism denies that the other 
person/group has “the capacity to plan, revise, and rationally pursue their own 
conception of the good,”53 and “thereby diminishes the moral status accorded to 
citizens”.54 
 
Reading mutual acceptability/reasonable nonrejectability as a heuristic device  
I want to suggest a different way of understanding Rawls’s insight into what 
justification requires, one that takes the focus off the mere fact of agreement or 
disagreement about reasons. I start with Thomas Scanlon’s take on what respecting 
others requires, which is, I believe, a friendly elaboration of Rawls’s natural duty of 
mutual respect. This runs as follows: 
 
1. Human life is valuable.  
2. From Premise 1, we have reason to respond to this value in an appropriate 
manner, viz., with respect. 
3. Human beings are creatures with two capacities – first, the capacity to assess 
reasons and justifications; and second, the capacity to govern our lives 
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 Jonathan Quong, Liberalism Without Perfection (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 74, 
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according to those reasons.
55
 (Scanlon’s second capacity of self-governance 
corresponds to Rawls’s description of the second moral power of the person, 
namely, the capacity to have a rational plan of life.
56
) 
4. Treating human beings with respect involves engaging these two capacities.  
5. Substantively, respectful engagement requires treating human beings “only 
in ways that would be allowed by principles that they could not reasonably 
reject insofar as they, too, were seeking principles of mutual governance 
which other rational creatures could not reasonably reject.”57 (Rawls’s 
version is in terms of offering mutually acceptable reasons.)
58
 
 
Premises (3) and (4) provide a helpful elaboration of Rawls’s argument from mutual 
respect. They tell us that reason-giving forms an intrinsic part of respecting others 
because our conception of our moral personality is tied up with our capacity for 
reason, which includes both the capacity to assess and respond to reasons. (5) 
simply states Scanlon’s own proposal for how to cash out respectful engagement.  
Focus on (5). In order to work out Rawls’s and Scanlon’s reasons for 
thinking that respectful engagement with others involves mutually acceptable 
reasons (Rawls’s formulation), or reasonably non-rejectable reasons (Scanlon’s 
version), we need to pause and look at their account of moral motivation.  
Rawls’s account of moral psychology provides, I think, some explanation of 
why he considers the natural duty of mutual respect to involve offering others 
mutually acceptable reasons. Speaking of the three principles of his moral 
psychology, which together explain how citizens in a well-ordered society come to 
acquire and affirm a sense of justice, Rawls observes that “The basic idea is one of 
reciprocity, a tendency to answer in kind. Now this tendency is a deep 
psychological fact.”59 According to Rawls, it is simply part of our nature as human 
beings that we are hard-wired to respond in kind to how we are treated by others. 
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94 
 
This claim has the status of an empirical observation. The natural attraction to 
reciprocity runs so deep that it affects our understanding of the boundaries of the 
moral community – Rawls says that “one who lacks a sense of justice lacks certain 
fundamental attitudes and capacities included under the notion of humanity”.60 
Applied to living together with others in political community, this desire for 
reciprocity expresses itself as wanting “to live with others on terms that everyone 
would recognize as fair from a perspective that all would accept as reasonable”;61 
“to act on principles that rational individuals would consent to in an initial situation 
which gives everyone equal representation as a moral person.”62 For Rawls, this is 
nothing other than the sense of justice. 
Rawls is not alone in thinking something like a desire for reciprocity is the 
basis for moral motivation. The appeal to some desire to be in moral community 
with others is common to Mill, Rawls and Scanlon. Both Rawls and Scanlon make 
reference to Mill’s reliance on the pain we experience when “our feelings are not in 
union with those of our fellows”;63 and to“the social feelings of mankind; the desire 
to be in unity with our fellow creatures”.64 Scanlon thinks that the ideal of acting in 
accord with principles that others could not reasonably reject is an intrinsically 
valuable “way of living with others,”65 and that people actually do (whether 
consciously or not) set value on their “lives and institutions (being) justifiable to 
others”.66 
Having the desire for reciprocity and hence desiring that the terms on which 
one lives with others be justifiable to each is a basic fact about human moral 
psychology. But it is also a normatively significant fact – the capacity to experience 
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this desire for reciprocity/justifiability defines the human moral community. Now, 
what justifiability requires is that we treat other members of the moral community in 
the way that their moral personality demands. Moral personality in turn connects up 
with the capacity for rationality - human beings have the capacity for morality in 
large part because we have a capacity for reason. Consider this - human morality 
does not simply consist of instinctive desires with benevolent content (for example, 
“do good to others”); it also involves a reasoned judgement that affirms the desire 
for reciprocity/justifiability as congruent with our good, as Rawls would put it.
67
 In 
light of this human capacity for reason (which, for Rawls, is worked out in their 
having a rational plan of life and the capacity for a sense of justice),
68
 treating others 
as members of the moral community requires that we give others’ reasons equal 
consideration as ours. Rawls puts it this way: “provided the minimum for moral 
personality is satisfied, a person is owed all the guarantees of justice...the essential 
equality is thought to be equality of consideration”.69 
This does not mean that we must treat every reason the same regardless of its 
merits – Rawls is not saying that we need to give a trivial reason the same weight as 
a serious one in figuring out what to think about a given matter. He makes this point 
in his discussion of conscientious objection: 
 
These contentions are mistaken if they mean that, having arrived at our 
moral opinions conscientiously (as we believe), we always have a claim 
to be allowed to act on them. In discussing conscientious objection, we 
noted that the problem here is that of deciding how one is to answer 
those who strive to act as their erring conscience directs them (§56). 
How do we ascertain that their conscience and not ours is mistaken, and 
under what circumstances can they be compelled to desist? Now the 
answer to these questions is found by ascending to the original position: 
a person’s conscience is misguided when he seeks to impose on us 
conditions that violate the principles to which we would each consent in 
that situation...We are not literally to respect the conscience of an 
individual. Rather we are to respect him as a person and we do this by 
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limiting his actions, when this proves necessary, only as the principles 
we would both acknowledge permit.
70
 
 
The mere fact that people disagree, even if they do so conscientiously, is not the end 
of the matter – Rawls does not prescribe that when disagreement is encountered, 
each party is to abstain from judgement on the matter in question. Rather, the 
prescription is to take up the original position, as a heuristic for figuring out what is 
just or unjust. Disagreement, on this reading of Rawls, is merely an indicator to alert 
us to the existence of reasons on the other person’s side that we have not sufficiently 
attended to.  
Scanlon applies this approach not only to justice but to the wider question of 
what we owe to each other. For him, asking the question of ‘what principle could a 
reasonable interlocutor not reasonably reject?’71 helps us to identify what is right or 
wrong. For both Rawls and Scanlon, the test of mutual acceptability/reasonable 
nonrejectability works by getting us to take up the point of view of others so that we 
treat our own and others’ reasons on a par.72 What emerges from deliberation in the 
Rawlsian original position, which forces one to use only mutually acceptable 
reasons,
 73
 is the correct balance between different persons’ interests, representing 
what is just;
74
 on Scanlon’s account, finding that a principle of governance could 
reasonably be rejected by another indicates that it would be wrong to impose it.  
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Why do we need this heuristic? Because, as Scanlon puts it, we are biased 
towards ourselves, often ‘underestimating the reasons associated with points of view 
which we have not occupied’, and “overestimating the costs to us of accepting 
principles that recognise the force of those reasons”.75 Having this heuristic “can 
help to reveal biases of this kind and press us to overcome them.”76We can now see 
Rawls’s original position as just the sort of heuristic that corrects for bias – consider 
how the veil of ignorance operates to help rule out irrelevant considerations which 
our natural bias would allow us to rule in.
 77
 As Rawls describes the morality of 
principles (required for those in a well-ordered society to put the principles of 
justice into practice), having a sense of justice just is taking up the point of view of 
others for the purpose of striking a reasonable balance between competing claims.
78
 
Notice that, without the element of epistemic abstinence, this reading of 
Rawls is no longer incompatible with Raz’s narrative about how the normal 
justification thesis (NJT) works
79
 – we could see this Rawlsian heuristic of putting 
oneself in others’ shoes as a way of coming to a right appreciation of the dependent 
reasons that exist. It is also entirely compatible with Raz’s comments on the attitude 
of critical rationality being compatible with having confidence in our reasons.
80
 The 
attitude of critical rationality, as Raz describes it, involves the recognition that 
“fallibility is part of the conditions of ordinary knowledge”,81 and therefore that all 
ordinary beliefs are corrigible and revisable. It is accompanied by a “readiness to re-
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examine our beliefs as necessary”. In both Raz’s picture of critical rationality and 
Rawls’s description of how wide reflective equilibrium is supposed to work, right 
thinking requires a willingness to revise one’s judgements in response to reasons. 
For Rawls, the method of reflective equilibrium is a method of justification, a way 
of figuring out what to believe about justice.
82
 For Raz, the attitude of critical 
rationality is an instrument in the service of truth-seeking. Without the obstacle of 
epistemic abstinence, the two can come together.  
 
A Rawlsian tale, minus epistemic abstinence 
We have travelled some distance from our initial concentration on shared 
reasons. Seeing mutual acceptability/reasonable nonrejectability as an instrument for 
helping us determine how to treat others in the moral community justly/rightly – 
what I shall call the “heuristic reading” of Rawlsian justifiability -  takes away the 
need to resort to epistemic abstinence in order to filter out reasons that could not be 
shared.  
To make this vivid, consider Leland and van Wietmarschen’s case of Sarah. 
Sarah is a citizen who endorses No Abortion: Human life is ensouled at the moment 
of conception, and the intentional killing of the ensouled human being is 
impermissible.
83
 On Leland and van Wietmarschen’s account, political liberalism 
asks Sarah not to appeal to No Abortion when deliberating and deciding about 
fundamental political issues. According to them, Sarah considers No Abortion, 
recognises that even the most competent judges among reasonable citizens disagree 
about it, and this attitude of intellectually modesty towards the view causes her to 
refrain from appealing to it since she knows that No Abortion could not be 
acceptable to all.
84
 
Compare this to how interpreting mutual acceptability/reasonable 
nonrejectability as a heuristic device would change the Sarah narrative. On the 
heuristic reading, Sarah, who endorses No Abortion, is motivated by a desire for 
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reciprocity/justifiability. She recognises that she disagrees with fellow citizens on 
the matter. Committed to treating her fellow citizens with respect because she 
believes they form part of the same moral community, Sarah tries to put herself into 
her interlocutors’ shoes and consider why they might not be able to accept/might 
reasonably reject No Abortion. She thinks of an atheist friend who does not share 
her faith in the existence of God and who thus does not believe that human beings 
have souls, and considers another person, an acquaintance who had recently had an 
abortion when she found out that her unborn child had a serious congenital disease. 
She acknowledges that these people have valid reasons for wanting abortion to be a 
legal option. At the same time, she thinks they are mistaken as to the truth, because 
they would in fact be condoning the murder of a human being.  
This exercise in perspective, while it may not lead to any sort of substantive 
consensus between Sarah and her two friends, is, effectively, an exercise in treating 
them as members of the same moral community. While Rawls’s own view, by 
requiring that reasons be shared, chooses the path of epistemic abstinence (I think 
unnecessarily), the following comment on public reason applies just as well to my 
interpretation of mutual acceptability as a heuristic device: 
 
 (c)itizens learn and profit from debate and argument, and when their 
arguments follow public reason, they instruct society’s political culture 
and deepen their understanding of one another even when agreement 
cannot be reached.
85
 
 
Even when the issue is not (yet) public justification in the form of actual 
conversations between citizens, but rather individuals trying to think things through 
for themselves, it is nonetheless true that the device of mutual 
acceptability/reasonable nonrejectability deepens understanding of the reasons that 
others have, and embodies an attitude of respect for a fellow human’s moral 
personality.  
The learning is not just on Sarah’s side. Sarah’s atheist friend, should she 
attempt the exercise of taking up Sarah’s perspective, would gain a deeper 
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appreciation of how Sarah’s world view is dominated by revealed truth, and might 
be challenged to explore the internal consistency of such a perspective. The woman 
who chose abortion might be led to see her decision with Sarah’s eyes, as an 
understandable decision but yet mistaking the value of all human life in the eyes of 
God, while still believing that she made the right decision for herself and for the 
unborn child, in order to save it from a life likely to be dominated by the effects of 
physical or mental disability. 
On this reading, ‘intellectual modesty’ is irrelevant. It simply does not matter 
who disagrees with Sarah and at what level. Sarah is free to try to persuade her 
fellow citizens to her point of view. Given what she has gleaned about their reasons 
for objecting to No Abortion, she may find that simply stating her view will not be 
effective in changing their minds; she may find the need to try to find other 
supporting reasons for her view which would find purchase with them – for 
instance, scientific evidence about the foetus’s development of a central nervous 
system and its therefore being able to feel pain at a very early stage, by way of 
persuading them that the foetus should be considered part of the moral community. 
But at no point is Sarah constrained to bracket No Abortion, simply because others 
disagree with her.  
Where does this leave Sarah? Even if the proposed alternative reading of 
Rawls does away with the requirement that she bracket any non-public view about 
the ensoulment of human beings at conception, does my proposed interpretation of 
Rawls not still mean that Sarah must conclude that No Abortion is not justifiable? 
Well, it depends. Perhaps, in looking for reasons that will speak to her fellow 
citizens who do not share her religious convictions, Sarah might find one that cannot 
reasonably be rejected by them. More likely, she will not reach such a happy 
reconciliation - which leaves her believing that No Abortion is true, but at the same 
time committed to judging that it would be unjust to impose it on others. 
Admittedly, this leaves Sarah in the grip of a moral dilemma.
86
 But it does not 
involve a “trumping” of comprehensive values by political ones, as an epistemically 
abstemious reading of Rawls would require; it allows full play to all the reasons 
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 Raz suggests a way out of this when he says that reasonable disagreement has the moral 
implication that “One should not criminalise actions undertaken because of a reasonable belief that 
they are right, if that belief will remain reasonable even if they are prohibited by law.” See his 
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Sarah has. Notice, too, that the question of what law Sarah’s society will choose on 
the matter remains open to debate from all sides – the practical task of living 
together carries on as usual.  
What I have just described as the heuristic reading of Rawlsian justifiability 
– justification requiring equal consideration of the reasons of those who disagree 
with you – may sound a lot like the sort of procedural justice espoused by Stuart 
Hampshire.
87
 Indeed, Hampshire’s refrain of “audi alteram partem” (“hear the other 
side”)88 being the “necessary condition” 89 of procedural justice resonates with the 
equal consideration of opposing views which I have suggested is required for justice 
and justifiability. But the similarities do not go very deep. First, the grounds of the 
prescription to attend to the other side of the story are different. Hampshire thinks 
that adversarial reasoning in the human mind is an internalisation of public 
adversarial discussions which is “grounded... in the nature of human thought,”90 
whereas I find the basis for this injunction in the duty of mutual respect in the moral 
psychology of reciprocity. Second, my proposed account of Rawlsian justifiability 
retains a role for justified, substantive political principles, which Hampshire would 
not. The test of reasonable nonrejectability has some bite – it sets limits on what can 
be considered a just political principle. By distinguishing between the requirements 
of justifiability (the subject of this chapter) and the practical task of living together 
(highlighted in Chapter 3), I propose, in effect, to separate out what Hampshire’s 
proceduralism would run together - as we shall see in Chapter 7, with the Malaysia 
case study, such a distinction can help us see that even where there is an existing 
procedure under which opposing views are heard, not just any procedure can count 
as just. 
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Wholehearted Reason-giving  
in the Public Sphere 
 
What is the mode of reasoning appropriate to the public sphere?  Having 
seen in Chapter 2 how the different approaches to justification taken by Rawls and 
Raz result in two quite different answers to this question, this chapter takes the 
heuristic reading of Rawls’s reasonableness requirement, developed in the previous 
chapter, and draws out its implications for public reason.  
The main import of the heuristic reading was that justifiability does not 
require the sharing of reasons; what it requires is giving others’ reasons the same 
consideration as our own. To do this, we use the heuristic test of justifiability – the 
test question of “could someone who disagrees with me reasonably reject my 
position?”1 – to help us put ourselves in others’ shoes, so as to help us appreciate 
their reasons. One of the key consequences of understanding justifiability in this 
way is that we see that we do not need epistemic abstinence for justifiability. 
Working out the implications of this understanding of justifiability for 
reasoning in the public sphere, the resulting picture is rather more Razian than 
Rawlsian. Doing away with the bright line between public and non-public reasons 
produces a much less structured conception of what reasoning in the public sphere 
should look like. Nonetheless, it remains, I believe, a conception faithful to Rawls’s 
core concern about justifiability, while avoiding the serious charge of potentially 
dividing individuals against themselves, to which we saw in Chapter 2 that Rawls’s 
account was vulnerable. 
 
How the heuristic reading of the reasonableness requirement changes the picture 
Understanding Rawls’s reasonableness requirement as a heuristic has a 
significant impact on the Rawlsian account of public reason. For a start, because 
there is no longer a need to filter out ‘private’ reasons, the term itself, ‘public 
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 See Chapter 4, footnote 72 on page 96, for my reasons for preferring Scanlon’s formulation of 
reasonable nonrejectability rather than Rawls’s of mutual acceptability. 
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reason,’ ceases to be fit for purpose, as it has come to be associated with the 
Rawlsian idea of there being a special sub-set of reasons, uniquely appropriate for 
public use.  
 
Restoring wholeheartedness  
Rawls tells us that the nature of the constraint public reason places on the 
reasonable citizen is a moral one. Throughout his account, Rawls emphasises that 
the duty of civility is a moral and not a legal duty. If this were not so, he points out, 
it would be incompatible with free speech.
2
 To this I would add that the problem 
goes deeper than Rawls acknowledges. As illustrated by our examination of what I 
have called the “no-conflict” claim in Chapter 2, public reason as Rawls describes it 
can also come into conflict with the protected liberty of conscience, because it 
demands, in effect, to be recognised as a trump card. As Raz’s negative argument 
against Rawls’s conception of public reason brings out, the necessity for political 
values to trump comprehensive ones undermines wholeheartedness. Given that 
Rawls is just as committed as Raz is to individuals and their well-being (recall that 
one of the original motivations of Rawls’s theory of justice was to provide a viable 
alternative to utilitarianism, which he thought did not rightly account for the 
separateness of persons), this would be a serious problem for Rawls.  
Understanding the requirement of mutual acceptability of reasons as a 
heuristic, however, allows us to do away with the partitioning of reasons between 
public and private, since there is no longer any need to bracket what in Rawls’s 
picture would have been private considerations. Once this is so, the threat to 
wholeheartedness is removed.  
One might worry that this allows too much into public debate, to the extent 
that it makes stability impossible, but remember that even though justification, in 
and of itself, might not require bracketing reasons that could not be shared, the 
pragmatic pressures of working out how to get along together still apply, and will 
help ensure that public debate happens in an orderly manner. In a democracy, these 
pragmatic pressures are heightened by the need to persuade others to one’s point of 
                                                          
2“The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” in John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Expanded Edition) 
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view so as to obtain their vote. To put Raz’s point about public debate centring 
around well-being in a familiar idiom, citizens would still have to appeal to the 
‘common good’ in order to try to bring fellow citizens round to their point of view.  
 
Standing ready to be transparent about our reasons 
Rawls’s ideal of public reason demands more than a purely hypothetical test 
of justifiability. There is a “standing ready” involved, a disposition on the part of 
citizens in a well-ordered society which means that they are “ready to explain the 
basis of their actions to one another”.3 Practising the ideal of public reason would 
sometimes involve actual conversations where citizens explain and justify to other 
citizens the policies which they support, from within a political conception which 
they sincerely believe others could reasonably endorse. Further, Rawls specifies that 
those who seek to practise public reason must also be prepared to defend their 
political conception, by proposing a criterion for what principles and guidelines 
other citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse along with them. For example, 
in defence of his political conception of justice as fairness, Rawls’s criterion would 
be “the values expressed by the principles and guidelines that would be agreed to in 
the original position”, where the particular features of the original position would 
serve to justify to other citizens why they can reasonably be expected to endorse the 
principles that emerge from it.
4
 
How does the understanding of Rawls’s reasonableness requirement as a 
heuristic change this dispositional element of reasoning in the public sphere? The 
heuristic reading accepts the Rawlsian picture of moral motivation, grounded in the 
desire for reciprocity and justifiability. As a result, reason-giving remains a crucial 
part of the justificatory picture - because our conception of others’ moral personality 
is tied up with their capacity for reason, reason-giving forms an intrinsic part of 
respecting others. Part of this, as with Rawls’s duty of civility, would involve 
attitudes such as willingness to listen to others and fair-mindedness in deciding 
when accommodations to others’ views should reasonably be made.5 In other words, 
respectful moral deliberation in the public sphere – the giving and receiving of 
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moral reasons - is entailed by the heuristic reading no less than by Rawls’s own 
account.
6
  
However, because the heuristic reading imposes no filter on the type of 
reasons allowed into public debate, the content of what the citizen stands ready to 
communicate to her fellows changes – she no longer has to defend a political 
conception. Rather, the rules governing the content of debate are contextually 
determined – each society must come to its own practice on the matter, with 
historical context being the major determinant of the conventions about what 
reasons are considered appropriate for public debate. This is the upshot of 
understanding the overlapping consensus primarily as concerning the practical task 
of living together,
7
 and the original position as a heuristic device that helps us see 
clearly the reasons that are relevant. The rules governing public debate have to do 
with the practical task of getting along with one another. 
To illustrate how this historical contextuality would work, let us pick up on 
the example of Sarah’s No Abortion convictions. One might imagine a conversation 
between Sarah and the acquaintance who aborted the baby, where Sarah shares both 
her religious grounds for believing No Abortion, and tries to give other, non-
religious reasons for thinking that even early-stage foetuses should be considered 
part of the human moral community. Even if Sarah’s interlocutor does not accept 
any of Sarah’s arguments, she could still appreciate Sarah’s honesty about the 
religious grounds of her view. This description of the conversation presumes a 
certain historical and political context - one with enough of a background of peace 
that it is ready for reasoned debate about emotive issues.  
That the manner of debate should be context-dependent should not be 
surprising - imagine a different backdrop, where the advocacy against abortion has a 
history of violence and abortion clinics are routinely bombed by well-organised and 
self-declared religious groups. It is not hard to see that in this different context, we 
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might be less likely to find an open and honest conversation between Sarah and this 
woman.
8
 Perhaps in such a hostile situation there might emerge, through unspoken 
convention or the recommendation of influential political leaders, that religious 
reasons in general should be excluded from debates about public policy, so as to 
avoid stoking an already volatile situation. Such a policy of exclusion of religious 
reasons may, on the face of it, look very much like the constraint imposed by 
Rawlsian public reason, but it would be qualitatively different, in that it would be 
arrived at as a matter of practical necessity rather than a requirement of justification. 
To see this, imagine that this society does adopt a “no religious reasons” policy. 
Imagine that by means of this policy the situation becomes calmer and there is a 
peaceful compromise about abortion law. Picture the same society two generations 
on, populated with a new generation of citizens who do not have the sort of baggage 
of violence and who are fully socialised into the need for peaceful discussion of 
important issues. They may no longer feel the need for the exclusion of religious 
reasons in order to keep the peace, and one can plausibly picture a new practice 
evolving which involves citizens sharing with their fellows their grounds of 
motivation for supporting a policy, including religious grounds. 
The rules of engagement, then, are like Bratmanian shared policies in that 
what matters is that they are shared; it is not a requirement of justifiability that all 
societies must have the same rules about how to reason together in public. By 
contrast, the commitment to reason-giving is a requirement of justifiability.
9
 Notice 
that on the heuristic reading, the reason for this commitment to reason-giving is a 
moral reason – it is respect for the moral personality of others. The fact that the 
commitment to reason-giving is a moral one is important – if it were purely 
pragmatic, all the way down, then one might imagine the exchange of reasons in 
public deliberation becoming merely an insincere and possibly manipulative 
leveraging on reasons. In other words, the reasons for citizens’ commitment to 
reason-giving matters enormously, not least because if this moral commitment is 
lacking, civic friendship will be undermined.  
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 Such contextual dependency is a key point made by Kent Greenawalt in Private Consciences and 
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9
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The possibility of civic friendship 
Robert Audi makes the helpful point that when citizens hear their fellow 
citizens’ arguments, they listen for voice, which comprises not merely the bare 
content of speech, but also the underlying motivation of the speaker. He points out 
that civic voice is material in our decision whether or not to accept what is said.
10
 
Audi’s own view is that acceptable civic voice must unite secular rationale with 
secular motivation.
11
 I think the heuristic reading of Rawls’s reasonableness 
requirement points to a different possibility – namely, that a willingness to be 
transparent about our reasons, contingent on favourable historical and political 
circumstances (the significance of which I touched on above), is sufficient to satisfy 
the concern about civic voice. If treating others with respect involves engaging with 
the reasons that apply to them, then when it comes to reasoning in the public sphere, 
being willing to lay our own reasons on the table in discussion is surely the other 
side of the coin. On this approach, the historical and political context draws the 
limits of how much mutual transparency of reasons is possible. Admittedly, this 
picture is messy. It is messy precisely because it allows full play to all our reasons. 
But I consider this a point in favour of rather than against it, for it reveals that some 
political decisions (like abortion policy) reflect, of necessity, deep disagreements 
about moral issues. Moral argument about such issues should not be avoided when 
reasoning about them in the public sphere. 
What is the point of worrying about ‘civic voice’, one might ask? Why 
should we be concerned about whether our voice when reasoning in the public 
sphere is acceptable to others? What purpose does such a concern serve? This 
concern about civic voice is, I believe, ultimately grounded in the value of civic 
friendship as a worthwhile goal for political society. 
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Aristotle classified civic friendship as a special case of advantage-
friendship.
12
 As with all forms of friendship, the advantage-friend wishes his friend 
well for his friend’s own sake. He does this as a consequence of recognising this 
person as one who regularly benefits him and has done so in the past.
13
 Civic 
friendship is based on the experience and continued expectation, on the part of each 
citizen, of benefit to himself, in common with other citizens, from membership in 
their civic association.
14
 Where civic friendship exists, citizens wish one another 
well, and are willing to confer benefits on other citizens for their own sake, in 
consequence of recognising that they are themselves regularly benefited by the 
actions of fellow citizens.
15
 This mutual well-wishing is, moreover, common 
knowledge. In a situation of civic friendship, citizens assume that their fellow 
citizens, even those they may not know personally, are willing supporters of their 
shared institutions and willing contributors to the common good, from which all 
derive benefit. They are “accommodating rather than suspicious, anxious to yield a 
point rather than insisting on the full letter of their rights whenever some dispute 
arises”.16 On Aristotle’s account, where citizens are bound together by bonds of 
civic friendship, there is a sense in which the good achieved in that city is more than 
the sum of individual advantages. The good attained by some becomes part of the 
good of others
17
 in the same manner as, within a family, the good fortune or success 
or good character of one family member is experienced by the others as part of their 
own good. Civic friendship constitutes that psychological bond that makes it 
possible for citizens to participate in the good of their fellows.
18
 This is why for 
Aristotle, law-givers are more concerned to foster friendship among citizens than 
they are to establish justice. Justice, in this context, is understood as respect for 
fairness and legality, and is compatible with a suspicious, narrow, hard, and 
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unsympathetic character. Aristotle says that those who are merely just need also 
friendship, but those who are friends do not need to become just in addition.
19
 
In making his argument for his theory of justice, Rawls appropriates and 
adapts this idea of civic friendship for the purposes of his argument for his two 
principles of justice. On his account, justice as fairness results in a well-ordered 
society where citizens can share bonds of civic friendship. Rawls’s account of how 
this happens is found in the third part of A Theory of Justice, where he connects up 
his theory of justice with the good of community.  
Rawls argues that his well-ordered society achieves the good of community. 
He emphasises that the point about the good of community is not merely that human 
beings are interdependent creatures, but that human beings  
 
have in fact shared final ends and they value their common institutions 
and activities as good in themselves. We need one another as partners in 
ways of life that are engaged in for their own sake, and the successes 
and enjoyments of others are necessary for and complementary to our 
own good.
20
  
 
As the brief discussion of Aristotle’s conception of civic friendship brings out, this 
is an idea which has Aristotelian roots. Moreover, Rawls’s argument for why the 
good of one’s community can be experienced as one’s own good relies, fittingly, on 
a companion effect of his Aristotelian Principle.
21
 The idea is this: no single person 
can do everything he might do, nor can he do everything that any other person might 
do. Each individual’s potentialities are greater than he can realise alone. But through 
cooperation with others in society, “each person can participate in the total sum of 
the realised natural assets of the others”.22 In this way, for Rawls as for Aristotle, the 
bonds of civic friendship allow the good achieved by a political society to be held in 
common in a way that transcends the sum of individual advantages.  
Rawls’s narrative of the various stages of the individual’s acquisition of a 
sense of justice can be read as an elaborated explanation of Aristotle’s core idea of 
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advantage friendship originating as a result of benefits received.
23
 Rawls says, “if 
those engaged in a system of social cooperation regularly act with evident intention 
to uphold its just (or fair) rules, bonds of friendship and mutual trust tend to develop 
among them, thereby holding them ever more securely to the scheme.”24 Civic 
friendship, then, along with a sense of justice, is the natural outcome of the 
experience of Rawls’s well-ordered society. This makes sense of Rawls’s claim, that 
“without a common or overlapping sense of justice civic friendship cannot exist.”25  
The question is, given that Rawls’s own picture of the sense of justice and 
principles of justice involves a significant dose of epistemic abstinence, can there 
still be civic friendship on the heuristic reading? I answer, quite simply, yes. The 
proposed heuristic reading of the reasonableness requirement on justification can 
affirm the value of the ideals of fraternity and civic friendship among citizens that 
Rawls paints in his argument for the difference principle, since the argument from 
mutual respect and the natural human desire for reciprocity still stand. Striving for a 
transparently honest exchange of reasons is part of working towards a relationship 
of civic friendship, since such exchanges, conducted in the right civic voice, is a 
means of building up mutual trust.  
 
Voting – a messier picture, contiguous with the rest of morality 
On Rawls’s account, the citizen must be prepared to back up the readiness to 
give reasons with action. Action comes in the form of voting in accordance with 
public reason, and holding government officials and candidates for public office to 
account for observing public reason in their official speech and conduct.  
Leaving aside the question of the appropriate standards to which to hold 
public officials, I want to consider what the heuristic reading of the reasonableness 
requirement would say about how citizens should vote. Because the heuristic 
reading does not call for any partition of reasons, there will be cases where someone 
like Sarah is caught on the horns of a moral dilemma, thinking that something like 
outlawing all abortion would be unjust (because having put herself in the position of 
her interlocutors she cannot find reasonably nonrejectable reasons for her position), 
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but at the same time believing it to be true that all abortion is murder and therefore 
wrong. In such cases, the traditional reading of Rawls on public reason would have 
Sarah bracket her No Abortion conviction and vote only according to the conclusion 
of deliberation reached from shared reasons. The heuristic reading gives no such 
prescription, but rather allows Sarah to come to an all-things-considered judgement 
on her own and to vote according to her conscience and where the balance of 
reasons lies. Its advantage is that it leaves Sarah free to decide for herself where the 
balance of reasons lies, without being divided against herself from the get-go, 
because she feels bound to create a firewall between her ‘public’ and her ‘private’ 
reasons. Should an abortion law with which Sarah disagrees be passed using 
legitimate procedures, then the heuristic reading is able to say, with Rawls, that 
Sarah should refrain from forceful resistance to the law, and accept the result of the 
vote.  
Returning to the issues we were left pondering after we surveyed 
Rawls’s and Raz’s approaches to reasoning in the public sphere in Chapter 2, 
we can see now that the heuristic reading allows us to chart a middle ground 
between Rawls and Raz on the question of what is the appropriate mode of 
reasoning in the public sphere. With a commitment to mutual respect worked 
out in the wholehearted giving of reasons, the heuristic reading of the 
reasonableness requirement on justification allows us to guard against society 
degenerating into an unprincipled struggle for power. At the same time, 
removing the need for epistemic abstinence and thus obviating the 
requirement for segregating public and private reasons, leads us to a 
restoration of moral argument as properly a part of politics.  
 
Space for moral standards that govern how we disagree in public? 
 The admirer of Rawls’s ideal of public reason might find herself 
disappointed by the account I have offered above on behalf of the heuristic reading. 
Part of the attractiveness of Rawls’s picture consisted in the thought that public 
debate could be governed by moral rules of conduct, whereas the heuristic reading 
seems to provide only a very thin account of the moral reasons we have for 
reasoning together in public. In this section, I try to show that there is no in-
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principle reason why we should not try to come to a policy, as a society, of valuing 
certain moral standards for how to conduct public deliberation. Of course, whether 
or not such convergence is possible will be largely a pragmatic issue – the important 
thing is that the establishment of a moral code of conduct for public reasoning is not 
ruled out from the start by the heuristic reading.  
 Rawls, in writing about the attitudes which the duty of civility, and in 
particular, what “fairmindedness in deciding when accommodations to [others’] 
views should reasonably be made” might amount to, refers us to a discussion by 
Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson,
26
 where they propose a set of principles for 
governing the manner in which people hold or express positions of moral 
disagreement in the public sphere.
27
 These they call “principles of accommodation.” 
They argue from mutual respect to its expression in two sets of such principles – 
first, principles which govern how citizens present their own moral positions; and 
second, principles which govern how citizens regard others’ moral positions. The 
first set of principles lay out standards of integrity for how citizens hold their 
positions. They say that citizens should be consistent in speech, as a sign of 
sincerity; positions should be held for moral reasons rather than for reasons of 
political advantage.
28
 Furthermore, citizens should act in a manner consistent with 
their stated positions, as well as accept the broader implications of their moral 
positions – so, for instance, those who oppose abortion should equally support 
measures to feed children properly.
29
 The second set of principles calls on citizens 
to acknowledge their opponents’ position as moral, rather than dismissing it as a 
nonmoral view.
30
 This requirement is worked out by engaging with those who 
disagree with us “in serious and sustained moral discussion”.31 In order to ensure 
that such discussion is more than a mere formality, Gutmann and Thompson add 
that citizens should cultivate a “disposition toward openness” which “keep(s) open 
the possibility that citizens could come to adopt and act on the position of their 
opponents”.32 Finally, they suggest that citizens should exercise charity in 
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disagreement, by seeking “an economy of moral disagreement”, consistently 
looking for “a common perspective at a deeper level of morality...that could 
transcend moral differences at the level of policy”33 
Gutmann and Thompson note that in advocating the establishment of a “public 
philosophy” of this kind, they are going beyond34 Rawls’s overlapping consensus, 
because it seeks agreement on substantive moral principles, even comprehensive 
ones, to guide citizens in public deliberation. While this view oversteps the 
boundaries set by Rawls’s own conception of public reason (as consisting only of 
political values), however, it is compatible with both Raz’s views and with the 
heuristic reading of Rawlsian justification. With regard to these, Gutmann and 
Thompson’s public philosophy presents just one more moral argument in the public 
sphere, which is not denied entry simply because it is a comprehensive ideal about 
how we should reason together. Whether or not it gains traction there will be an 
issue of history, sociology and other contingencies – the important thing to notice is 
that the establishment of the public philosophy suggested by Gutmann and 
Thompson is not ruled out from the start, by the requirements of justification.  
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Toleration: Theory into Practice 
 
 
This chapter and the two that follow form a linked set which draws the 
connections between philosophical theory with policy implementation, by 
examining three case studies which fall, broadly, under the rubric of toleration. This 
chapter looks at how Raz and Rawls respectively formulate and defend a principle 
of toleration. It traces the differences in the reasons they give for a principle of 
toleration to their distinct approaches to justification. I use the heuristic reading of 
justification developed in Chapter 4 to show how Rawls’s and Raz’s justification for 
toleration may be drawn closer together. Chapter 7 looks at the state of religious 
toleration in Malaysia, highlighting the common ground Rawls and Raz share in 
emphasising the moral importance of national sovereignty. Chapter 8 lays out the 
cases of the Muslim veil in France and Turkey, which I use to argue that a 
commitment to liberal justifiability does not require secularism, nor is such 
secularism necessarily liberal.  
 
Philosophical approaches – Rawls and Raz on toleration 
 One of the reasons people find Rawlsian epistemic abstinence attractive is 
that they view it as the right way to defend a principle of toleration for different 
ways of life.
1
 It is not, of course, the only way to defend toleration by moral 
argument. Comprehensive liberalism, equally, has moral resources from which to 
defend a principle of toleration. What is more, if we accept, as I have suggested, the 
heuristic reading of Rawls’s reasonableness requirement on justifiability, then it is 
possible to defend toleration without epistemic abstinence, in a way that is distinct 
from Raz’s. 
                                                          
1
 Samuel Scheffler helpfully describes and evaluates four different bases for a principle of toleration, 
by way of probing Rawls’s proposal of the overlapping consensus. Samuel Scheffler, “The Appeal of 
Political Liberalism,” Ethics, Vol. 104, No. 1 (Oct 1994), 4-22. 
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 In seeking to defend a principle of toleration, Rawls and Raz share the goal 
of avoiding the Scylla of scepticism about value,
2
 and the Charybdis of providing a 
merely pragmatic, balance-of-power account of toleration which, devoid of moral 
ballast, cannot remain stable over time.
3
 What is wanted is an account of toleration 
that takes seriously the deep disagreements about value which exist between 
reasonable people; an account that fulfils the key function of helping us to get along 
together without bloodshed and which is based on moral conviction rather than mere 
convenience; and finally, an account that allows us to be true to ourselves and our 
deepest convictions.  
 
Rawls 
For Rawls, the principle of toleration originates in a historical phenomenon. 
On his account, before the “successful and peaceful practice of toleration in 
societies with liberal institutions there was no way of knowing that possibility [viz., 
that of a reasonably harmonious and stable pluralist society]”4 Rawls characterises 
the acceptance of the principle of toleration in as a modus vivendi emerging from the 
Reformation and its aftermath, accepted “at first reluctantly, but nevertheless as 
providing the only alternative to endless and destructive civil strife”.5 
Fast forward to modern times and the modern problem of political 
philosophy, characterised by Rawls as how to find fair terms of social cooperation 
amid conditions of reasonable pluralism. For us today, says Rawls, the historical 
fact of religious toleration provides one of the “settled convictions”6 and “fixed 
                                                          
2
 Skepticism about value claims that “there is no good sense to be made of the idea of objective value 
or the notion of a good life,” and grounds toleration in the thought that there is no legitimate basis, 
therefore, for intolerance. See Scheffler, “The Appeal of Political Liberalism,” 4. This is a highly 
controversial stance, which many would consider a counsel of despair about the possibility of moral 
reasoning.  
3
 Susan Mendus has a helpful introduction in Justifying Toleration: Conceptual and Historical 
Perspectives, ed. Susan Mendus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), in which she lays 
out the different strategies for how toleration may be justified (or in the case of Marxist theory, done 
away with). 
4
 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Expanded edition), (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2005), xxv. 
5
 John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement,  ed. Erin Kelly (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2001) 192-3; Political Liberalism xxiv.  
6
 Political Liberalism 8. 
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points of our considered judgements of justice”7 within our fund of implicitly 
recognised shared ideas in the public culture.  
 It is starting from this ‘settled conviction’, among others, that Rawls seeks to 
construct principles of justice that are capable of being justified to all. His method is 
to use the veil of ignorance as a device to sift out a shared set of reasons which 
could be used by all to justify to one another the choice of a set of principles of 
justice, thus rendering the chosen principles of justice justifiable. A principle of 
toleration, in the shape of equal liberty of conscience, emerges quite naturally from 
this procedure. He says,  
 
The veil of ignorance leads to an agreement on the principle of equal 
liberty; and the strength of religious and moral obligations as men 
interpret them seems to require that the two principles be put in serial 
order, at least when applied to freedom of conscience.
8
 
 
Rawls’s procedure involves bracketing any judgement of the truth (or lack thereof) 
of any of these moral or religious doctrines (another manifestation of what Raz 
would term Rawls’s “epistemic abstinence”). The parties in the original position do 
not know the particular content of their moral or religious obligations, although they 
understand in abstract form the importance that such commitments would have for 
someone who does hold them.
9
 For Rawls, this sort of epistemic abstinence is 
critical to his project of justification. It is because the parties in the original position 
do not know what their religious or moral view is that they are led towards 
agreement on equal liberty of conscience for the same reasons;
10
 Rawls says, “it 
seems that equal liberty of conscience is the only principle that the persons in the 
                                                          
7
 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Revised edition) (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 2000) 181. 
8
 Theory of Justice, §33, 182. 
9
 Theory of Justice, §33, 181. 
10
 In Gerald Dworkin’s terms, it is because they do not know their religious or moral view that they 
are forced to pick a “neutral” rather than a “non-neutral” principle. Dworkin also argues that Rawls’s 
argument for equal liberty of conscience relies on the epistemological assumption that one cannot 
arrive at justified belief in religious matters. See Gerald Dworkin, “Non-Neutral Principles,” The 
Journal of Philosophy, Vol 71, No. 14, Some Problems in Ethics (Aug 15, 1974), 491-506. For his 
specific argument against Rawls, see 503-505. 
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original position can acknowledge”.11 Epistemic abstinence, for Rawls, is crucial for 
achieving this justificatory convergence:  
 
The characteristic feature of these arguments for liberty of conscience is 
that they are based solely on a conception of justice. Toleration is not 
derived from practical necessities or reasons of state. ...Moreover, the 
argument does not rely on any special metaphysical or philosophical 
doctrine. It does not presuppose that all truths can be established by 
ways of thought recognised by common sense; nor does it hold that 
everything is, in some definable sense, a logical construction out of what 
can be observed or evidenced by rational scientific inquiry. The appeal 
is indeed to common sense, to generally shared ways of reasoning and 
plain facts accessible to all, but it is framed in such a way as to avoid 
these larger presumptions. Nor, on the other hand, does the case for 
liberty imply scepticism in philosophy or indifference to religion.
12
  
 
Rawls is emphatic that, unlike in, for instance, a Millian utilitarian theory where a 
principle of toleration (such as the harm principle) might be justified on utilitarian 
grounds, his basis for toleration is that the principle of toleration passes the test of 
justifiability. It fulfils the reasonableness requirement (viz., the requirement that 
candidates for principles of justice can be endorsed by reasonable people who do not 
share your conception of the good).
13
 That the principle of toleration flows out of 
Rawls’s understanding of justification becomes even clearer in his introduction to 
Political Liberalism, where he describes political liberalism as “appl(ying) the 
principle of toleration to philosophy itself”. This involves attaining a “shared 
reason” (of a conception of justice) by abstracting from the truth of the “opposing 
and conflicting philosophical and religious doctrines that citizens affirm”.14  
 In Political Liberalism, the argument for a principle of toleration proceeds 
via the burdens of judgement. The burdens of judgement present a general fact 
about modern democratic societies, namely, that “many of our most important 
                                                          
11
 Theory of Justice, §33, 181. 
12
 Theory of Justice, §34, 188. Italics added. 
13
 Rawls says, “The grounds for this confidence [in the principle of equal liberty], according to the 
contract view, is that the equal liberties have a different basis altogether. They are not a way of 
maximising the sum of intrinsic value or of achieving the greatest net balance of 
satisfaction….Rather these rights are assigned to fulfil the principles of cooperation that citizens 
would acknowledge when each is fairly represented as a moral person.” (Theory of Justice, §33, 185, 
italics mine.) 
14
 Political Liberalism 10. 
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judgements are made under conditions where it is not to be expected that 
conscientious persons with full powers of reason, even after free discussion, will all 
arrive at the same conclusion.”15 The sources of reasonable disagreement include 
such things as the complexity of empirical and scientific evidence, disagreements 
about weighting the relevant considerations to a problem, vagueness of concepts, the 
influence of individual experience on how we assess evidence and weigh values, 
fundamental conflicts of normative considerations, as well as limited social space 
for the realisation of moral and political values.
16
 Given that the burdens of 
judgement exist,  
 
reasonable persons see that the burdens of judgement set limits on what 
can be reasonably justified to others, and so they endorse some form of 
liberty of conscience and freedom of thought.
17
  
 
That is, the burdens of judgement limit the scope of potential candidates for 
principles of justice in a modern, democratic society. They ensure that a principle of 
toleration is chosen in the original position. It is worth noting, however, that Rawls 
does not defend pluralism as such, but only reasonable pluralism. Unreasonable 
doctrines, which given political power, would impose their comprehensive view on 
others by force, do not fall under the principle of toleration. Unreasonable 
comprehensive doctrines are to be contained, “so that they do not undermine the 
unity and justice of society”.18 
 
 
 
                                                          
15
 Political Liberalism 58. 
16
 Political Liberalism 56-57. 
17
 Political Liberalism 61. 
18
 Political Liberalism, Introduction, xvii. Rawls credits Joshua Cohen with pressing him on this 
point. Cohen, in an article cited by Rawls cites in Political Liberalism, elaborates on the significance 
of the distinction this way: “...if we did embrace the requirement that a conception of justice be able 
to bring everyone on board – that it restrict itself to reasons embraced by all understandings of value 
– then it is hard to see what the response would be to the objection that the requirement of an  
overlapping consensus simply forces an accommodation to power. (Joshua Cohen, , “Moral 
Pluralism and Political Consensus,” in Philosophy, Politics, Democracy: Selected Essays 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2009), 55-56). 
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A very different route – Raz on toleration 
Rawls and Raz agree on the observed phenomenon of rational citizens being 
stably disposed to hold distinct understandings of value.
19
 More than that, they each 
have an explanation for why such disagreement should be accommodated in 
political life using a principle of toleration. Rawls’s explanation, as we have seen, 
proceeds through the burdens of judgement. In a contrasting route to a principle of 
toleration, Raz makes the point
20
 that value-pluralism is competitive. He starts with 
a truth-claim about the nature of value – namely, that it is plural. He then goes on to 
claim that  values are, by nature, competitive in that certain valuable ways of life 
exclude certain other such lives, and moreover, that certain valuable ways of life 
commit their adherents to disapproving of other, valuable, ways of life. That is, 
value-pluralism admits the validity of distinct and incompatible moral virtues; it 
accepts the value of virtues “possession of which normally leads to a tendency not 
to suffer certain limitations in other people which are themselves inevitable if those 
people possess certain other, equally valid, virtues.”21 Because of its competitive 
aspect, value-pluralism tends to generate intolerance.  
For Raz, it is the link between competitive value-pluralism and autonomous 
well-being that gives rise to a principle of toleration.
22
 On his account, human well-
being requires personal autonomy. Personal autonomy in turn presupposes 
competitive pluralism, because one of the conditions for personal autonomy is the 
existence of an adequate range of valuable options.
23
 But given that competitive 
pluralism has an inherent tendency towards intolerance, which left unchecked, 
                                                          
19
 Borrowing from Joshua Cohen (“Moral Pluralism and Political Consensus” in Philosophy, Politics, 
Democracy: Selected Essays (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2009), 52), I use 
“stably disposed” here rather than the Rawlsian “reasonably (holding)” in light of the fact that for 
Rawls (in Political Liberalism), accepting the burdens of judgement is partly constitutive of being a 
reasonable person (Political Liberalism, 54). See the extended discussion on this in Leif Wenar’s 
“Political Liberalism: An Internal Critique,” in Ethics, Vol. 106, No. 1 (Oct. 1995), 37-48. 
20
 “Autonomy, toleration, and the harm principle,” in Justifying Toleration: Conceptual and 
Historical Perspectives, ed. Susan Mendus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) 174. Raz 
says, “…people should have available to them many forms and styles of life incorporating 
incompatible virtues, which not only cannot be all realized in one life but tend to generate mutual 
intolerance.” (underlining added) 
21
 Morality of Freedom, 404. 
22
 In “Autonomy, toleration, and the harm principle,”174, Raz says that “Such an autonomy-valuing 
pluralistic morality requires a principle of autonomy which will protect people pursuing different 
styles of life and assure the survival of the options to pursue different forms of life. The principle of 
autonomy itself generates such a principle of toleration.”  
23
 See Chapter 14 of Morality of Freedom, 372-378. The other two conditions of autonomy are 
appropriate mental abilities, and independence (freedom from coercion and manipulation).  
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would destroy the diversity of ways of life, a principle of toleration is required. As 
Raz puts it, “respect for autonomy by requiring competitive value-pluralism also 
establishes the necessity for toleration”.24  
Raz’s autonomy-based account thus provides the resources for somewhat 
more than an equal liberty of conscience. In contrast with the Rawlsian framework 
which requires the government to abstain from making judgements in the realm of 
the good (as opposed to the domain of the political, or the right), for Raz, a 
legitimate government’s duty to secure the conditions for autonomy “requires 
positively encouraging the flourishing of a plurality of incompatible and competing 
pursuits, projects and relationships,”25 provided that the judgement has been made 
that these belong to valuable ways of life.  
Unlike Rawls’s principle of toleration which draws the line at unreasonable 
comprehensive doctrines rather than making any direct judgement on the substance 
of comprehensive doctrines, Raz’s principle of toleration does not protect “morally 
repugnant activities or forms of life”. For Raz, because autonomy is only valuable 
insofar as the options pursued are valuable, worthless forms of life do not need to be 
protected. In terms of the limits to government intervention to promote perfectionist 
ideals, Raz argues that a version of Mill’s harm principle should govern the extent 
of permissible intervention - perfectionist policies are allowed so long as they do not 
require resort to coercion. This limit is grounded in the third condition of autonomy, 
viz., independence from coercion and manipulation - because coercion and 
manipulation invade autonomy, coercive interventions are ruled out unless they are 
needed to protect autonomy.
26
  
Having looked at how Rawls and Raz separately defend a principle of 
toleration, we can see that this is their disagreement about the nature of justification 
played out in a different aspect. For Rawls, a principle of toleration and equal liberty 
of conscience flow out of the fact of reasonable pluralism and the need for 
justifiability based on shared reasons. For Raz, on the other hand, the principle of 
                                                          
24
 Morality of Freedom, 406. 
25
 “Autonomy, toleration, and the harm principle,” 174. Italics added. 
26
 “Autonomy, toleration, and the harm principle,” 175. See John Stanton-Ife, “The Limits of Law” in 
the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy for an argument that Raz’s attempt to base the harm 
principle on considerations of autonomy does not succeed. 
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toleration emerges from a concern with a fully-fleshed out picture of autonomous 
well-being and human flourishing. 
 
The heuristic reading of the reasonableness requirement 
 Before venturing to set out how the heuristic reading of Rawlsian 
justifiability makes a difference to the defence of a principle of toleration, some 
preliminaries.  
First, any acceptable account of justification must distinguish, with Rawls, 
between the simple fact of pluralism, and reasonable pluralism. At stake in this 
distinction is the danger that eliding the two might lead one wrongly to 
accommodate unreasonable views in an unwarranted caving-in to the ugly realities 
of political life. The project in which we are engaged is determining the correct 
account of justifying the implementation of political principles, not discussing the 
best way for politicians to get re-elected. Establishing a coherent account of how 
reasonable pluralism might exist frames the problem in the correct way, by 
specifying why it is that we might owe justification to individuals who differ in their 
conceptions of value. This distinction is a key part of Rawls’s project in Political 
Liberalism. And although Raz does not make use of Rawlsian terminology, his 
claim of value-pluralism serves the same function as Rawls’s reasonable pluralism. 
That is, it provides an explanation of why the diversity we observe around us ought 
to be protected by means of a principle of toleration.
27
 
Second, notice that both Rawls and Raz would agree that reasonable 
disagreement should not lead one to scepticism about the truth of one’s own beliefs. 
Rawls is very clear on this – he says, “Above all, [political liberalism] does not 
argue that we should be hesitant and uncertain, much less skeptical, about our own 
beliefs.”28 He is especially keen to leave open the possibility of the truth of one of 
the “affirmations of faith” about which reasonable people disagree29 - it is this 
possibility, on his view, which allows the overlapping consensus to dissolve the 
                                                          
27
 For this, see Chapters 13 and 14 of his Morality of Freedom, on Incommensurability and value 
pluralism particularly. Raz makes the point that while different valuable ways of life might be 
incommensurable, it is not the case that they are adopted/affirmed without reason. 
28
 Political Liberalism, 63. 
29
 Political Liberalism, 63. 
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“paradox” of public reason by having citizens affirm the ideal of public reason from 
within their own reasonable doctrines.
30
 Raz is equally clear about reasonable 
disagreement not leading to skepticism.
31
 Helpfully, Raz distinguishes between 
scepticism and fallibility – the realization that our beliefs may be mistaken. Having 
justified certainty and confidence in our beliefs is grounded, Raz points out, in “a 
belief that one is not in fact mistaken, that there is no reason to suspect a mistake, 
and every reason, based on evidence and on one’s situation, to trust one’s beliefs.”32 
Reasonable disagreement in the realm of value should not weaken the trust one has 
in one’s own conception of value, where the above-listed conditions are met. One 
makes the judgement that others’ disagreement is reasonable when  
 
through no fault of their own, they do not have evidence of the same 
quality that I have, but their evidence is sufficient for them, given their 
degree of understanding and expertise in the matter, to base a judgment 
on, or else when the evaluation of the evidence is sufficiently difficult to 
make error not really surprising, given normal human capacities.
33
 
 
For the reasons of wholeheartedness earlier elaborated in Chapter 2, I believe, with 
Rawls and Raz, that the defence of toleration that we are after should allow us to 
affirm our confidence and certainty in our own conceptions of the good.  
Third, we now have the tools to separate the issue of the burdens of 
judgement from the question of how a principle of toleration is to be justified. The 
burdens of judgement are, in principle, separable from the demand of justifiability. 
In effect, I think that Rawls and Raz can agree on the burdens of judgement – in 
Raz’s terms, these are just the conditions of ordinary, fallible human knowledge, 
including knowledge about value judgements.
34
 Consider again how Rawls 
describes the “many hazards”35 involved in the correct use of our reason and 
judgement, such as conflicting and complex evidence, differing views about the 
                                                          
30
 For more on Rawls’s solution to the paradox of public reason, see Chapter 2. My own view, in a 
nutshell, is that Rawls’s epistemic abstinence prevents him from succeeding in dissolving the 
paradox. 
31
 In particular, Raz has a section specifically dealing with this question in his essay, “Liberalism, 
Scepticism, and Democracy,” in Ethics in the Public Domain, 104-106. 
32
 Raz, “Liberalism, Scepticism, and Democracy,” 100. 
33
 Raz, “Liberalism, Scepticism, and Democracy,” 104-5. 
34
 Raz, “Liberalism, Scepticism, and Democracy,” 103-5. 
35
 Political Liberalism, 56. 
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weight of various considerations, the indeterminacy of concepts, the ineliminable 
impact of our experience on how we weigh evidence and assess moral and political 
values etc.
36
 Raz, it seems, does not deny the burdens of judgement.
37
 Their 
disagreement lies elsewhere – namely, in their approach to justifiability; it is only 
because Rawls’s route to justifiability demands shared reasons that the burdens of 
judgement which lead to reasonable disagreement end up playing the role of 
limiting factor to what is reasonably justifiable.
38
 If justifiability does not require 
shared reasons, as I am suggesting, then we could accept the burdens of judgement 
without necessarily relying on them to generate the limits of what can be justified to 
others. 
Now back to the heuristic reading of Rawlsian justifiability. What route does 
the proposed heuristic reading take to a principle of toleration?  
From the first preliminary comment above, we can see that what is required 
is a certain kind of explanation of reasonable pluralism; one that is able to explain 
why justification is required as a matter of justice, rather than of political 
expediency. Judged solely against this criterion, both Rawls’s burdens of judgement 
account and Raz’s value-pluralist account succeed. But then what happens when the 
heuristic reading of Rawlsian justifiability removes the requirement of shared 
reasons? The first immediate consequence is that we find that Razian value-
pluralism is not ruled out from the start as a legitimate justification of a principle of 
toleration – that is, its commitment to a claim about the nature of value does not 
render it inadmissible as a premise in justification from the very start. Moreover, we 
find that other (epistemically committed) explanations of reasonable pluralism, 
which would be ruled out by an epistemically abstemious reading of Rawlsian 
justification, are also ruled in. For instance, Leif Wenar’s Catholic citizen,39 who, 
contra Rawls, regards the diversity of religious views in our modern democratic 
                                                          
36
 See Political Liberalism, 56-7 for Rawls’s list of the “more obvious sources” of disagreement 
between reasonable persons.  
37
 See Raz, “Liberalism, Scepticism, and Democracy,” 105, where he explicitly acknowledges the 
existence of reasonable disagreement due to differences in the assessment of the evidence. 
38
 Rawls says that “the burdens of judgement set limits on what can be reasonably justified to others”. 
(Political Liberalism, 61.) See also Chapter 4, where I have touched on (but without specific 
reference to toleration) how the heuristic reading of Rawlsian justifiability brings Rawls’s account 
into harmony with Raz’s normal justification thesis.  
39
 This example is adapted from Leif Wenar, “Political Liberalism: An Internal Critique,” Ethics, 
Vol.106, No. 1 (Oct., 1995), 42-48. 
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societies as a lamentable descent away from the truth, but who nonetheless affirms 
the reasonableness of people who hold those false views because the source of their 
error is spiritual (spiritual blindness due to the work of the devil, for instance), 
rather than rational, would be able to offer the appropriate sort of explanation for 
reasonable pluralism. 
What is important, from the point of view of the heuristic reading of 
justifiability, is that all involved acknowledge the duty of mutual respect and accept 
that the use of the coercive power of the state requires justification. They need to 
accept that the duty of mutual respect requires them seriously to consider the 
reasons others have for disagreeing with them, and to have, at the least, an initial 
presumption against using the coercive power of the state to enforce a principle that 
cannot be justified to fellow citizens. How different citizens end up accepting these 
premises could differ significantly; my suggestion in previous chapters has been that 
the desire for reciprocity is deeply rooted in human psychology, but the reasons 
individuals might give for agreeing to these premises might look quite different. 
Take Wenar’s Catholic citizen. This person could well have religious reasons which 
also support allegiance to the duty of mutual respect which would lead her to refrain 
from coercively imposing religious requirements on non-believers. (These might 
include both Lockean arguments concerning the nature of faith as being voluntary 
and thus incapable of coercion, or perhaps, the belief that human beings, even those 
who erroneously adhere to false religions, have a dignity according to their status as 
beings created in God’s image and should be respected by giving them freedom of 
conscience.
40
)  
Once a commitment to justifiability and mutual respect in the form of equal 
consideration of others’ reasons is in place, the heuristic reading is able to make use 
of a justifiability test à la Rawls, but without bracketing judgements of truth. The 
argument resembles closely that which Rawls uses to conclude that a principle of 
equal liberty of conscience would be chosen in the original position.
41
 With Rawls, 
the heuristic reading is able to say that to impose anything less than an equal liberty 
of conscience would not pass the test of justifiability, understood as reasonable 
                                                          
40
 This latter argument is cited by Leif Wenar, “Political Liberalism: An Internal Critique,” 46, to 
show that rejecting the burdens of judgement need not be incompatible with supporting liberal 
toleration.  
41
 Theory of Justice, 180-183. 
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nonrejectability. The difference is that on the heuristic reading, there is no need to 
rule out appeal to the truth of any particular moral or religious doctrine.  
A couple of examples might make this clearer. Take Sarah, our citizen from 
Chapter 4 who believes in No Abortion. Let us assume that her beliefs on abortion 
derive from her Catholic faith. She believes that her God is the only true God, and 
that life under his rule is the best life any person could lead. She believes, as a 
result, that all other religious (or anti-religious) beliefs are false. She concludes from 
this that it would be good for everyone to have the Catholic religion legally 
enshrined as the national religion, and its observance legally enforced.
42
 However, 
what she comes to see when she runs this proposed policy through the heuristic 
device of the reasonable non-rejectability test, is that others who do not share the 
same religious beliefs as she does, might have good reasons to reject her policy. For 
instance, they might plead that being coerced into observing the religious rituals of 
another religion would deeply undermine their psychological well-being. Sarah 
concludes, as a result, that denying others equal liberty of conscience would be 
unjust. Thus, while Rawls’s own formulation of the heuristic (in the form of the 
original position) depends on shared reasons,
43
 we see here that it need not 
necessarily do so.  
 Or, to use a case which we shall see in more detail in the next chapter, 
imagine a conversation in Malaysia about the currently enforced political principle, 
viz., “allow everyone except Muslims freedom of conscience”. A Malay citizen 
(who under current legislation would automatically be considered Muslim) desiring 
to convert out of Islam might say to her Muslim compatriots that in denying her the 
right to convert out of Islam they are imposing an unjustifiable principle, since she 
has good reason to want to shape her life according to her conception of the good. 
Where the heuristic reading of justifiability differs from the standard Rawlsian story 
is that it allows into this conversation about justifiability, reasons on each side 
which are drawn from comprehensive doctrines. Thus, for instance, on the heuristic 
reading of justifiability, a legitimate part of this conversation would involve the 
                                                          
42
 A felicitous conclusion would of course be if Sarah were to come to some religiously-premised 
argument, such as Locke’s argument for toleration, which allowed her to approve a principle granting 
freedom of conscience for all. I exclude this possibility for the sake of the illustration at hand. 
43
 For Rawls’s version of the argument for equal liberty of conscience, from the original position, see 
Theory of Justice, 181-183. 
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Muslim Malay citizen putting forth his reason for supporting the status quo is that 
Allah’s law requires that the Muslim community enforce the Islamic faith on those 
brought up in it. Admittedly, such a conversation could ultimately still end in 
practical stalemate, since even if the Muslims all ended up convinced that denying 
Muslims freedom of conscience was unjustifiable, they could nonetheless decide, all 
things considered, that their obedience to Allah trumped the need for justifiability. 
In such a case the result would be that the society fails to practice liberal toleration. 
Here, the demand for justifiability comes apart from the practical need to find a way 
of living together in political society – even if the demand for justifiability cannot be 
met, the practical task of living together goes on; even unjust societies try to get 
along, somehow.  
7 
Religious Toleration in Malaysia 
 
This chapter works through a case study of the state of religious toleration in 
Malaysia, in order to see clearly how the twin concerns of justifiability and of the 
practical task of living together might shed light on how we assess some real-life 
situations. I work through how the heuristic reading of Rawlsian justifiability might 
bring together the Rawlsian and Razian positions on Malaysia, allowing us to 
discern the reasons why some of the cases discussed might be considered unjust. I 
also highlight the common ground that Rawls and Raz occupy in their emphasis on 
the moral importance of national sovereignty. 
 
Malaysia 
Malaysia is a majority Muslim nation, with 60.4% Muslims in a population 
of 23.3 million people. A significant minority subscribe to Buddhism or other 
traditional Chinese religions (21.8%). Another 9.1% are Christian, 6.3% are Hindus, 
and there is a smattering of tribal religious believers.
1
 The indigenous ethnic Malay 
population, who make up 50.2% of the population, is by constitutional definition, 
Muslim.
2
 Article 11 of the Malaysian constitution guarantees the right of every 
individual to profess and practice his religion. Even within the constitution, 
however, there are built-in limits to the principle of toleration – the right in Article 
11 is subject to a provision which allows the restriction of the propagation of any 
religious doctrine among Muslims. This stems from the status of Islam as “the 
religion of the Federation”, enshrined in Article 3 of the constitution. 
Even at a theoretical level, such a constitutional structure poses problems for 
a policy of toleration. To start with, it raises the question of adherents of the official 
religion not having an equal liberty of conscience, since (as the cases in this chapter 
will show) it is not at all clear that there is a right of exit from the Islamic faith. 
Secondly, friction is also caused by the interface between Muslims and non-
                                                          
1
 From the UN Statistics Division, based on the 2000 Malaysian census. 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/sconcerns/popchar/popchar2.htm , accessed on 12 Dec 2011 
2
  According to Article 160(2), "Malay" means a person who professes the religion of Islam, 
habitually speaks the Malay language, and conforms to Malay custom. 
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Muslims within Malaysian society. Thirdly, religious expression on the part of the 
non-official religions often runs up against the protection of Islam as the official 
religion.  
Surveying media coverage of race and religion in Malaysia from 2005 to 
2010,
3
 issues to do with conversions into and out of Islam have dominated the 
landscape. These can be divided up into three broad categories of cases – those 
concerning Islamic burials for Muslim converts, custody battles involving one 
Muslim convert spouse, and finally, cases of Muslims wanting to leave the Islamic 
faith. In each category, I will give the key facts of the landmark case of the period, 
along with some comments on the trend of how these cases have been dealt with, 
both by the Malaysian courts and by the Malaysian government in policy 
statements. A final section on religious expression illustrates the difficulties 
religious minorities encounter in practising their religion.  
 
Burial of Muslim converts 
The M. Moorthy case 
Summary of the case 
 Maniam Moorthy was a national hero - the former army commando was a 
member of Malaysia’s 1997 Mount Everest climbing team, who were the first 
Malaysians to reach that summit. On 20 December 2005, Moorthy, who had been 
born and raised a Hindu, died in a hospital in Kuala Lumpur (KL). He had been 
paralysed from the waist down since an accident in 1998 and had slipped into a 
coma after a fall from his wheelchair in November 2005. While he was in the coma, 
a former army colleague told Moorthy’s Hindu wife, Kaliammal Sinnasamy, that 
her husband had earlier converted to Islam and changed his name to Mohammad 
Abdullah.  
 At his death, officials from the Federal Territories Islamic Religious Affairs 
Council arrived to collect the body, saying that since Moorthy had converted to 
                                                          
3
 This survey has been done across the English media only, for the period 2005-2010. Given that my 
focus is on the events themselves rather than the different communities’ perception of each event, 
this should not be a problem for the analysis in this chapter.  
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Islam, he must be given Muslim burial rites. When Kaliammal objected, the hospital 
decided to withhold the body until it was ordered to release it by court order.  
 On  21 December 2005, Kaliammal filed a case in the civil high court, 
asking for her husband’s body to be released to her for a Hindu burial, on the 
grounds that Moorthy had professed Hinduism as his religion. Her evidence 
included the following: 
(i) That Moorthy had never told Kaliammal or any of his family, relatives or 
close friends that he had converted to Islam. 
(ii) There had been no announcement at the army camp where he stayed that 
Moorthy had converted to Islam, and his military identity card had never 
been changed to reflect any such conversion.  
(iii) Moorthy publicly took part in Hindu religious rites up to 11 days before he 
fell into a coma.  
(iv) Affadavit evidence showing that Moorthy did not adhere to Muslim 
religious practices, and that he ate pork, drank alcohol, and had not 
undergone circumcision.  
(v) Kaliammal claimed that if Moorthy had converted, it was not of his own free 
will, as since his paralysis he had been constantly ill and had lost his powers 
of concentration, suffering frequent emotional disturbances and forgetting 
what he was doing.  
On 22 December 2005, the syariah high court in KL ruled that Moorthy was a 
Muslim, and ordered his body released to the state Islamic council for Muslim 
burial. Kaliammal was not named as a party to the suit in the syariah court, and she 
was given no notice of the proceedings there.  
 On 28 December 2005, the KL high court dismissed Kaliammal’s suit, 
stating that the civil high court did not have any jurisdiction to nullify or ignore the 
order of the syariah court, since Article 121(A) of the Malaysian constitution was 
interpreted as saying that the syariah courts had exclusive jurisdiction to decide on 
conversions into Islam, and to determine whether or not a person was a Muslim.  
 Following the dismissal, Moorthy’s body was released by the hospital 
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authorities to the Islamic authorities and Moorthy was buried as a Muslim.  
 Kaliammal appealed against the decision, and in May 2007, the Court of 
Appeal ruled that the syariah court had sole jurisdiction to determine if an 
individual is a Muslim.   
Reactions 
 The Malaysian Consultative Council of Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism 
and Sikhism (MCCBCHS), a registered body with no Muslim representation, 
organised a month-long candlelight vigil in from 29 December 2005, protesting 
against the fact that non-Muslims had no legal recourse over decisions made by the 
syariah court. About a week into the vigil, attendance was between 50 to 100 
persons, of various faiths. The vigil was suspended indefinitely on 19 January 2006 
on the request of the Chief Secretary to the Government. In a statement to the press, 
Reverand Wong Kim Kong, spokesman for the MCCBCHS, said, “We want to 
convey a very strong message to the government that we are uneasy and 
uncomfortable ...Eventually, slowly, people may assume syariah is the supreme law 
of the land."
4
 
 
 In January 2006, 10 non-Muslim Cabinet ministers submitted a joint 
memorandum to Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi, asking him to review laws 
pertaining to religious conversion. This was withdrawn following the 21 January 
2006 Cabinet meeting.
5
 PM Badawi said that Article 121(A) of the Constitution, 
which gave the syariah court the exclusive jurisdiction to decide on conversion into 
Islam, would not be repealed, but said that provisions within it might be amended 
for clarificatory purposes. Meanwhile, two marches in the capital took place, 
comprising opposition party members and university students respectively, calling 
on the authorities to ensure that changes to the Constitution would not result in 
limiting the power of the syariah courts.
6
  
 
                                                          
4
 Quoting the New Straits Times, 30 Dec 2005, and cited on the National Evangelical Christian 
Fellowship website 
http://www.necf.org.my/newsmaster.cfm?&menuid=43&action=view&retrieveid=675, retrieved on 8 
Dec 2011. 
5
 Malaysiakini, 21/1/2006. 
6
 Bernama, 20/1/2006. 
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In the wake of the Moorthy case, a string of similar so-called “body-snatching” 
cases were highlighted in the Malaysian media in 2006. In each of these cases, 
whenever the deceased’s non-Muslim family members attempted to appeal to the 
civil courts, they were told that the civil courts did not have jurisdiction over such 
cases.  
 
Custody battles involving Muslim converts 
The R. Subashini case 
 A Hindu woman, R. Subashini, battled in the civil courts from 2006 onwards 
to prevent her estranged Muslim convert husband, T. Saravanan, from dissolving 
their marriage in the syariah courts, and unilaterally converting their younger child, 
then 2 years old, to Islam (Saravanan had already unilaterally converted their older 
child, then aged 4). She failed to get the conversion of her younger child declared 
invalid by the civil courts; the Federal Court ruled that the conversion was valid 
because consent from one parent is sufficient for conversion of a minor, according 
to Article 12 (4) of the Constitution. However, the Federal court also ruled that the 
marriage would still be valid in the civil court even if it had been dissolved under 
syariah law. In addition, the Federal court ruled that Subashini and her husband 
could initiate custody proceedings in the civil and syariah courts respectively.
7
  
 
Due to the (contested) interpretation of Article 12(4) of the Malaysian Constitution,
8
 
to mean that a minor’s religion can be decided by the consent of any one parent, this 
kind of case is not unusual. Moreover, since the syariah courts do not recognise 
marriages between Muslims and non-Muslims, and since custody of a Muslim child 
cannot be awarded to a non-Muslim, custody would invariably be awarded to the 
Muslim party in a case like this.  
                                                          
7
 Bernama, 27/12/2007. http://www.bernama.com/bernama/v3/news_lite.php?id=304754, accessed 
on 10 Dec 2011. 
8
 Article 12(4) states that “the religion of a person under the age of eighteen years shall be decided by 
his parent or guardian”. The interpretation that “parent” means ‘any one parent’ is contested by those 
who point to the Eleventh Schedule of the constitution, on interpretation of constitutional provisions, 
which states, regarding the construction of singular or plural, that “words in the singular include the 
plural, and words in the plural include the singular”. 
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Muslims (including Muslim converts) seeking to leave Islam 
The Lina Joy case 
 In 2007, the Federal Court ruled that Lina Joy, an ethnic Malay and self-
identified ex-Muslim, who had appealed to the civil courts to have her former 
religion struck off her identity card, would have to appeal to the syariah court to 
approve her conversion. In doing so, the Federal Court confirmed that jurisdiction 
on the issue of converting out of Islam lay definitively with the syariah courts. Since 
the syariah courts almost never grant permission for ethnic Malays to leave the 
religion, this in effect amounted to refusing to Lina the right to convert to another 
religion. In this particular case, the ruling also meant that under Malaysian (syariah) 
law, Lina could not legally wed her Catholic fiancé.
9
  
 
In the cases covered by the media over the 2005-2010 period, no living ethnic 
Malay who tried to convert out of Islam succeeded in doing so.
10
 Those who apply 
to the syariah courts to leave Islam would normally be detained for religious 
rehabilitation.
11
 The only successful cases of applications to leave Islam were of 
non-ethnic Malays – some the product of mixed marriages, who were raised in other 
                                                          
9
 The Sun, 30/5/2007, US Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. 2008 International 
Religious Freedom Report, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2008/108413.htm, accessed on 10 Dec 
2011. 
10
 The exception, if one can even call it that, is the 2006 case of Nyonya Tahir, who was already dead 
at the time of the court case. Nyonya Tahir, an 89-year old ethnic Malay woman, died of old age in 
2006. She had married a Chinese Buddhist man in 1936 and had had 13 children with him. In 1986, 
she had made a declaration at the Alor Gajah religious office that she wanted to live and be buried as 
a Chinese. When she died, the Negri Sembilan Religious Affairs Department wanted to bury her as a 
Muslim as she was of Malay birth and thus Muslim by definition. When the case came to the syariah 
court, her non-Muslim children were called as witnesses. In the end, the body was handed back to the 
family for a Buddhist burial. Then-PM Abdullah Badawi used the case to make the point that non-
Muslims could get justice in the syariah court. Bernama, 24/1/2006, New Straits Times, 21/1/2006.  
11
 For example, the case of Revathi, who was born to Indian parents who had coverted to Islam. She 
was registered as a Muslim (under the name Siti Fatimah) but claimed to have been brought up as a 
Hindu by her grandmother. She married a Hindu man and they had a daughter. She was put into 
detention and her year-old daughter taken from her and handed to her Muslim mother when she 
attended a syariah court hearing to have her official religious status changed to “Hindu”. 
Malaysiakini, 11/7/2007, The Sun, 5/4/2007 and 6/7/2007. 
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religions;
12
 or in one case, a Chinese woman who had converted in order to marry a 
Muslim but who had never practised Islam.
13
 Even with these, in the majority of 
cases the Muslim convert would be sent for religious rehabilitation. 
 
Religious expression 
The “Allah” controversy 
 In 2007, the Catholic weekly publication The Herald started to encounter 
problems renewing its yearly publishing permit, due to the use of the word “Allah” 
in its Bahasa Malaysia section to refer to the Christian God. The Internal Security 
Ministry’s stance was that “Allah” was to be used only for the Muslim God. Non-
Muslims should use the word “Tuhan” which is the general term for God.  
 In end 2009, High Court judge Lau Bee Lan declared the order by the Home 
Minister banning the use of the word “Allah” illegal, as The Herald had a 
constitutional right to use “Allah” to propagate the Christian religion, though not to 
Muslims.  
Reactions 
 Pending the government’s appeal (which has still not been heard by the 
courts), a number of churches, a Sikh temple, mosques and Muslim prayer halls 
were hit by petrol bombs, arson attacks and vandalism as Muslims protested the 
decision and others retaliated.  
 
Muslim sentiment on the “Allah” issue is driven by the worry that Christians would 
use confusion over the use of the term to proselytise and convert Muslims out of 
Islam. The de facto minister for Islamic affairs claimed the word "Allah" in 
Christian literature could confuse the country's Muslims and draw them to 
Christianity. Together with the term “Allah” (God), some other terms - "Baitullah" 
                                                          
12
 This was a case of 10 siblings, children of a Muslim man and a Hindu woman, raised as Hindus, 
who applied to have their religious status on their identity cards changed to “Hindu”. The Star, 
24/2/2007 and New Straits Times, 25/2/2007. 
13
 This was the case of Tan Ean Huang in Penang, who converted to Islam (taking the Muslim name 
Siti Fatimah Tan Abdullah) to marry an Iranian man who left her a few months later. The Star and 
New Straits Times, 11/8/2007 and The Straits Times, 8/5/2008.  
134 
 
(House of God), and "Solat" (prayer) are also restricted for use by Muslim groups 
by the Publications and Al-Quran Texts Control Department under the Home 
Ministry; the government claims that these words are the sole province of the 
Muslim community.
14
  
 
Hindu temples – protest and counter-protest 
2007 demolition of the Sri Maha Mariamman temple in Padang Jawa, Shah Alam
15
 
 The demolition of this century-old temple sparked clashes between residents 
and local council authorities and police. There was violence on both sides, with 
hundreds involved. Allegedly, the temple committee had only been told verbally the 
night before the demolition. The demolition sparked historic protests in November 
2007 against racial discrimination, organised by the Hindu Rights Action Force 
(Hindraf),
16
 where the demolition of Hindu temples was a key issue. 
2009 “Cow head” protests against relocation of Hindu temple 
 In August 2009, a group of 40 Muslims gathered at the gates of the Selangor 
State Secretariat, protesting against plans to relocate a Hindu temple to majority-
Muslim Section 23 of the city. A severed cow’s head was carried by the protestors, 
and later stomped on and spat upon. The protesters were later arrested and charged 
with sedition.  
 
The demolition of Hindu temples is a long-running issue. Many of the temples in 
question would have been constructed on privately owned plantations prior to the 
country’s independence in 1957. After independence, plantation lands along with 
their temples were transferred to government ownership. As the law allows the state 
authorities to demolish unregistered religious places of worship, cases like those 
                                                          
14
 Malaysiakini, 20/12/2007 and 21/12/2007, 2008 US International Religious Freedom Report 
(Malaysia), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2010/148881.htm, accessed on 10 Dec 2011. 
15
 Shah Alam is the state capital of Selangor, and is next to Kuala Lumpur.  
16
 Hindraf is an unregistered non-governmental organisation focussed on the concerns of ethnic 
Indians, which was banned by the Malaysian government in 2008 following the large-scale protests 
in 2007. US Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour, July- Dec 2010 International 
Religious Freedom Report, dd.13 Sep 2011. www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2010_5/168363.htm. 
Accessed on 10 Dec 2011. 
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described above are not uncommon.
17
 In the period reviewed, the media also 
highlighted the occasional case of a Chinese temple (in Penang) and a church (in 
Kelantan, a state held by the Islamic opposition party, PAS) being demolished.  
 
Twin concerns  
 In the discussion at the end of Chapter 4, we started to see how, by reading 
Rawls’s reasonableness requirement on justification as a heuristic device, we could 
bring together his account of justification with Raz’s. Fundamentally, Rawls and 
Raz share the concern that political principles should be justifiable to those who are 
subject to them. The heuristic reading, we saw, can be understood as a method to 
help us uncover the dependent reasons that exist in different circumstances. 
Meanwhile, the exploration in Chapter 3 of the overlapping consensus as a set of 
shared policies about weights identified a different concern, one that had to do with 
the practical matter of living together in a political society.  
 The Malaysia cases tell a story of the interaction between these two concerns 
– the concern for justifiability on one hand, and of the need for practical 
convergence in shared policies in order to live together well, on the other. Each set 
of issues detailed in the stories above – body-snatching, custody and conversion 
battles, disputes about freedom of expression and places of worship – shows us a 
breakdown of convergence on how to live together, because of the failure of 
justifiability. What is striking about these cases is that there is ultimately no 
resolution, no convergence about how to get along together. The practical need to 
agree on shared policies in order to live successfully together simply is not met. In 
the body-snatching cases, there is no agreed way to deal with the situation – each 
new case of body-snatching simply deepens the mistrust between religious groups 
and breaks the unity of the polity. The custody and conversion cases present 
particularly acute cases of the failure to converge on a practical resolution resulting 
in legal limbo for individuals. Similarly, the demolition of Hindu temples is an 
ongoing sore point, with worshippers living in constant uncertainty about having a 
place in which to worship. Perhaps only the “Allah” case comes close to at least 
                                                          
17
 US Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour, 2008 International Religious Freedom 
Report. http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2008/108413.htm, accessed on 10 Dec 2011. 
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having a practical solution for getting by, but even there the looming legal appeal 
creates uncertainty.   
 Such failure to live together successfully points back to a failure of 
justifiability. The priority of the concern for justifiability becomes clear when we 
ask the question – what caused the practical task of living together to break down, in 
each of these cases? As we shall go on to look at, in each of these different cases, 
asking the question of “Could this policy be reasonably rejected?” reveals the 
underlying reasons for the injustice in each case.  
 
Uncovering reasons, encountering complications 
 Each of these cases is unjust because it fails the test of justifiability. When 
we ask the question posed by the heuristic reading of Rawls’s reasonableness 
requirement – “Why might (the person concerned) reasonably reject the (legal or 
administrative) decision/policy of the authority?”, we find that in each case, there 
are good reasons to reject the situation, reasons based ultimately in the well-being of 
the individual, which is supposed to be safeguarded by the government. 
Let us begin with the conversion and custody cases, which involve, either 
directly or indirectly, the right to exit the Muslim faith. Lina Joy and Subashini each 
have a fundamental interest in shaping their life according to their conception of the 
good; their well-being requires, as a background condition, the freedom to choose 
between valuable ways of life without coercion. As a result, Lina Joy’s situation, 
where she is prevented from leaving the Muslim faith, undermines her well-being. 
Moreover, given that the authority of her government is premised on its usefulness 
as an instrument for serving the interests of its citizens, this is a case where she 
might reasonably expect her government to step in to guarantee her a right of exit.
18
 
                                                          
18
 Raz observes that it is to be expected that the relationship between liberal multiculturalism and 
various non-liberal cultures should be a shifting one. He says, “Since (liberal multiculturalism’s) 
respect of cultures is conditional and granted from a point of view outside many of them, there is 
little surprise that it finds itself in uneasy alliance with supporters of those cultures, sometimes 
joining them in a common front while at others turning against them to impose ideals of toleration 
and mutual respect, or to protect the members of those very cultures against oppression by their own 
group.” (Raz, “Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective,” in Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in 
the Morality of Law and Politics (Revised Edition) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), 183) He also 
makes the point that being in a multicultural society often makes cultural groups more repressive 
than they would be were they to exist in relative isolation.” (Multiculturalism, 185) – one explanatory 
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The same criticism would also apply, though indirectly, in the Subashini case, since 
the gravity of converting minors to Islam with only one parent’s consent derives in 
part from the fact that conversion to Islam in Malaysia at the moment is a one-way 
street, with no legal right of exit. In both of these cases, not allowing a right of exit 
from Islam poses a threat to the well-being of citizens who are Muslim. Because the 
justification for a principle of toleration is based on the good of individuals, 
applying a principle of toleration to a multi-religious society like Malaysia would 
not extend to allowing any religion the right to deny exit to its members.
19
  
As for non-Muslims not getting legal redress in civil courts for cases which 
involve Muslims, and at the same time not having locus standi in the syariah court 
(problems brought out by the Moorthy burial and Subashini custody cases), those 
affected could very reasonably charge the government with failing to protect the 
non-Muslim’s well-being, because not having access to legal redress frustrates their 
pursuit of the significant projects and relationships they have set upon.
20
 In the 
Subashini case, I think it would be fair to assume that one of the significant projects 
of her life was to pursue the valuable activity of being a good mother to her 
children. The legal limbo in which she finds herself dooms this ambition to failure. 
Given that her case is but one instance of a systemic bias in the existing legal rules, 
there is reason to call her predicament, and the rules which permit it, unjust.  
In the ‘body-snatching’ cases, although the dead-person’s well-being can no 
longer be affected, 
21
 there is a public good argument to be made against such body-
snatching practices by the Muslim religious authorities. One of the effects of these 
body-snatching cases is that they create an atmosphere of uncertainty. Such 
uncertainty harms all non-Muslims, since the practice of body-snatching gives rise 
to doubt over whether they will be able to successfully complete their life in their 
chosen faith (or none), given that their religious status could be subject to dispute 
                                                                                                                                                                   
hypothesis for why conversion-related cases are so sensitive in Malaysia is that Malaysian Muslims 
feel threatened by the presence of a significant minority of adherents of other religions.  
19
 “Multiculturalism,” 190. Raz calls the right of exit a “limit of toleration”. The other limits which 
he lists are, in denying communities the right to repress their own members, and in discouraging 
intolerant attitudes to outsiders.  
20
 For Raz, frustrating a person’s pursuit of the projects and relationships he has set upon constitutes 
doing harm to that person. (Morality of Freedom, 413, Chapter 15, “Freedom and Autonomy”) 
21
 Harm to well-being, in its ordinary use, is forward-looking - “(t)o harm a person is to diminish his 
prospects, to affect adversely his possibilities.”
 
Morality of Freedom, Chapter 15, “Freedom and 
Autonomy,” 413-4. 
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after their death. This doubt in turn undermines the wholeheartedness necessary to 
lead a successful life. It could be argued therefore that non-Muslims, therefore, have 
a collective interest in being assured that their religious status will not be subject to 
dispute after their death, unless an open hearing in the civil courts can prove that 
they had indeed been converted.  
Moreover, the body-snatching cases have a negative impact on the well-
being of the family members left behind, and they can reasonably reject the practice 
as unjust. Consider Moorthy’s wife, Kaliammal. Her well-being is compromised by 
not being able to obtain legal recourse in the civil courts, because this frustrates her 
project of living her life as a Hindu woman, married to someone of the same faith 
and part of a family who practises the same faith. Her assessment of how successful 
she has been in living a life of faith does not concern herself only but also her 
family. Judging from the evidence adduced to support her claim that her husband 
had not in fact converted, she was keen to vindicate the success and integrity of 
Moorthy’s life as a follower of Hinduism, for if he had indeed converted to Islam, 
he would have failed in the project of being a good Hindu. The fact that in such 
cases the decision as to a person’s religious status lies with the syariah courts, the 
impartiality of which is not beyond doubt in such cases, makes this case one of 
illegitimate authority on the part of the government.  
The reasons for rejecting the demolition of Hindu temples and the threat of 
denying the use of “Allah” to all but the Muslim community have to do with 
freedom of expression and how that connects with well-being.
22
 We validate our 
chosen way of life by expressing it in the public sphere. Public expression of a way 
of life serves to reassure its adherents that they are not alone, that their problems and 
experiences are known to others, and gives the way of life the stamp of public 
acceptability. Free expression is thus a public good because it perpetuates the 
existence of valuable ways of life. By denying public expression to a way of life, 
“the government restricts and impedes the ability of that way of life...to gain public 
recognition and acceptability”.23   
                                                          
22
 I take these arguments from Raz, “Free Expression and Personal Identification” in Ethics in the 
Public Domain. 
23
 “Free Expression,” 162. 
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Given that public worship conducted in religious buildings is an integral part 
of the exercise of many non-Muslim religions, the demolition of religious buildings 
denies those communities the validation that public worship enables. The Malaysian 
government’s response that the demolitions are not aimed at the religious buildings 
per se but rather take place because of the buildings’ illegal status would be 
insufficient to deflect the accusation of injustice, if it turned out to be true that the 
government was not allocating sufficient land for the Hindu community to build 
places of worship sufficient for their numbers.  
As for the “Allah” controversy, the Christian and Sikh communities in 
Malaysia had, as a matter of traditional practice, habitually made use of the term 
“Allah” to describe their respective gods. The government’s decision to restrict the 
use of the term to the Muslim community denied the Christian and Sikh religions 
the public validation that comes from a community’s sharing their faith through the 
published word. Moreover, precisely because of the role of public expression in 
validating a way of life, censorship of public expression takes on a wider negative 
significance, which is to express “official, authoritative disapproval and 
condemnation of the style of life of which the censored communication is a part”.24 
In the “Allah” case, denying Christians and Sikhs the right to use the word to refer 
to their god constitutes a message of disapproval and rejection of their entire way of 
life.  
In addition, the ruling against non-Muslims using the term “Allah” also fails 
adequately to appreciate that the different major religions are not just incompatible 
but rival ways of life.
25
 That is, Islam and Christianity are not just incompatible 
(meaning they cannot be adopted by the same person at the same time). More than 
that, they are rival ways of life, meaning that being an adherent of one entails 
disapproving of some aspects of the other. Fundamentally, Islam and Christianity 
disagree on whether the man Jesus is God (“Allah”), and trying to remove this deep 
                                                          
24
 “Free Expression,” 156-7. Raz emphasises that this account of censorship as insult is not merely of 
the views or opinions censored but of the whole style of life of which they are a part.” (“Free 
Expression,” 153) Raz deems this second argument the more powerful of the two, in some ways.  
(See “Free Expression,” 158). 
25
 Raz makes this distinction in “Free Expression,” 165-6. He says, “A Christian can approve of the 
way of life of the Muslim, and vice versa, in that they can and should find each other’s way of life 
valuable and worthwhile. But not without reservations. There are aspects of the other’s practices, 
attitudes, and beliefs that each of them must take exception to, must disagree with. Disagreement, 
condemnation, and even hostility to certain aspects of rival ways of life is an essential element of 
each way of life.” 
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disagreement by awarding the word to one party rather than another is to seriously 
underestimate the problem. To deny the use of “Allah” to non-Muslim religious 
communities would be to demand that these communities make a conceptual shift in 
their community’s understanding of their god. For Christians, the government’s 
suggestion was that they should replace “Allah” with the general term for god, 
“Tuhan”. However, for Malay-speaking Christians, “Tuhan,” would not be a 
satisfactory substitute since the two terms are used to refer to two distinct concepts 
in the Malay bible. This deep rivalry is precisely why a policy of toleration is 
needed in the first place. For the state to favour Islam in this matter betrays its 
responsibility to safeguard the well-being of all its citizens by ensuring freedom of 
expression.  The official condemnation conveyed by such censorship alienates 
people from their society, harming their well-being by making them feel less than a 
full member of their society.
26
 
In each of these cases we have found reasons, grounded in the well-being of 
individuals, to reject the policies/practices in question. The existence of these 
reasons helps us make the assessment that each of these situations is unjust, since 
they demonstrate that the test of justifiability is not met.  
While thinking about the issues with a concern for justifiability leads us to 
the conclusion that these situations are unjust and therefore must be changed, the 
political realities of Malaysia complicate the picture by pointing us to the 
considerable obstacles which stand in the way of rectifying some of these. While 
issues such as the demolition of Hindu temples and the use of “Allah” are resolvable 
given sufficient political will, the issues that touch on syariah law are much less 
tractable. There are, first of all, constitutional impediments to legal reform – Islam is 
a matter of state law, which means that the federal government in power, even if 
they had the political will, would not have the power to unilaterally change the 
situation. As things stand, the federal government has limited wherewithal to impose 
limits on what syariah courts can or cannot do; the Malay Sultans (rulers), who are 
constitutionally designated the guardians of the Islamic faith in the country, have the 
right of veto for any law touching on syariah law. The problem is not merely 
political or legal, but also a theological problem internal to Islam. At present, the 
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state of Negri Sembilan is the only state in Malaysia whose syariah law contains 
provisions for a Muslim to renounce his/her faith. If a guarantee of a right of exit 
from any religion is to be put in place for all Malaysians, the Muslim community 
would also need to engage in serious theological deliberation to ascertain whether 
they can find a theological basis for allowing conversions out of Islam. 
Secondly, the Malaysian population is majority Malay-Muslim. As a matter 
of political survival, most governments would be chary of alienating Muslim voters 
by attempting to guarantee a right of conversion out of Islam, unless there were first 
a shift in Muslim opinion on the matter. In short, the politics of the case tells us that 
a practical convergence on an alternative, just policy, which guarantees the right of 
exit from the Muslim faith, is unlikely in the immediate future. Just as Rawls 
describes the emergence of the practice of toleration in Europe as a fortuitous 
historical occurrence, so also the establishment of a right of exit from Islam in 
Malaysia will likely take a significant shift in the political and social realities in 
order to obtain.  
 
How epistemic abstinence silences the verdict of injustice  
Notice how in the previous section we were able to come to an assessment of 
injustice. Using the heuristic reading of Rawlsian justifiability, we asked, for each 
set of circumstances, whether it could be reasonably rejected. On the basis of the 
reasons that emerged, many of which reflected Razian concerns about well-being, 
we concluded that the various situations were unjust. In this section, I want to draw 
out the contrast with the standard interpretation of Rawls, which requires epistemic 
abstinence, and on which a verdict of injustice could not be straightforwardly 
obtained.  
Recall that Rawls’s starting point in looking for a shared basis for 
determining the principles of justice for a constitutional democracy is “the public 
culture itself as the shared fund of implicitly recognised basic ideas and 
principles”.27 If Malaysia were to fall under the category of society to which 
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Rawls’s arguments in A Theory of Justice or Political Liberalism should apply, then 
such judgements of injustice would be straightforward. But Malaysia is not a case 
where the public culture sees an equal liberty of conscience as a “fixed point” or a 
“settled conviction”.28 Malaysia may have inherited a policy of toleration from her 
British colonial rulers, but within the Malaysian public culture, it is not clear that 
anything like an equal liberty of conscience would form a fixed point in the 
Malaysian citizenry’s considered judgements of what is just. Because of this, it is 
not clear that Rawls’s argument justifying an equal liberty of conscience can 
directly apply.  
To see this, consider - to whom is the justification of the principles of justice 
directed? Rawls distinguishes three points of view as relevant to justification of 
justice as fairness as a moral conception: that of the parties in the original position, 
that of citizens in a well-ordered society, and that of us, observers from outside the 
system.
29
 It is from the third point of view – that of you or me – that justice as 
fairness must be assessed. On Rawls’s account, a substantive theory like justice as 
fairness is only justified when there is “sufficient convergence”; where “a basis is 
established for political reasoning and understanding within a public culture”, 
enabling the members of that society to “make mutually acceptable to one another 
their shared institutions and basic arrangements, by citing what are publicly 
recognized as sufficient reasons, as identified by that conception.”30 This description 
of justification clearly does not apply to the first viewpoint - that of the parties 
situated behind the veil of ignorance. That viewpoint is merely the bridging decision 
mechanism connecting the procedure of justification to its substantive results (viz., 
the principles of justice); it is not a perspective from which the theory can be 
assessed as to justification. Rawls tells us that justice as fairness is only justified 
from the second viewpoint - that of citizens in a well-ordered society. The fact of 
justification is modelled by the “unanimous agreement of the parties in the original 
position.”31 This leaves the third viewpoint – ours; the outsider. The argument from 
the original position is addressed to us, Rawls’s readers. And it only succeeds if its 
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premises accord with our considered judgements, implicit in the public culture of 
our society. For justice as fairness to count as a justified moral conception for us, we 
must agree with the “model-conceptions”32 of “freedom” and “equality”, and “moral 
persons” that Rawls outlines. Thus Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness, rather than 
merely stating facts, seeks to convince us of the implications of what our modern, 
democratic societies already believe.
33
 But if justifiability indeed requires shared 
reasons, then this is also why, for a society where Rawls’s model conceptions are 
not implicit in the background culture, the argument for the principles of justice 
does not go through.
34
 
 Nonetheless, could Rawls not say that his arguments apply to any country 
which claims to be democratic?  After all, he does say that “(j)ustice as fairness is a 
political conception of justice for the special case of the basic structure of a modern 
democratic society.”35 Since Malaysia would classify itself as a democracy, this 
would seem to give Rawls some purchase on the Malaysian case. In what follows, I 
argue that this will not ultimately work, because while Malaysia is a democracy, 
there is no agreement in Malaysian public culture on the liberal conceptions of 
freedom and equality needed for Rawls’s original position argument for the two 
principles of justice. 
On the proposed approach, what Rawls would need for the argument from 
the original position to go through is to show that Malaysian public culture contains 
a conception of itself as a fair system of cooperation between free and equal 
persons. This can be broken down further into two conceptions – first, a conception 
of the person as free and equal, and second, its companion conception of society as a 
scheme of social cooperation over time.  
The conception of a person that Rawls needs for the argument from the 
original position to work is that of a person possessing two moral powers, as 
follows:  
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a. a capacity for a sense of justice – the capacity to understand, apply and act 
from principles of political justice that specify the fair terms of social 
cooperation; and  
b. a capacity for a conception of the good – the capacity to have, revise and 
rationally to pursue a conception of the good; what one considers of value in 
human life.  
Such persons are conceived of as equal in virtue of the fact that they possess the 
above moral powers to the requisite degree of being a fully cooperating member of 
society over a complete life. This equality is modelled in the original position by the 
fact that the citizens’ representatives are “symmetrically situated” and have equal 
rights in reaching an agreement about the principles of justice.
36
 The persons are 
considered free because they regard themselves and other citizens as capable of 
standing apart of their particular conception of the good. This means that their 
identity as citizens is not affected by changes in their specific conceptions of the 
good.
37
 They also consider themselves as free because they regard themselves as 
self-authenticating sources of valid claims, meaning that they see themselves as 
entitled to make claims on their institutions so as to advance their (permissible) 
conceptions of the good.
38
  
 We begin to see why the case of Malaysia is problematic. For neither 
Rawls’s conception of freedom nor that of equality seems to have a firm grip. 
Equality obtains only partially – although citizens are viewed as responsible, 
cooperating members of society, the full-blown liberal conception of equality is not 
accepted. In the public understanding, solidified in the constitution, the indigenous 
peoples are not symmetrically situated with respect to their non-indigenous 
counterparts. Freedom, too, does not obtain because for Muslims in particular, their 
identity as indigenous citizens, or “bumiputera,” is tied to their religious and 
cultural identity.
 39
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Let us turn to the second conception needed for the argument from the 
original position to work – Rawls’s conception of social cooperation. This 
conception has three essential features:
40
  
a. Social cooperation is distinct from merely socially coordinated activity, in 
that it is guided by publicly recognised rules and procedures which those 
cooperating accept as appropriate to regulate their conduct.  
b. A notion of the fair terms of cooperation, which each participant may 
reasonably be expected to accept, provided that everyone else likewise 
accepts them. 
c. Cooperation as including the idea of each participant’s rational advantage, 
which is the advancement of their conception of the good.  
This second conception arguably exists in Malaysian public culture, though subject 
to the restrictions arising from the special position of the indigenous peoples and the 
status of Islam as the official religion.  
If we understand justifiability as requiring shared reasons, any attempt to 
make the argument from the original position to Rawls’s two principles of justice 
would lack bite because of the absence of consensus regarding the fundamental 
conceptions of freedom and equality. In particular, there is no agreement in 
Malaysian public culture that certain historical factors are irrelevant to the common 
good idea of justice. There would not be consensus that these factors should be 
excluded from the original position. As a result of the distinction made between the 
original inhabitants of the land (the Malays and other indigenous peoples) and later 
immigrants (among them the Chinese and Indians), the Malaysian constitution 
enshrines the “special position” of the Malays and other indigenous peoples. With 
this special position came the entrenchment of Islam as the official religion of the 
federation.
41
 Thus the nub of the problem is that, while Malaysia might be 
constitutionally democratic, it is not a liberal society. That is, it is not a society 
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where the principles of justice governing the basic structure of society are 
commonly acknowledged to be those chosen by citizens deemed free and equal.  
Perhaps due in part to such considerations, Rawls in The Law of Peoples 
allows for the Society of Peoples to be extended to what he calls “decent 
hierarchical peoples”.42 For these, there is no original position argument deriving the 
form of the basic structure of their society. This is because “(a)s it is used in a social 
contract conception, an original position argument for domestic justice is a liberal 
idea, and it does not apply to the domestic justice of a decent hierarchical regime.”43 
Further, “(o)nly equal parties can be symmetrically situated in an original 
position,”44 and equality is not a shared premise in the Malaysian case. Rawls 
considers decent peoples one variety of “well-ordered peoples”,45 and they are 
marked by the following two criteria:
46
 
1) They are peaceful, not aggressive; and 
2) The second criterion has three parts: 
a. Their law secures human rights – specifically, they have “the right to 
life (to the means of subsistence and security); to liberty (to freedom 
from slavery, serfdom and forced occupation, and to a sufficient 
measure of liberty of conscience to ensure freedom of religion and 
thought); to property (personal property); and to formal equality as 
expressed by the rules of natural justice (that is, that similar cases be 
treated similarly).”47  
b. Their law specifies a decent scheme of cooperation. Persons are seen 
as responsible and cooperating members of their respective groups, 
without them necessarily being equal citizens.  
c. Legal administrators must believe that the law is guided by a 
common good idea of justice.  
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In spelling out the content of the human right to liberty referred to in the second 
criterion, Rawls makes clear that this would not be the same as the rights to liberty 
guaranteed by the first principle of justice in a liberal society for which the 
arguments of justice as fairness would apply. Rather, the right to liberty is a more 
restricted, “special class of urgent rights, such as freedom from slavery and serfdom, 
liberty (but not equal liberty) of conscience, and security of ethnic groups from mass 
murder and genocide”48 Rawls further elaborates that a decent hierarchical society 
must admit  
 
a sufficient measure of liberty of conscience and freedom of religion and 
thought, even if these freedoms are not as extensive or as equal for all 
members of the decent society as they are in liberal societies. Though 
the established religion may have various privileges, it is essential to the 
society’s being decent that no religion be persecuted, or denied civic and 
social conditions permitting its practice in peace and without fear.
49
  
 
Once a society is deemed to meet these two criteria, Rawls in The Law of Peoples 
says that the Society of Peoples should accept them as members in good standing. 
For such societies, he says, forceful intervention by diplomatic and economic 
sanctions, or military force, cannot be justified.
50
  
Malaysia seems to fit well into Rawls’s category of a decent hierarchical 
society. Certainly it is neither a slave society nor one where ethnic groups are 
systematically butchered. The coalition which has governed the country since 
independence in 1957, the Barisan Nasional (BN), is organised along communal 
lines, with each party providing representation for a different ethnic group in the 
country. Citizens thus have an avenue of participating in the political decision-
making of the country, without them having equal rights, since the bumiputera 
(indigenous peoples) of the country have special privileges, safeguarded by the 
constitution. One might question whether a society where one religious group (in the 
Malaysian case, Islam), denies a right of exit to its adherents, could still be counted 
                                                          
48
 Law of Peoples, 79.  
49
 Law of Peoples, 74. 
50
 Law of Peoples, 80. 
148 
 
as “reasonable”.51 Rawls clarifies, however, that what is required of decent 
hierarchical societies is not that they are reasonable, but that they are “not fully 
reasonable”.52 Decent hierarchical societies occupy the gap between the fully 
unreasonable and the fully reasonable.
53
 Whereas full reasonableness, such as is 
seen in justice as fairness, is concerned with the individual’s rights to various 
freedoms, decency appears to set a lower bar, requiring only the freedom of the 
religious groupings. Once we allow for the categorisation of Malaysia as a decent 
hierarchical society, Rawls’s recommendation for a liberal people’s foreign policy 
toward Malaysia would be to recognise her as a full member of the Society of 
Peoples. 
Why is Rawls so permissive when it comes to non-liberal societies? The 
answer is twofold. First, Rawls considers a people’s “amour-propre” one of the 
“fundamental interests” of a people. 54 He elaborates:  
 
This interest is a people’s proper self-respect of themselves as a people, 
resting on their common awareness of their trials during their history 
and of their culture with its accomplishments...this interest shows itself 
in a people’s insisting on receiving from other peoples a proper respect 
and recognition of their equality.
55
 
 
Rawls is clear that such self-respect is a good. He says:  
 
[it is] a good for individuals and associations to be attached to their 
particular culture and to take part in its common public and civic life. In 
this way political society is expressed and fulfilled.  
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  This is no small thing. It argues for preserving significant room 
for the idea of a people’s self-determination and for some kind of loose 
or confederative form of a Society of Peoples.
56
 
 
The argument, it seems, is this: 
1. The amour-propre of a people is a good.  
2. The maintenance of a society’s amour-propre requires having respect 
from other peoples. 
3. Coercive intervention57 in a society in the form of political, economic 
or military sanction or other coercive measure constitutes a denial of 
respect for that society.  
4. Such denial of respect requires strong reasons. 
5. An example of a strong reason for intervention would be the society’s 
violation of core human rights. 
6. In the case of decent consultation hierarchies, there is no such strong 
reason to intervene. 
7. Therefore decent peoples should be recognised as fully-fledged 
members of the Society of Peoples. 
One might question Rawls’s implicit assumption that coercive intervention is the 
only alternative to recognising a people as a fully-fledged member of the Society of 
Peoples. As we shall see in the next section, if one can both respect a people and 
express reservations about their unequal treatment of part of their population in a 
way that is not coercive, then Rawls’s argument would not take him all the way to 
his conclusion in (7).  
Rawls’s second reason for recommending full recognition of decent peoples in 
the Society of Peoples is that decent societies have an internal mechanism for 
change, which makes it more probable that change in a liberal direction will take 
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place. Because decent peoples have a consultation hierarchy which allows citizens 
both a substantial political role in making decisions and a right of dissent, “the 
common good conception of justice held by decent peoples may gradually change 
over time, prodded by the dissents of members of these peoples.”58 Rawls thinks 
that this internal change is likely to tend in a liberal direction, because of the people 
of the decent hierarchical society acknowledge the evident superiority of liberal 
institutions.
59
 Rawls therefore urges liberal peoples not to withhold respect from 
decent peoples by denying them good standing in the Society of Peoples, as this 
might stifle any organic change in a liberal direction.
60
 Rather, Rawls recommends 
giving decent peoples an equal place in the Society of Peoples, thus maintaining a 
climate of mutual respect in the Society of Peoples, which will in turn create a 
supportive environment for liberal reforms to flourish.
61
 
 While it is a fair observation that internal change can more easily 
happen in a decent consultation hierarchy than in a system where internal 
dissent is forbidden (for example, in a dictatorship), the question of whether 
internal change in a decent hierarchical society is in fact likely to favour a 
liberal slant, remains a question for empirical study. Given the diversity of 
comprehensive views present in the modern societies, one might argue that 
change in a decent hierarchical society could just as often tend in the direction 
of, for example, theocratic government. Much would depend on the 
composition and background of the decent people in question, and the 
historical dynamics at play. It is not self-evident that the citizens of a decent 
hierarchical society are more likely than not to look to liberal democracies and 
make the judgement that those societies are organised in a superior fashion.  
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Notice that Rawls’s question in The Law of Peoples involves a shift in 
perspective from his question in A Theory of Justice or Political Liberalism. The 
question in The Law of Peoples is about how a liberal people should run its foreign 
policy, whereas the focus in his earlier works is solidly domestic. We have just seen 
Rawls’s arguments about the foreign policy stance appropriate for a liberal people to 
take towards a decent society such as Malaysia. But this was not the question we 
started this section with. Our initial focus was a domestic one – we wanted to see if 
the standard understanding of Rawlsian justification would allow us to conclude that 
the Malaysian cases detailed in the first part of this chapter were cases of injustice. 
To put the point more sharply, if Rawls were to take the perspective of the Hindu 
woman Subashini, fighting for her younger child not to be unilaterally converted to 
Islam but finding herself without recourse in the civil courts, what could he say? 
Posing the question in this manner reveals why Rawls’s answer in The Law of 
Peoples might leave us unsatisfied. Telling Subashini that philosophical 
investigation reveals that Malaysia is a decent society is neither here nor there; it 
does not address her plight.  
Although none of the following is explicitly mentioned in the Rawls’s 
writings, the standard reading of Rawls on justification leaves him a few things he 
could say on Subashini’s behalf. First, Rawls could affirm her negative judgement 
of her situation, in the following manner. Insofar as Subashini lives in a world 
where she can see for herself that there are liberal democracies outside where all 
citizens have equal legal standing in the courts, she would be making a true 
judgement that those liberal systems are superior to her own society’s basic 
structure.
62
 This is precisely the argument which in The Law of Peoples, undergirds 
Rawls’s recommendation of non-interference with decent peoples.  
Second, Rawls could encourage Subashini to voice her dissent within her 
own society’s common good idea of justice, so as to start the process of change 
towards having more liberal institutions. This would be in keeping with Rawls’s 
vision of a decent people “recognis(ing) the advantages of liberal institutions and 
tak(ing) steps toward becoming more liberal on its own.” 63 He could point out that 
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it is entirely within the spirit of Malaysia’s rules of social cooperation that 
Subashini’s ethnic political representatives (because Malaysian politics is organised 
along ethnic lines) should speak out for legal reform on her behalf, and make 
common cause with other non-Muslim political entities which share the same 
interest.  
That Malaysia is a self-acknowledged democracy, with at least a minimal 
conception of society as a system of social cooperation, is a place to start, since, as 
Rawls puts it, for democratic societies, “citizens do not regard their social order as a 
fixed natural order, or as an institutional structure justified by religious doctrines or 
hierarchical principles expressing aristocratic values.”64 Malaysia being a 
democracy, all the political levers of democratic participation are available to 
Subashini – dissent, voicing of that dissent via political channels, voting against the 
ruling party if no action is taken on the matter, and so on. Nothing in Rawls’s theory 
requires that Subashini keep silent about how she experiences the impact of her 
situation. Because a decent people is a well-ordered society, effectively regulated by 
a publicly recognised common good idea of justice, that common good idea of 
justice is able to serve as the basis for adjudicating political disputes.
65
 And while 
the specific argument from the original position to the two principles of justice may 
not be available to the citizen of a decent consultation hierarchy, the method of 
reflective equilibrium is. Assume for a moment that Malaysia as a decent people had 
achieved general reflective equilibrium before the Subashini case – that is, citizens 
affirmed the same public conception of political justice. With Subashini’s court case 
and its manifestly unsatisfactory outcome, there would have been a disturbance in 
the general reflective equilibrium of the people. This would put in motion forces for 
change. Because in a non-liberal democracy no less than in a liberal one, “a 
conception of justice is not fixed once and for all,”66 but is rather an unfinished 
project,
67
 for a decent people there is always hope for reform in a liberal direction, 
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since each new generation affirms, amends or remakes the legacy of the past in 
accord with its considered judgements.
68
 
At the same time, however, Rawls has forfeited the international 
community’s speaking rights by including decent peoples in the Society of Peoples. 
The international community’s engagement with the reality of Malaysia’s imperfect 
policy of toleration ends at the determination that Malaysia is a decent consultation 
hierarchy. By Rawls’s lights, while Subashini could rightly speak up within her 
society against her situation, she would not have or feel “the moral support of the 
whole world”, to use the phrase of one of the leading drafters of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.
69
 By his definition of “decent” as including societies 
which fulfil just a “a special class of urgent rights”, and not requiring an equal 
liberty of conscience,
70
 Rawls’s theory of international justice assigns the 
international community the role of the silent observer who watches and hopes for 
the best. Liberal peoples, qua peoples,
71
 may wish Subashini luck, but may not 
speak up or intervene on her behalf.  
 
Speaking out about injustice while affirming the moral importance of national 
sovereignty 
 The heuristic reading of Rawlsian justifiability gives us a way to both speak 
out about injustice and to affirm the moral importance of national sovereignty. 
Because the heuristic reading does not require epistemic abstinence, it does not 
result in a need to hold back moral criticism of a society, simply because it does not 
share the liberal conceptions of freedom and equality. As we have seen in the 
“Uncovering reasons” section above, making use of the heuristic device of 
reasonable nonrejectability helps us see the reasons there are for thinking a certain 
situation is unjust, and enables us to call injustice what it is, wherever we find it. 
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At the same time, the heuristic reading is able to take on board Rawls’s 
concern about the moral importance of national sovereignty. The heuristic reading, 
by removing the requirement of epistemic abstinence in Rawls, brings out the 
common threads in his and Raz’s views on the forms of political power. What they 
share emerges particularly clearly in the case of foreign policy. Both Rawls and Raz 
are chary of coercive foreign intervention. Their concern about forceful intervention 
has to do with justifiability; with the reasons that would be needed to justify such 
intervention. Each thinks that because there are strong moral reasons to value 
national sovereignty, coercive intervention requires special justification.  
The moral case for national sovereignty starts with individual well-being. As 
we have already seen in the previous section with Rawls’s concerns about the 
“amour-propre” of a people, Rawls emphasises that enjoying respect as a people-
group is good for individual well-being. Raz is entirely in agreement with Rawls on 
this point. He notes that the fact that our world is organised in nation-states shapes 
people’s self-perception and hence their well-being. This historical and sociological 
fact – that individual self-respect is affected by the esteem in which one’s nation is 
held – gives rise to an argument for the moral importance of national self-
government: “individual dignity and self-respect require that the groups membership 
of which contributes to one’s sense of identity be generally respected and not made 
a subject of ridicule, hatred, discrimination, or persecution”.72 Among the 
behaviours ruled out by the moral importance of national sovereignty would be 
coercive intervention for anything less than compelling reasons of human well-
being. This acknowledgement of the reasons we have to value national sovereignty 
and to be wary of unjustified, forceful foreign intervention is, I believe, is a virtue of 
both Rawls’s and Raz’s accounts. The argument for the moral importance of 
sovereignty seems to me sound, accurately describing the relationship between 
individual well-being and the groups to which we belong. 
Being able to begin from where our international order currently stands is an 
advantage. Post-Westphalia, we find ourselves in a world of nation-states, where 
there are moral norms (respect for national sovereignty, some understanding of the 
rules of engagement for armed conflict) which allow us to get along together in 
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relative peace and stability. Our situation is akin to Rawls’s favourite example of a 
modus vivendi – the emergence of a principle of toleration subsequent to the 
devastating European wars of religion. While, as Rawls points out, a mere modus 
vivendi is unstable, it is still better than all-out armed conflict. The advantage of the 
approach to justifiability which I have sketched in the sections above is that it gives 
us a realistic, non-utopian, account of our current practice of international relations, 
while at the same time allowing us to level moral criticism where it is due.
73
  My 
proposed approach to justifiability forces us to take seriously the reasons that there 
are in favour of the status quo, rather than allowing us to bypass those reasons and 
proceed straight to a reality of our imagining.
 74
 In doing so, this provides a better 
basis for change, where it is needed. If, having considered all the reasons there are 
for the status quo, the balance of reasons lies on the side of change, then we have a 
better chance of making that change justifiable to those on whom we would impose 
it. And if the previous chapters are correct about mutual respect for persons 
requiring justifiability, then we have good reason for choosing this starting point. 
Thus although, as Leif Wenar observes, Rawls’s account in The Law of Peoples has 
attracted “unusually deep misgivings” from his “most sensitive and sympathetic 
interpreters”75 for being too conservative, it is this very realism about the world in 
which we find ourselves, a perspective shared by Rawls and Raz, which we should 
value as a strength of their common concern with justifiability.  
Acknowledging the moral importance of sovereignty is not, however, the 
same as holding back on calling injustice by its proper name. As Raz rightly points 
out, there is a gap between the limit of legitimate authority and the limit of 
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sovereignty.
76
 Not every action which exceeds a state’s legitimate authority is a 
reason for other states to interfere in that state’s affairs. Thus while the Malaysia 
cases detailed in the first part of this chapter might be rightly called instances of 
injustice, it is a separate question as to whether there is reason for coercive 
intervention in a way that infringes Malaysian sovereignty. Moreover, as Raz 
observes elsewhere,
77
 there are many non-coercive forms of government action – 
offering subsidies for certain activities, rewarding desired activities, etc. This opens 
up a range of options for governments to take, when they see injustice taking place 
in a foreign country – if they find themselves in the position of caring about the 
justifiability of their actions, they are compelled neither to be silent about injustice, 
nor to stand idly by while it occurs.  
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8 
The Muslim Veil in France and Turkey 
 
This chapter has as its target secularism of a certain sort. Specifically, it 
examines the French conception of laïcité and the Turkish variant of this, laiklik, 
both of which involve a public sphere stripped of all religious symbol and 
affiliation. By looking at the arguments justifying these forms of secularism, I aim 
to show that a commitment to liberal justification does not require secularism, nor is 
such secularism necessarily liberal. The first part of the chapter lays out the 
background and details of two cases of what might be called ‘Secularism v. the 
Muslim veil’, as seen in France and Turkey. In the second part, I proceed to 
examine these cases through the lens of liberal justifiability, using the different 
approaches to justification developed in earlier chapters. I conclude that there is no 
distinctively liberal argument to support the headscarf ban in either France or 
Turkey, and highlight the need for sensitivity to historical and sociological factors in 
trying to make policies that are justifiable to citizens. 
 
Turkey 
Turkey’s 1982 Constitution enshrines secularism as the most important pillar 
of the state and stipulates that this characteristic of the Turkish state is an 
“irrevocable” provision and cannot be removed from the Turkish Constitution.1 
Article 2 states, “The Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular, and social state 
governed by the rule of law…”2 The overwhelming majority of Turkish citizens - 
99.8%
3
 - are Muslims, with women in headscarves making up 61.3% of the female 
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 Article 4 of the 1982 constitution states that the provisions (including secularity) concerning the 
characteristics of the Republic – which include secularism, “shall not be amended, nor their 
amendment proposed”. From the text of the Turkish constitution, Constitutional Court of the 
Republic Turkey website, http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/index.php?l=template&id=210&lang=1&c=1, 
accessed 4 Dec 12. 
2
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12. Italics added. 
3
 CIA factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos//tu.html, 
accessed 4 Dec 2012. 
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population.
4
 In practice, secularism, or laiklik, functions as a state ideology in the 
service of the national effort of development and modernization.  
The Turkish understanding of secularism, laiklik, is not identical with the 
French concept. While laïcité requires the separation of church and state, laiklik is 
more hands-on about religion, in requiring that the state be the sole custodian of 
religion, enforcing secularism by controlling religious matters. Laiklik allows for 
the state’s encroachment on religion in the public realm, and even in the private 
realm to the extent that this is deemed necessary to limit the involvement of religion 
in state affairs. Thus the Diyanet, the directorate of religious affairs, oversees 
religious affairs and education in the name of the state.
5
  
Turkey’s headscarf ban is justified by Article 2, in spite of the fact that 
Article 10 of the same Constitution guarantees equality before the law to all citizens, 
while Article 24 guarantees freedom of conscience and religious belief.  Islamic 
head-covering is viewed by secularists as representing the Ottoman past and 
religious fundamentalism, and therefore regarded as a threat to the project of 
Turkish modernization defended by Turkish nationalists.
6
  
Legislation prohibiting the wearing of religious garb in public started to 
appear in the early years of the Turkish republic. The 1925 Hat Law mandated the 
wearing of western style hats in place of the Islamic fez. Those who resisted were 
severely dealt with.
7
 By 1934, Turkey’s founding father, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, 
had succeeded in implementing strict restrictions on the wearing of religious dress, 
even by religious authorities such as imams, priests, and rabbis – these were only 
permitted to wear religious garments during their official duties and in their 
vocational premises. In contrast with the legislative coercion applied to men to 
prevent them from wearing religious dress, women were initially only encouraged to 
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 According to research conducted by TESEV in 2006. Ali Çarkoğlu and Binnaz Toprak, Değişen 
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5
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7
 Kavakci Islam, 19, mentions İskilipli Mehmed Atıf Hoca, an Islamic scholar, as one of the people 
who was executed for refusing to wear a hat as mandated by the law.  
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dress in Western styles. The suggestion to rid themselves of the Islamic headscarf 
was resisted by the majority of Turkish women.
8
 It was the women of the Istanbul 
elite who were first seen to westernise their appearance by taking off their 
headscarves. Wives of military officers and federal employees also led the way.  
 
An early case of professional discrimination: In 1972, Emine Aykenar was 
disbarred from the Ankara Bar Association because “a religious cover could not be 
compatible with civilized dress and professional outfit.”  The bar association’s 
president defended the disbarment decision by saying that if they were not removed, 
then “başörtülü [headscarved women] would fill up every corner.”9 
 
1980s - Ban on religious head coverings in universities and public service 
Following a military coup in 1980, General Evren’s government banned the 
wearing of headscarves for students through a decree of the National Security 
Council. In 1982, a second headscarf ban followed, this time for government 
officials. General Evren said, “We will not let başörtülü [headscarved women] into 
the university. We are adamant about that. No one should insist on it. There is no 
such thing in the religion, anyway.” 10 The bans were the culmination of societal 
changes which took place alongside Turkey’s modernisation project. In the late 
1960s, a handful of headscarved women began to challenge the stereotype of 
headscarved women as backward, rural folk who should remain unseen, by moving 
into the public arena as professionals. These women were middle or upper-middle 
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 Kavakci Islam, 19. During Turkey’s war of independence (1919-1923), headscarved Turkish 
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9
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160 
 
class, educated, with careers. Their visibility in the public sphere provoked anger in 
the Kemalists, who had previously been able to relegate headscarved women to the 
periphery of society.
11
  
The 1981 ban was a response to the increasing number of well-educated 
Turkish women who were wearing the veil and demanding their place in public. The 
target of the bans was a sub-set of those who wear headscarves. Specifically, it was 
women who wore headscarves out of religious consciousness and who demanded a 
legitimate presence in the public sphere.
12
 This group tended to be more urban, 
though they came from diverse backgrounds. Visually, the two groups of 
headscarved women were distinguished by the pin which the target group used to 
hold the ends of their headscarf together under the chin. Having a pin under the chin 
reflected a woman’s commitment to following the requirements of Islam strictly, 
because the pin ensures that the headscarf does not slide back.
13
  
On the ground, implementation of the university headscarf ban was uneven, 
with some universities enforcing it harshly while others took a more light-handed 
approach.
14
 The response was varied. Some veil-clad women transferred between 
universities. Others chose to suspend their education temporarily. Yet others 
submitted to the new rules and took off their headscarves. Some wore wigs on top of 
their headscarves. Others enrolled in online university courses as an alternative 
method of accessing higher education. 
15
 The ban extended to government religious 
schools, with government officials conducting periodic inspections.
16
 
 
1990s – the rise of Islamist politics and secularist pushback 
In the mid 1990s, headscarved women became linked with the rise of 
Islamist politics in Turkey, and in particular with the success of the Islamist Welfare 
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Party (Refah Party or RP). When the RP came to power in a coalition government in 
June 1996 and Prime Minister Erbakan publicly stated his aim of expanding 
freedoms that stifled practising Muslims, including reversing the ban on headscarves 
in universities, he set the stage for the “post-modern” coup of 1997, which forced 
RP out of power. The constitutional court subsequently banned Erbakan from 
politics. 
 
Denial of access to education: The 2005 Leyla Şahin v. Turkey case in the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECHR) is one of the most high-profile cases of the Turkish 
headscarf ban. Leyla Şahin had completed the first five years of her medical degree 
(1992-7) at the Cerrahpaşa Medical School of Istanbul University, with headscarf 
on. In 1998, the headscarf ban was reactivated at her university. As she refused to 
take off her headscarf, she was unable to complete her education there. She moved 
to Austria where she was able to complete her degree without taking off her 
headscarf.
17
 
 In 2005, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) ruled that Leyla’s exclusion from the Faculty of Medicine of Istanbul 
University did not constitute a violation of Article 9 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR), on freedom of conscience.
18
 A main argument in the 
judgement was that contracting states should have broad discretionary scope in 
implementing the ECHR, in line with the principle of self-determination. The 
ECtHR would not intervene unless the interference of the state was not ‘justified in 
principle and proportionate to the aims pursued.’ In this case, the Court accepted the 
overriding importance that the Turkish constitution and political system attributed to 
secularism, and pronounced that “the interference/violations of fundamental rights 
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concerning headscarf were acceptable” in Turkey, as part of the legitimate goal of 
“protecting the rights and freedoms of others and maintaining public order.”19  
 The Court assumed the restrictions to have been foreseeable, practised 
equitably and compatible with the principle of proportionality.
20
 In referring to the 
rights and freedoms of others, the court drew attention to “the impact which wearing 
such a symbol, which was presented or perceived as a compulsory religious duty, 
may have on those who chose not to wear it.”21 
 Belgian judge Francoise Tulkens dissented, arguing that the aim of the Court 
was to protect the rights and freedoms of citizens and not in the first place to affirm 
broad discretionary ‘room for maneuver’ of states.22 
 
The 1997 coup ushered in a difficult time for headscarved women and for religious 
Muslims in general. The government introduced measures including the 
“coefficient” system, which made it extremely difficult to graduate from the 
religious Imam Hatip schools to the country’s universities. Under this system, the 
scores of vocational school students, which included Imam Hatip students, had to be 
multiplied by a coefficient of 0.3 rather than 1, resulting in the scores being lower 
and thus making it much harder for them to enter state universities compared to 
other candidates not from vocational/religious schools. The government also banned 
the teaching of the Qur’an to children under the age of 12, both in private and in 
public.
23
  
 
Denial of access to political office: At the 1999 elections, Merve Kavakci Islam was 
one of two headscarved women elected to the Turkish Parliament as a member of 
the Virtue Party (the successor to the RP). She refused to take off her headscarf to 
be sworn in, and as a result was not allowed to take her oath of office. She was 
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stripped of her Turkish citizenship, and charged with inciting hatred, discriminating 
against people, insulting the dignity of the state, and attempting to overthrow the 
regime.
24
  
 In 2007, in Kavakci v. Turkey, the ECtHR ruled against Turkey, stating that 
Turkey had violated Article 3 of Protocol 1 of the ECHR, which guarantees the right 
to fair elections. The Court affirmed the Turkish state’s concern for protecting the 
secular character of the state as being within its rights; it only judged that the state’s 
response to Kavakci’s action of entering the parliamentary sitting in her headscarf 
was disproportionate.
25
 
 
In addition, headscarved women were subject to verbal and physical abuse, 
expulsions, investigations and suspensions.
26
 For instance, at the universities, 
humiliation began at the school gates, where they had to take off their veils at a 
public site, which these women dubbed the turban duvari (turban wall).  
During this post-1997 period, the restrictions on headscarved women in 
public space were tightened, by expanding  the boundaries of what was considered 
public space. Turkey’s secularist President Sezer banned headscarved women from 
his residence, justifying this by saying that because the President represented the 
Republic, and secularism was the basis of the Republic, the presidential residence 
constituted a public space, where wearing the headscarf could not be permitted. 
During Sezer’s term as president (2000-2007), he broke with past practice in not 
inviting the headscarved wives of the prime minister, speaker of parliament, cabinet 
ministers and parliamentarians to the national holiday celebrations.
27
 In universities, 
the ban on headscarves expanded beyond students themselves to their families. 
Starting in 1997, Atatürk University in Erzurum did not permit parents who wore 
the headscarf to attend their children’s graduation ceremonies unless they wore wigs 
in lieu of headscarves.
28
 Similarly, federal employees’ private lives and that of their 
spouses became the object of scrutiny. Female federal employees who wore 
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headscarves outside of working hours, or male federal employees whose wives wore 
the headscarf, were penalised professionally. In the military, particularly in the 
aftermath of the 1997 coup, having a wife who wore the headscarf was perceived as 
sufficient for discharging one from the military establishment.
29
  
Headscarved women who were neither students nor public servants also 
suffered under the ban, as they would run into difficulties when trying to access 
public services. In 2003, Hatice Hasdemir Şahin was prevented from testifying 
before an Ankara court where she appeared as a defendant. The judge “defined the 
courtroom as public space” where one has to be “in a demeanor, behaviour and 
outfit that is in accordance with the regulations.”30 In 2005, Sultan Ozkan was not 
allowed to take her driving test in Ankara, after being verbally harassed by the 
officials.
31
 Other headscarved women and their families were denied health care at 
hospitals. In 2006, one woman was denied health care twice by the attending 
physician at Istanbul University’s hospital because she wore a headscarf, with the 
delay resulting in her ovaries having to be removed.
32
 In another case, a five-year 
old boy was denied treatment at the paediatrics department at Zeynep Kamil 
Hospital in Istanbul because his mother wore a headscarf.  
 
2000s – the rise of the AKP 
The Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002 on the 
back of economic crisis, in a landslide victory which was read as a backlash against 
Kemalist interventions. In tacit recognition of the fate of its two Islamist governing 
predecessors, the AKP did not address the headscarf issue during its first term in 
office, choosing instead a policy of avoidance.  
In 2008, the AKP, led by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, tried to lift 
the headscarf ban for university students. On 9 Feb 2008, the AKP pushed through 
amendments to the Constitution to create the legal framework for lifting the 
university headscarf ban. Two articles were changed – Article 10, which guarantees 
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equality before the law irrespective of language, race, colour, sex, political opinion, 
philosophical belief, religion or sect, was amended to include a commitment to 
ensure that all citizens have equal access to public services. Article 42, on the right 
to education, was changed to include a phrase preventing anyone from being denied 
access to education except for a reason openly stated in law. This was significant, 
because there was no written law preventing headscarved students from entering the 
university; it was an implicit regulation of the Higher Education Council (YÖK) 
through which the ban was implemented.
33
 The opposition Republican People’s 
Party (CHP) quickly applied to the Constitutional Court for the annulment of the 
Constitutional amendments. On 5 June 2008 the Constitutional Court, by nine votes 
to two, declared the constitutional amendments invalid because they violated the 
principle of secularism which was enshrined in the Constitution as an unchangeable 
characteristic of the Turkish Republic.
34
 
Since that initial knockback, the AKP has systematically tackled the 
secularist forces ranged against it. In September 2010, the party won a constitutional 
referendum which gave the president and parliament greater say over the 
appointments of senior judges and prosecutors, paving the way for a judiciary more 
amenable to its Islamist agenda in the future.
35
 Soon after, in October 2010, YÖK 
sent a circular to universities advising teachers that they could no longer send 
students out of class for violating the dress code.
36
 While this contradicted the 2008 
Constitutional Court ruling, and constitutional amendments would be needed to 
definitively lift the ban, the reality on the ground has already started to change - 
most universities have already started permitting students to wear the headscarf on 
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campus. Earlier, in March 2010, the YÖK had moved to deal with the “coefficient 
problem”, easing the way for graduates of religious high schools to enter the 
university programmes of their choice.
37
 In 2011, the ban on Qur’an instruction for 
children under 12 was also lifted.
38
 
There are indications that the AKP is making progress in taming the 
zealously secularist military. At a reception at the president’s mansion to celebrate 
Turkey’s Republic Day on 29 Oct 12, the country’s top military commander stood 
alongside the headscarved wives of the president and prime minister.
39
 This would 
have been inconceivable in years past; since 2007, the military top brass had refused 
to attend presidential gatherings hosted by President Abdullah Gül, in protest 
against First Lady Hayrunnisa’s wearing a headscarf.40  
The latest loosening of secularist restrictions has been the lifting of the 
headscarf ban in schools below university level, announced on 27 Nov 12. 
Beginning from the 2013-14 academic year, pupils at schools providing religious 
education, and during Qur’an lessons at regular schools, would be able to wear 
headscarves. Earlier, in March 2012, Erdoğan pushed through a reform of 
the education system which boosted the role of religious schools.
41
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Following the AKP’s re-election in 2011, it only remains for these changes 
to be protected by law through requisite amendments to the Constitution. Turkey is 
currently in the process of drafting a new Constitution to replace the one that was 
imposed by the military after the 1980 coup.
42
 In the process of giving substance to 
the religious freedom of the majority Muslims, it remains to be seen whether the 
AKP government will also act to give legal protection to the interests of the non-
Muslim religious minorities.
43
 These minorities, which make up less than 1% of the 
population, have suffered disproportionately from the secularist policies – 
restrictions on the non-Muslim minorities included denial of the right to train clergy, 
offer religious education, and to own and maintain places of worship. 
 
France 
France is home to Europe’s biggest Muslim population. The Interior 
Ministry estimates that 8 to 10% of the population, or five to six million people, are 
Muslim, 25% of whom attend Friday prayers. The Muslim population is primarily 
made up of immigrants from former French North African and sub-Saharan colonies 
and their descendents. French Islam is diverse and fragmented due to ethnic, 
linguistic and national divisions, comprising a spectrum of diverse practices and 
levels of commitment, ranging from a strictly observant minority to the merely 
culturally Muslim.
44
 On the whole, French society is not very religious - according 
to a poll published in Le Parisien in February 2011, only 36% believe in God, 34% 
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do not, and 30% are uncertain.
45
 Nonetheless, around 64% of the French population 
identify themselves as Roman Catholic, although only 4.5% of those are 
observant.
46
 All other religious groups combined constitute less than 7% of the 
population.
47
 
The French government’s approach to issues of religion can be summarised 
in a word - ‘laïcité’. This is the uniquely French conception of the proper place and 
function of religion within the state. It unites the ideals of state neutrality toward 
religion, the autonomy of the individual citizen, and the community of French 
citizens qua citizens.
48
 The roots of laïcité can be traced to the 1789 Revolution, 
where the right to religious freedom was asserted in Article 10 of the Declaration of 
the Rights of Man: ‘no one should be persecuted for their opinions, even religious 
ones’.49  
In 1905, the Third Republic put an end to the official recognition of 
religion
50
 with the Law of Separation between Church and State:
51
 
 
Article 1: The Republic ensures freedom of conscience. It guarantees the 
free exercise of religion, under restrictions prescribed by the interest in 
public order. 
Article 2: The Republic does not recognise, remunerate, or subsidise any 
religion.  
 
The 1905 law linked religious freedom with state neutrality - Article 2 protects 
freedom of conscience (Article 1) by guaranteeing that the state will remain neutral 
between religions. The principle of separation between church and state has since 
been recognised as a quasi-constitutional principle, and is implicitly referenced in 
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people’,50 and officially recognised the social utility of religion.50  
51
 Laborde 33, McGoldrick, 36. 
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Article 1 of the 1946 Constitution, which states that ‘France is an indivisible, laïque, 
democratic and social republic.’52   
Subsequent detailed provisions of the Law of Separation expropriated all 
religious property, resulting in all religious buildings built before 1905 coming 
under state ownership. Ironically, although the Law of Separation made it illegal for 
the state to ‘remunerate or subsidise’ any religion, in reality, the French government 
funds the maintenance of Roman Catholic and Protestant churches as well as Jewish 
synagogues and allows the respective religious communities to use them. Given that 
Muslim immigration has occurred only after 1905, this has resulted in a disparity for 
the Muslim population – while Christian and Jewish places of worship are supported 
by public funds, mosques are not.
53
 Today, Islam has taken the place of Catholicism 
as the main target of the secularists. In addition to the inevitable conflict between 
the doctrine of laïcité and a religion which denies any separation of private and 
public spheres, there is an overlay of xenophobia, due to the relatively recent 
vintage of France’s Muslim minority.  
 
Public vs Private spheres: schools as the locus of dispute 
The Revolution started a century-long process of dis-entangling civil 
government from the Catholic Church.
54
 From the 1880s onwards, the republican 
government undertook measures to secularise the public sphere. Chief among 
these
55
 were new education laws establishing secular state primary education, 
removing this from the hands of the Catholic Church. In 1884 primary education 
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was made free and compulsory both for boys and girls; all were to be taught a 
nation-wide uniform curriculum.
56
 The mission of the new state schools was to 
teach future citizens how to be French.
57
 To this end, schools had to be neutral 
towards religious and other particular allegiances;
58
 ‘moral and civic instruction’ 
was substituted for traditional ‘moral and religious instruction’.59 Civic education 
was a new subject: children were to be taught basic principles of universal morality, 
the principles of the 1789 Revolution, and their rights and responsibilities as citizens 
of the Republic. The religious neutrality of schools was insured by scrupulously 
avoiding any reference to religion in the content of education, and by removing all 
religious signs such as Christian crosses from classrooms. While schools are meant 
to be religiously neutral, they are by no means politically neutral;
60
 they are 
unabashedly used to transmit patriotic values such as republicanism, individualism, 
equality and democratic citizenship.
61
  
 Laïcité understands religion as an essentially private matter in relation to 
which each individual exercises free choice. It concludes that the public sphere 
should be secularised, and that citizens must be citizens in the public sphere while 
being religious believers (if they so choose) in private. Proselytisation is thus taboo 
in public institutions,
62
 and especially in schools where future citizens must be 
taught to use their faculty of reason and exercise freedom of thought.  
Following 15 years of controversy about the hijab in schools (see boxed 
story on the headscarf affair, below), a 2004 law, voted explicitly in the name of the 
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republican principle of laïcité,
63
 was passed, stipulating that ‘in primary and 
secondary public schools, the wearing of signs or clothes through which pupils 
ostensibly express/overtly manifest a religious allegiance is forbidden.’64  
 
A neutral public sphere  
French government employees are not permitted to wear religious symbols 
at work, although the number of cases challenging this prohibition is growing. The 
theory behind this goes back to the doctrine of laïcité, with its assumption that only 
if the public sphere is free of religious symbols, can all citizens can be treated 
equally within it. On this logic, civil servants must be seen to be neutral.
65
 The duty 
of embodying this neutrality of the state was understood to apply especially strictly 
to teachers, because of the special place of education in forming new citizens. The 
ban on civil servants wearing religious symbols seems to apply whether or not the 
particular officials wear official uniforms or not. For instance, a Muslim tax 
inspector was prevented from wearing a headscarf while on duty. Public service is 
expansively construed to cover postal services, public transport systems, etc.
66
   
 This affects citizens, when they are performing or trying to access public 
services. Women wearing the hijab have been excluded from juries. Personal 
photographs required for the issuance of aliens’ residence permits and national 
identity cards must be taken full-face and bare-headed. Mayors have in some cases 
refused to allow women in hijab to be married or to witness a marriage unless they 
remove their hijab so that their identities can be confirmed.
67
 The official line 
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common to all these cases is that citizens need to be able to function as citizens in 
public space.  
 In 2010, the French passed a law prohibiting the covering of one’s face in 
public. This came into effect in April 2011. It is widely recognized that the law was 
intended to prohibit Muslim women from wearing the burqa or niqab (Islamic dress 
forms that cover the whole face except for the eyes) in public places.
68
 The law 
imposes a fine of 150 euros on violators or requires attendance at a course in 
citizenship. In addition, those who coerce another person on account of gender, by 
threat, violence, force, or abuse of power or authority, to cover his or her face, are 
subject to a fine of 30,000 euros and could receive a sentence of up to one year in 
prison; the fine and sentence is doubled if the victim is a minor. In December 2011, 
a woman wearing a niqab was fined 35 euros for unsafe driving, on the grounds that 
the niqab limited her vision and presented a safety hazard.
69
 From April 2011, when 
the law went into effect, to December of that year, 231 women were given warnings 
by police. Six were convicted and fined, and several were sentenced to attend 
citizenship classes.
 70
 
 
                                                          
68
 According to an Interior Ministry circular sent to officials prior to the start-date of the law, police 
are only to enforce the law in public places, including public transportation, government buildings, 
and other public spaces such as restaurants and movie theatres. The circular specifically instructed 
police not to enforce the law in private locations, or around places of worship, where the law’s 
application would unduly interfere with the free exercise of religion. If the police encounter someone 
in a public space wearing a face-covering garment such as a mask or burqa, they are instructed to ask 
the individual to remove it to verify the individual’s identity. Police officials are not allowed to 
remove it themselves. If individuals refuse to remove the garment, police may detain them and take 
them to the local police station to verify their identity. However, an individual may not be questioned 
or held for more than four hours. 
69
 While this chapter in the main argues against the justifiability of a ban against headscarves in the 
context of schools, this particular case gives us an example of where the need for practical solutions 
for living together (in this case, living safely together), provides a compelling reason to justify 
outlawing religious garb which compromises the safety of oneself and others. See Brian Barry, 
Culture and Equality (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001) for other examples, notably the case of 
turbaned Sikh motorcyclists, whom, he argues, should not be exempt from motorcycle helmet-
wearing laws. Given that my main concern in this thesis is to argue against the need for epistemic 
abstinence, I would highlight one key aspect of how my justification for a political principle 
permitting a ban on the niqab/turban while driving/riding a motorcycle would differ from Barry’s – it 
would not require the scepticism about one’s conception of the good which Barry thinks necessary to 
ground his idea of a second-order impartiality. See Brian Barry, Justice as Impartiality (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1995) Chapter 7. 
70
 International Religious Freedom Report 2011, France country report, US Bureau of Democracy, 
Human Rights and Labour, 
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm#wrapper, accessed 29 Dec 12. 
173 
 
Blurring the boundaries – laïcité in the private sector 
 The treatment of veiled women in the French private sector varies widely. 
Legal cases against employers who forbid veiling are focussed on discrimination 
and whether there is sufficient justification for employers to regulate veiling. 
Justifications offered by employers include business needs, the lack of any 
deliberate intention to discriminate, and the employees’ refusal to respect 
disciplinary rules. One academic suggests that many of these justifications would 
not survive a rigorous discrimination analysis – for instance, an intention to 
discriminate is usually irrelevant.
71
  
  
On 27 October 2011, a Versailles appeals court ruled that a privately owned daycare 
center in a Paris suburb could ban its employees from wearing religious symbols at 
work. This case is expected to set a precedent for other private educational 
establishments to enforce the principle of “religious neutrality,” a term defined by 
the 2004 law banning “ostentatious signs of religion” in public schools. The court’s 
decision reinforces a previous ruling in December 2010 that a nursery in Mantes-la-
Jolie, a Paris suburb, was within its rights to fire a female employee in 2008 after 
she refused to remove her headscarf.
 72
 
 
What appears to be happening in these cases is a bleeding of the ideology of laïcité 
into the private sector. There is also considerable murkiness as to whether laïcité 
applies when it comes to areas where some state functions are partially or 
completely privatised but still subject to extensive government regulation. 
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An untidy reality 
 In schools, the implementation of the 2004 ban has been messy. 
Distinguishing the ‘ostentatious’ from the ‘discreet’, and religious from non-
religious ornamentation, has remained a matter for the judgement of individual 
school authorities, leading to uneven implementation
73
 and a multitude of 
unintended consequences, such as Catholic chaplains being turned away from 
schools because they were wearing cassocks. More importantly, it has resulted in 
schoolchildren being excluded from state education, the very instrument of 
republican integration. 
Concern has also been voiced about the ban’s negative impact on the 
psychological well-being of individual Muslims. In 2005, the United Nations 
Human Rights Commission’s Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion expressed 
concern at the law’s impact on the psychological well-being of young Muslim 
women who felt stigmatised for wearing the headscarf, as well as the attitude of 
intolerance towards headscarf-donning Muslim women, even where they wore the 
veil legally. 
The debate about laïcité cannot be isolated from the wider realities of direct 
and indirect discrimination against France’s Muslim population in education, jobs 
and housing. Around a third of France’s Muslims live in deprived council housing 
estates where there is a high immigrant population, disproportionately high 
unemployment (three times the national average), an extensive underground 
economy, and a culture of gangs, drugs and criminality. This has resulted in 
growing disaffection and social problems amongst suburban Muslim youth.
74
 This 
socio-economic cleavage overlaps with the religious divide, resulting in a toxic mix 
that erupted briefly in October/November 2005 with riots in the Paris suburbs. 
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The headscarf affair (L’affaire du foulard) 
 In 1989, three pupils in the Parisian suburb of Creil arrived in class wearing 
the hijab.
75
 (Prior to this case, it had been considered acceptable to wear hijab in this 
school but not when in the classroom; the girls would drop the headscarf to their 
shoulders when entering the classroom.) Two of the three pupils were sisters, Leila 
and Fatima Achaboun, whose father was from Morocco. The third girl, Samira 
Saidini, was the daughter of a local Islamic activist from Tunisia. The three were 
initially suspended. Following negotiations between school officials, the girls’ 
parents, Islamic religious leaders, Islamic organisations and representatives of the 
respective immigrant communities, the third girl, Samira Saidini, was persuaded to 
revert to previous practice. The sisters were not initially willing to do so, but 
eventually relented, following the intercession of the King of Morocco, Hassan II, 
spiritual leader of Moroccan Muslims.
76
  
 The College Gabriel Havez, where these events took place, was an 
increasingly crowded public middle school (pupils aged 11-15),
77
 located in a poor 
neighbourhood in the industrial city of Criel. It had a reputation for being a difficult 
place to teach at and a very high staff turnover. Its student cohort was multi-
national, comprising some 26 national groups. Two thirds of the non-French pupils 
were from the Mahgreb, mainly from Morocco, and the principal had become 
concerned that the school was developing into a series of religious ghettoes which 
would bring religious and political conflicts into the school environment.
78
  
 When it arose, this case posed a challenge for laïcité, because French state 
schools have no school uniform policy, and it was unclear that there was an explicit 
rule preventing pupils from wearing religious symbols. The case attracted national 
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publicity and a prolonged national debate ensued. Asked by the Education 
Minister
79
 to provide legal advice, the Council of State laid out general principles 
and guidelines in its November 1989 avis (opinion):
80
  
 Headscarves were not in themselves in breach of laïcité.81 International law 
supported the protection of religious liberty.
82
 Schoolchildren should have 
‘the freedom to express and manifest their religious beliefs within 
educational institutions.’83  
 The exercise of religious freedoms by pupils could be limited only when it 
was an obstacle to carrying out the statutory mission of education,
84
 such as 
when the display of religious insignia involved pressure, proselytism, 
propaganda, or provocation, when it disturbed the good order of the school, 
or posed a threat to health and safety.
85
  
 This was consistent with the neutrality mandated by laïcité, because 
neutrality in schools was meant to apply to teachers,
86
 the content of 
teaching, and school buildings, not pupils themselves.
87
  
This nuanced ruling proved difficult to implement. Individual headmasters were left 
to settle issues on a case by case basis. In the years following this case, increasing 
numbers of cases were brought to court as the boundaries of secularism were 
challenged in schools and beyond. Beyond donning the headscarf, there was a 
growing trend of Muslim girls refusing to take part in sport in schools.
88
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 In 1994, Education Minister Francois Bayrou published more specific 
instructions banning all ‘ostentatious’ signs in schools, which provided the 
inspiration for the 2004 law. The instructions stated:  
 
The school is the space which more than any other involves education 
and integration, where all children and all youth are to be found, 
learning to live together and respect one another. If, in the school, there 
are signs of behaviour which show that they cannot conform to the same 
obligations, or attend the same courses and follow the same programs, it 
negates this mission. All discrimination should stop at the school gates, 
whether it is sexual, cultural, or religious discrimination...In schools, 
freedom of conscience, combined with respect of pluralism and the 
neutrality of public service, requires that the ‘educational community’ 
be insulated from any ideological or religious pressure...It is not possible 
to accept the presence and multiplication of ostentatious signs in school, 
signs whose meaning involves the separation of certain students from 
the rules of the common life of the school...Such signs are in themselves 
part of proselytism.
89
  
 
Bayrou’s circular contained the idea that because schools are special places where 
pupils learn the principles of public citizenship, the principles of toleration of civil 
society do not apply with full force in them, and laïcité demands religious restraint 
on the part of pupils too.
90
 Bayrou’s 1994 circular banned only “ostentatious” 
religious signs in schools, with the result that Muslim headscarves but not Jewish 
yarmulkes, nor Christian crosses, fell into that category. This measure was nullified 
by the Council of State on the grounds that it established too absolute a prohibition. 
Yet till 2004, it was left to headmasters to decide whether particular instances of 
headscarf wearing were “ostentatious” or not.91  
 The Stasi Commission
92
 was convened in 2003 by President Jacques Chirac, 
to give advice on whether Muslim schoolgirls should be allowed to wear 
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headscarves in state schools. The Stasi Report articulated the following three values 
as providing the central values of laïcité: freedom of religion, equal respect, and 
state neutrality.
93
 The Report reaffirmed that French public schools should be 
neutral grounds that protected students from discrimination based on race and 
religion. On the specific issue of the hijab, the Report expressed concern about 
pressure exerted by elements in the Muslim community on Muslim girls to don the 
hijab against their will. The Commission however considered that at university level 
precedence should be given to students’ right to express their religious and other 
convictions.
94
  
 The March 2004 law, which stipulated that ‘in primary and secondary public 
schools, the wearing of signs or clothes through which pupils ostensibly 
express/overtly manifest (“manifestent ostensiblement”) a religious allegiance is 
forbidden,’95 was voted explicitly in the name of laïcité.96 The bill’s preface says 
‘while pupils...are naturally free to practise their religion, they must do so while 
respecting the laïcité of the schools of the republic. It is precisely the neutrality of 
the school which guarantees the freedom of conscience of pupils, and equal respect 
for all beliefs.’97  
 The decision to draw the line at “ostensible” signs was deliberately designed 
to avoid a violation of Article 9 of the ECHR, since the law, as phrased, would still 
allow very small, discreet religious displays.
98
 In an Education ministry circular to 
guide schools in the application of the 2004 law, Muslim headscarves, Jewish 
yarmulkes and large Christian crosses were explicitly mentioned as falling under the 
law. The 2004 law was intended to put an end to the longstanding headscarf debate, 
but has since led to a host of unintended consequences. Practically speaking, 
distinguishing the ‘ostentatious’ from the ‘discreet’ remained the task of individual 
school authorities. Since the coming into effect of the 2004 law, unforeseen 
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possibilities have emerged: 
 Sikh turbans. It appears that this was a case which was simply overlooked by 
the French government, given that there are only an estimated 7,000 Sikhs in 
France. In March 2005, a French court upheld the expulsion of three Sikh 
boys, aged 15 to 18, for wearing to school under-turbans (the Sikh keski, 
which is like an invisible hair net), since their continued wearing made the 
boys ‘immediately recognisable as Sikhs’. In most other French schools with 
Sikh pupils, a compromise was reached that allowed them to wear the under-
turban to control their hair.
99
 
 Non-Muslim pupils wearing the hijab as a fashion statement.100 
 Male pupils wearing a beard for religious purposes.101 
 Principals in state schools in southern France turning away Catholic 
chaplains, because they were wearing cassocks.
102
 
During the first full year of the 2004 law’s implementation, 626 girls arrived for 
lessons wearing the hijab. Of these, 44 were eventually expelled. Leaving the state 
education system, the students affected either enrolled in correspondence courses, 
switched to private religious schools, or went abroad to places where wearing the 
hijab would not be an issue.
103
 In 2005, the United Nations Human Rights 
Commission’s (UNHRC) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion visited France 
and expressed concern at the indirect effects of the law. One of the issues he raised 
was that “The implementation of the law by school establishments has in a number 
of cases led to abuses that provoked feelings of humiliation, in particular amongst 
young Muslim women....Moreover, the stigmatization of the so-called Islamic 
headscarf has triggered a wave of religious intolerance when women wear it outside 
school, at university or at their workplace.”104 
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Liberalism and secularism 
The first thing to notice is that in both the French and Turkish cases, the 
argument for secularism takes place within a larger framework that already assumes 
a principle of toleration. It is precisely this acknowledgement of the principle of 
toleration that gives rise to the tension that we experience when reading about the 
specific policy decisions and their outcomes in the French and Turkish cases above. 
Recall our conclusion from Chapter 6 that epistemic abstinence was not 
required in order to obtain a principle of toleration. I suggested there that the 
heuristic reading of the Rawlsian reasonableness requirement was able to ground 
toleration in a demand for liberal justifiability, which constrains us to coercively 
impose on others only those principles that we can justify to them using reasons 
they could not reasonably reject.
105
  
Taking as a given a basic commitment to a principle of toleration, secularism 
(in the specific forms of French laïcité and Turkish laiklik)
106
 raise the following 
two questions: 
a. Is secularism required for respecting persons?   
Recall that the motivation for a principle of toleration is a desire for 
justifiability that is grounded in the duty to respect persons. If one thinks that 
secularism, too, is needed in order to respect persons, that would be reason to 
think that secularism is the right policy to adopt.  
b. Is secularism needed for toleration?  
One argument for the French and Turkish forms of secularism is that a 
principle of toleration entails it. The claim is that secularism, in the form of 
the emptying of the public sphere of religious symbols/affiliation, is necessary 
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in order to maintain the neutrality of public space, to prevent discrimination 
based on religious affiliation, so that individuals can freely exercise their 
liberty of conscience, which is the goal of a principle of toleration.  
 By way of addressing these questions, I wish to critically examine a view 
that would answer “yes” to both questions (a) and (b). 
 
Laborde’s critical republicanism 
In what she terms a “critical republican” response to the French hijab debate, 
Cécile Laborde articulates a middle course between the official French republican 
position and its multiculturalist critics. Here, I propose to examine just one specific 
part of her position – her claim that equal respect for citizens requires secularism, or 
“secular impartiality”107/“secularist neutrality”108 as she calls it. To summarise her 
position in a nutshell, Laborde argues that “members of religious minorities would 
benefit from more rather than less secularism, if this is understood as the 
construction of a less Christian-biased, genuinely neutral public sphere showing 
respect to all citizens.”109 In the case of the hijab, Laborde defends the official 
republican ideal of secularism, but opposes the ban on religious symbols as being 
self-defeating, because it results in the exclusion of Muslim schoolgirls from civic 
education, thus undermining the republican ideals of religious freedom, inclusion, 
and equal respect. She also agrees with multiculturalist critics of the ban that 
secularism, rightly understood, is compatible with the wearing of religious signs by 
pupils.  
Stated in general form, Laborde’s critical republican standard of impartiality 
is stated as follows:
110
  
The state should not support religion, unless such abstention  
(i) unreasonably burdens the exercise of basic religious freedoms 
[the “basic free exercise” proviso]; or  
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(ii) legitimizes status quo entitlements which unduly 
disadvantage minority religious groups [the “contextual 
parity” proviso] 
In specifying these provisos, Laborde emphasises that the free exercise right must be 
basic,
111
 and that the ‘undue disadvantage’ referred to by the contextual parity 
proviso must be “exorbitant”112 for the provisos to kick in.  
Laborde’s justification for the default secularity of the main clause of her 
critical republican standard of impartiality (“the state should not support religion”) 
is that this is the best way of treating citizens with equal respect. She says,  
 
A non-sectarian, non-confessional public space best embodies the ideal 
of democratic impartiality by showing respect to, and thus motivating 
the allegiance of, all citizens regardless of their particular beliefs.
113
 
 
In concrete terms, this default secularity requires that institutions be neutral with 
respect to religion. For Laborde, this entails non-establishment. Drilling down a 
little further, this means that the constitution must not be “theologically inspired”, 
and that public policies must be justified without reference to religious views.
114
 
This is a restriction on the reasons that can be appealed to (by public officials, 
public documents, etc) to justify state action. On questions of religion, the state is 
supposed to remain agnostic,
115
 neither affirming nor repudiating any religious 
creed. In terms of state action, Laborde’s account of neutrality requires that the state 
not seek to confer either special benefits or burdens to citizens in view of their 
affirming a religious creed (or none). 
116
 In Laborde’s view, schools fall into the 
public sphere and thus should adhere to this default secularity. What this means in 
practice is that school buildings should not display religious symbols, and the 
content of teaching should not affirm any religion. 
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 For Laborde, this main clause applies even where establishment puts no one 
at any serious disadvantage. In such cases, she argues that establishment alienates 
citizens not belonging to the established religion, and interferes with their basic 
identification with their institutions. She says, “Just as Muslims are likely to be 
alienated by the distinctively Christian religiosity permeating public institutions, so 
non-religious citizens are likely to be alienated by any official display of religiosity 
by institutions.”117 Citizens thus have, says Laborde, an interest “in maintaining the 
secular character of the public sphere”.118 She acknowledges that a secular public 
order will not be equally suited to religious and non-religious citizens alike, but 
insists that “it is the closest we can get to being an order that most, if not all, citizens 
can endorse”.119 
 The basic free exercise proviso establishes a limit to the default secularity 
where it comes into conflict with the protection of the religious liberty. The idea is 
that, one of the reasons for having a secular order in the first place is that it is the 
best way of protecting religious liberty. Thus it cannot be that the state should 
enforce strict secularity where it interferes with religious liberty, understood as the 
basic free exercise of religion. Thus, in addition to being constitutive of an attitude 
of equal respect for all, the default secularity of the public sphere is also 
instrumental to protecting freedom of conscience of individuals. Laborde says,  
 
(T)he basic insight of critical republicanism is clear enough: secularism 
is primarily an institutional doctrine of separation, prescribing the extent 
to which state institutions, and the public sphere more generally, must 
remain secular so that citizens can freely follow their conscience. A 
tough institutional doctrine is therefore the condition for a tolerant 
doctrine of conscience.
120
 
 
Applied to the case of hijab-wearing in schools, the argument would run as follows: 
schools should be a secular space (that is, where no religious creed is affirmed or 
denied by the curriculum, and teachers adhere to a duty of religious restraint), so 
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that pupils can freely practise their religion, which includes choosing to wear the 
veil. 
 On Laborde’s account, the free exercise proviso allows the state to act in 
support of religion where this involves enabling religious citizens to practise the 
basic tenets of their religion (provided that these do not impose unreasonable 
burdens on other citizens). For instance, Laborde tells us that the state has a duty to 
provide chaplaincy services in enclosed public institutions such as prisons, boarding 
schools, hospitals, and the armed forces.
121
 
 The interaction of the free exercise proviso and the default secularity main 
clause becomes more complicated when it comes to the basic religious exercise of 
public officials when on duty. Here, Laborde says:  
 
In a critical republican view, such prohibitions can never be general in 
form, and should be a function of the importance of the public function 
and of the vulnerability of the users of the service.
122
 
 
She concludes that government ministers and primary school teachers may be 
subjected to an obligation of religious restraint while on duty, but tax inspectors and 
university lecturers need not be. This duty of restraint (“devoir de réserve”) includes 
refraining from display of any sign of religious allegiance while on duty, so as to 
respect citizens as users of public services. In making reference to tax inspectors, 
Laborde has in mind the case of a Muslim tax inspector who was prevented from 
wearing a headscarf while on duty.
123
 
 Meanwhile, the contextual parity proviso gives Laborde a way of making an 
assessment about the justice (or lack thereof) of the status quo, and to allow for 
government action to correct for gross inequalities arising from, for example, 
historical legacies. It seems that what Laborde has in mind is that only those 
inequalities which affect the basic free exercise of religion would be compensated 
for, rather than any inequality whatsoever.
124
 Thus she supports state support for the 
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building of mosques in France, on the grounds that this is a part of the basic exercise 
of religious freedom, combined with the fact that the status quo condemns Muslim 
to a situation of “blatant” inequality where unlike church buildings, which for 
historical reasons are in plentiful supply, Muslims have insufficient places of 
worship.  
 
The possibility of an inclusive public sphere: the multiple instantiations of equal 
respect 
 I wish to question Laborde’s main clause of default secularism. I argue that 
neither a concern for justifiability nor a concern for respecting persons requires 
secularism, and further, that secularism is not needed for the protection of the 
effective implementation of a principle of toleration which allows for the exercise of 
freedom of conscience. In the process, I hope to draw out one of the implications of 
the discussion so far of justifiability, namely, that it is compatible with a variety of 
different practical arrangements. 
 Boiled down to its essentials, I think Laborde’s view on what why equality 
requires secular neutrality can be summarised in the following claims, which I will 
examine in turn: 
Claim 1: Secular neutrality is constitutive of equal respect to all 
citizens, religious and non-religious. (This corresponds to the main 
clause of the critical republican standard of impartiality.) 
Claim 2: Secular neutrality is the best instrument to protect freedom of 
conscience of every individual. (This corresponds to the basic free 
exercise proviso.) 
Claim 3: The default should be secular neutrality unless exorbitant 
inequalities need to be corrected for. (This corresponds to the contextual 
parity proviso.) 
Begin with Claim 1, which asserts that secular neutrality is constitutive of equal 
respect for citizens. One might share Laborde’s emphasis on the need for equal 
respect for all citizens, regardless of religion, without agreeing with her conclusion 
186 
 
that equal respect therefore requires a secular public sphere that is devoid of 
religious symbols and other signs of affiliation.  
 Let us accept, for the sake of argument, that something like the Rawlsian 
account of the state’s neutrality between conceptions of the good is required in order 
to respect all citizens. The Rawlsian account of “neutrality”, if one wants to call it 
that, is ultimately concerned with justification. It says that, in order to respect 
persons, the principles on which one structures society should be justifiable to other 
citizens. The previous chapters allow us to specify this more precisely - the 
principles of justice must pass the justifiability test; they must be capable of being 
endorsed by reasonable people who do not share the same conception of the good. 
From this principle of justifiability, Laborde’s requirement that the constitution must 
not be “theologically inspired”, and that public policies must be justified without 
reference to religious views,
125
 might follow. I propose that something like this 
Rawlsian account is what Laborde means by “justificatory neutrality”.126 
 But notice that Laborde’s main clause does not yet follow – agreeing that 
state policies should be justifiable to all citizens in non-religious terms does not 
logically entail that the state should not provide support for any religion. Assuming 
that some non-religious argument could be made for providing support for a religion 
(take, for instance, the 1905 Concordat’s acknowledgement of the social utility of 
religion), there would be no reason to rule out such support. 
 Moreover, it does not follow that a unique picture of the public sphere – one 
“free of religion”127 emerges from this concern with justifiability. Certainly it does 
not mean that the physical face of institutions (such as schools) should be devoid of 
religious symbols. This account of justifiability is equally consistent with schools 
where the teachers wear crosses, turbans and headscarves, each in accordance with 
their religious beliefs. 
 Recall Laborde’s argument that because establishment alienates citizens who 
do not belong to the established religion and prevents them from identifying with 
their institutions, the state has a compelling interest in maintaining a secular public 
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sphere. If we accept that what equal respect requires is justifiability, this argument 
loses its force. If we think that justifiability (a constraint on the reasons that there 
are for coercive state action) suffices for respecting citizens, we would need further 
reasons to think that such feelings of offence are any more morally significant than 
some citizens’ disapproval of their neighbours walking around naked in their own 
homes.  
 Now consider Claim 2, that secularism is the best instrument to protect 
freedom of conscience. I take it that the value Laborde is trying to protect with her 
basic free exercise proviso is that of religious liberty. Laborde does not elaborate on 
why religious liberty and thus basic free exercise should be valuable and thus 
deserve protection by the state. However, one can easily fill this in, for instance, 
with a Razian account of how religious ways of life are instances of valuable ways 
of life which contribute to the well-being of their adherents. Individual well-being, 
being intrinsically valuable, is what gives rise to the state’s duty to protect and 
promote the conditions which allow citizens to flourish. Or, if one prefers the less 
committal Rawlsian account, one could say that freedom of religion (along with the 
freedom to choose not to have a religion) is one of the liberties which, no matter 
what one’s position in society, one has reason to want to secure.  
 Having filled in the account of why religious liberty is valuable, it still 
makes sense to ask: is it true that secular neutrality is the best instrument to 
protect religious liberty? Laborde claims that that institutional separation of 
the state from religion will allow citizens freely to follow their conscience. 
Her reading is backed up by official pronouncements on the issue, as seen in 
the details of the French case – the Stasi Report, for instance, explains the link 
in the following manner – neutrality, understood as a space where no religion 
is recognised, prevents the state from discriminating against individuals based 
on religion, which therefore protects the individual’s freedom of religion and 
treats each individual with respect.  
 But I think Laborde generalises too easily from the French experience 
to secularism as the best instrument for protection of religious liberty. 
Depending on one’s assessment of French (or for that matter, the European 
experience of the wars of religion in the 16
th
 and 17
th
 centuries), one might 
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even grant her that secular government turned out to be the best instrument for 
protecting religious liberty in France, without conceding that her critical 
republican principles are generalisable across  historical contexts. Yet Laborde 
seems keen to extend the application of her theory of citizenship beyond 
French borders.   
 To see the crucial role that history is playing in Laborde’s critical 
republican conclusions, imagine a country where, historically, secular 
government has not been the means through which free basic exercise of 
religion by citizens of different faiths has come about. Perhaps this country 
started out as a direct democracy where a doctrine of toleration became 
enshrined in the constitution. Notice that such a constitutional principle of 
toleration would be justifiable and thus meet Laborde’s condition of equal 
respect. The government of such a country could freely support multiple faiths 
in free basic exercise without needing to claim to be secular in the way that 
Laborde describes.  
 Turkey provides a counter-example to secularism necessarily being a 
good instrument to protect freedom of conscience. Particularly in the case of 
the university headscarf ban, it can be plausibly argued that secularism is 
being wielded against freedom of conscience.   
 The fancy footwork Laborde finds is necessary to get around the 
question of public officials’ basic exercise of religious freedom when on 
duty
128
 may be a symptom of the problem created by positing that secularism 
is the best instrument for protecting religious freedom. Apart from the fact that 
the “function-of-importance-and-vulnerability” test does not yield determinate 
answers, my suspicion is that it may not be needed. The values that Laborde 
seeks to protect – equal respect for citizens regardless of religion, and 
religious liberty – can be safeguarded using the test of justifiability and by 
direct appeal to the requirement for basic exercise of religious freedom. The 
paradigm case for which Laborde thinks there is a need for a “devoir de 
réserve” can be explained without recourse to secularism - consider Laborde’s 
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conclusion that government ministers should justify public policy in non-
religious terms. This could quite coherently be explained by respect for 
persons requiring that policies be justifiable to all citizens regardless of 
religion. Presumably, Laborde would not want to say that government 
ministers should not be allowed to wear religious symbols such as crosses, 
turbans or headscarves while on duty, so this case does not raise the issue of 
basic free exercise in the shape of wearing religious symbols. 
 Admittedly, direct appeal to the value of religious freedom seems to 
give a different result from Laborde’s in the case of the religious restraint for 
teachers. (Laborde affirms religious restraint for teachers on the grounds that 
young minds are particularly vulnerable.) This, I think, points to a tension 
within Laborde’s own framework. She would allow pupils to practise their 
religion by wearing the hijab in school and affirms encountering religious 
difference ‘in the flesh’ as aiding civic integration, while at the same time 
forbidding teachers to exercise their religious freedom in the same context – it 
may end up that the more consistent solution to the problem is to allow 
teachers, too, to demonstrate their religious allegiance freely, at least when it 
comes to dress.  
 As for Claim 3, which is concerned with the possible need for rectification of 
exorbitant inequalities, this can be folded into the basic free exercise proviso, given 
that what Laborde is concerned with is not parity in and of itself, but rather 
protecting free basic exercise.  
 Having answered our initial questions (a) and (b) in the negative – 
secularism is neither conceptually necessitated by the duty of mutual respect, nor is 
it entailed by a principle of toleration, to protect freedom of conscience - we are 
now in a position to proceed to a discussion of the specific issue of the Muslim veil.  
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Seeking a liberal argument, finding empirical complications 
 Raz, speaking in defence of multiculturalism, lists three liberal doubts about 
it,
129
 which I propose to adapt to treat the issue of the Muslim veil, using them to 
frame our thinking about the issue in France and Turkey. Looking at the French and 
Turkish cases of the Muslim veil side by side, what is immediately apparent are the 
striking similarities between them. Notwithstanding their different starting points – 
France is usually regarded as belonging to the select group of undisputed liberal 
democracies, whereas Turkey’s membership in the club of liberal nations is still a 
matter of dispute – the two countries’ treatment of citizens wearing the Muslim veil 
has much in common; and it is not clear that what they share in common can rightly 
be characterised as a liberal commitment. In this section, I also highlight the 
importance of considering historical, sociological, psychological and other factors 
which have a practical impact on policy decisions, since we all have reason to care 
about living together successfully.  
 
Liberal doubt #1: Liberalism is committed to individual freedom. The fear is that 
allowing women in public places/ students/schoolgirls to wear the veil would 
support the power of communities to hold on to reluctant members against their 
will.
 130
   
 That this doubt has a motivating role in the various headscarf bans comes 
across clearly in the French case. The Stasi Report voiced concern about pressure 
exerted by elements in the Muslim community on Muslim girls to don the hijab 
against their will. An attempt to respond to this worry is also seen in the differential 
penalties stipulated by the 2010 French law prohibiting face-covering in public - the 
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punitive fine (30,000 euros) to which those found to have coerced another to cover 
his/her face is subject, compared with the relatively light fine of 150 euros for those 
who themselves break the law on public face covering. This was clearly meant as a 
warning against those who would exercise inappropriate pressure on members of 
their own family/community to conform to a strict religious dress-code against their 
will. 
 Asking the question of whether the ban could be reasonably rejected 
immediately brings out reasons for rejecting this liberal doubt as a motivation for 
the ban. Taking societies as they currently are, we commonly acknowledge that 
parents have a legitimate interest in transmitting their cultural and religious values 
to their children. Moreover, it is a legitimate interest grounded in the well-being of 
the very children whom the liberals are trying to protect - it is important for a child’s 
well-being to be brought up in the culture and traditions of his or her family. Those 
who oppose the headscarf bans could claim that the bans interfere with this 
legitimate interest on the part of parents who are acting as custodians of their 
children’s well-being.  
Of course, the liberal doubt, as described above, would draw a distinction 
between this legitimate interest of cultural and religious transmission and undue 
pressure amounting to oppression. However, the recalcitrant reality of how the 
various bans have worked out in practice suggests that simple conclusions at the 
level of principle can rarely be straightforwardly translated into effective policy 
solutions. The tool of policy (in this case, the ban on headscarves in schools), is 
simply too blunt to achieve the nuanced objective of protecting only those children 
who would count as being unduly pressured into wearing the hijab. Consider the 
effect of the French headscarf ban, which was to exclude those who persisted in 
wearing the hijab from the state education system. Clearly for those who were 
expelled, the objective of helping reluctant, oppressed members of the culture to 
break free was not met. So long as the state chooses to allow families decision-
making power over the schooling choices of their children, and so long as families 
have options outside of the state education system, such a policy is likely to fail to 
affect at least some of its target audience.  
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In the Turkish case, the ECtHR referred this same liberal doubt in its 
judgement on Leyla Sahin, when it drew attention to the impact which wearing the 
headscarf might have on others who chose not to wear it. However, in the domestic 
debate on the headscarf ban in Turkey, this concern does not seem to have been at 
issue. There are, of course, differences in the bans in Turkey as compared to France. 
One significant difference is that in Turkey, the ban extends to university students. 
Compared to the younger schoolgirls in the French case, these grown women would 
seem to be less at risk of being pressured into wearing the headscarf, and better able 
to reason clearly about and articulate their allegiance to religious values as being the 
source of their desire to don the headscarf. As a result, this first liberal doubt has 
less force in the Turkish case than in the French one. When the test of justifiability 
is used for the Turkish case, we find that Turkish students could reasonably reject 
the headscarf ban in universities because it undermines their well-being by 
hampering their ability to manifest their freely-chosen faith in public.  
What this brings out is that understanding of the policy context is crucial. 
We might start with a concern with the justifiability of a policy, but the arguments 
may not be conclusive – on the one hand, the liberal doubt is a genuine and well-
founded one; but so are the reasons there are to reject the bans. Whether or one 
thinks a ban on headscarf-wearing is, on balance, justified, would depend on many 
factors, many practical rather than at the level of principle. For instance, looking at 
these cases, the empirical details clearly make a difference to our all-things-
considered judgement of whether the bans were the right policy. First, human 
ingenuity being what it is, the target of a policy does not always remain static – non-
Muslim pupils wearing the hijab as a fashion statement,
131
 or Turkish students 
wearing wigs on top of their headscarves - are an object lesson that the real target of 
the policy – oppression – may not be effectively dealt with by the blunt instrument 
of a ban.  Secondly, if we have a desire for justifiability grounded in the natural duty 
of mutual respect, then this very concern entails that we cannot ignore the wider 
consequences of such headscarf bans on psychological well-being. The UNHRC’s 
Special Rapporteur’s comment on the humiliation caused by the ban in France, and 
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the dispersal of these effects even outside of schools, cannot be dismissed as 
irrelevant. 
In any case, perhaps the more direct way of dealing with the possibility of 
internal oppression is to ensure that there is a legal right of exit from any cultural or 
religious group, and to ensure that the knowledge of such a right is conveyed to 
every citizen.
132
 Given that participation in national education system is, arguably, 
be the best way to ensure that children come to understand that they have a legal 
right of exit from their religious or cultural community, the fact that the headscarf 
ban has the consequence of excluding children from education, becomes a stronger 
argument against the ban.  
 
Liberal doubt #2: Liberalism is committed to secularism. This secular, democratic 
culture is superior, and should rightly be reluctant to give equal rights to inferior 
cultures like Islam, which do not give equal rights to women. There is the fear that 
allowing the veil to be worn in public places/in schools and universities will lead to 
a contradiction of fundamental liberal values.
133
  
 This second doubt is a strong thread in the Turkish case, on the part of the 
Kemalists. Consider what the Chief Prosecutor said in the case brought against the 
AKP in 2008, calling for its closure. The case to shut down the AKP was triggered 
by the party’s attempt to lift the headscarf ban in universities. The Chief Prosecutor 
distinguished between Christianity and Islam as threats to secularism, and claimed 
that whilst Christian identity did not pose a threat to secularism, political Islam did, 
because it had a religious law, the syariah, which claimed to regulate all aspects of 
life according to divine command and brooked no opposition to its authority. In 
contrast, he praised secularism which “achieved modernisation with the leadership 
of reason and science”. He added that “thanks to the democratic and secular 
Republic, which are the foundations of democracy and modernity, Turkish people 
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were finally able to move up from ummah to nation, [and] slavery to citizenship.”134 
The argument of the Kemalists, which I attempt to cast in a liberal form, seems to be 
the following: 
1. Being committed to liberal values involves being committed to secularism.  
2. Parties which support the wearing of headscarves in universities represent 
political Islam. Political Islam accepts no division between public and 
private spheres, and aims to replace secularism with an imposition of syariah 
law for everyone.  
3. The success of political Islam will mean the demise of liberal values, 
including secularism and freedom of religion for all. 
4. Therefore, in order to safeguard the survival of  liberal values, parties which 
support political Islam should be shut down.  
We have already seen (in the previous section examining Laborde’s defence of 
French republicanism) that liberalism is not, in principle, committed to secularism. 
This makes premise 1 invalid.  
 But could we remove the factor of secularism from the mix, and amend the 
Kemalist argument to say that drastic measures (such as shutting down the AKP) are 
required to safeguard the survival of liberal institutions? Given that the trigger for 
the constitutional court case was the AKP’s passing of legislation to reverse the 
headscarf ban, this might have a measure of plausibility. The revised argument 
would appeal to the well-known caveat in liberal theory about tolerating the 
intolerant, which states that where the survival of liberal institutions themselves are 
at stake, illiberal measures can sometimes be justified.
135
 The trouble is, even with 
this revised argument, the link between reversing a headscarf ban and the demise of 
the liberal right of freedom of religion is not a tightly coupled one. Saying that a 
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group would be intolerant if it came into power is not normally sufficient grounds 
for limiting their liberty.
136
  
Also, whether or not the AKP in fact lifts the ban on the headscarf in 
universities is not a good test of whether it is liberal in its commitments, as it claims 
to be. The key indicator might be instead what the AKP government chooses to do 
with Turkey’s tiny proportion of non-Muslim religious minorities. Given that the 
restrictions on non-Muslim minorities (denial of the right to train clergy, offer 
religious education, to own and maintain places of worship) cannot be justified by 
any plausible principle of toleration which is underwritten by a liberal concern for 
justifiability, what the AKP chooses to do here might be a better indication of the 
AKP’s real attitude towards those who differ from them in religious conviction.  
Turn now to the French case. There, it would be much harder to make the 
case that liberal institutions are under any immediate threat; the self-preservation-of-
liberal-institutions argument for banning headscarf-wearing is not available to 
French republicans.  
Recall that the core liberal argument for valuing cultures is grounded in the 
good of individuals. Cultures should be protected because individuals need cultures 
within which they can exercise their individual freedom. Or as Raz puts it, cultures 
have a moral claim to respect only insofar as they serve the well-being of their 
individual members.
137
 Because for most, membership in their cultural group plays a 
major role in their sense of their own identity, therefore slighting that culture, 
ridiculing it, persecuting it, hurts individuals and offends their dignity.
138
 This is the 
domestic analogue of Rawls’s “amour-propre” argument for why respecting national 
sovereignty is morally important, which we saw in Chapter 7. The importance of 
culture to individual well-being gives us reason to be wary of “organised campaigns 
of assimilation and discrimination” 139 – one thinks of the forcible removal of 
aboriginal children from their families in Australia throughout a large part of the 
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20
th
 century.
140
 But the same concern is applicable to policies like the headscarf ban 
– it gives policy-makers reason to be mindful of the symbolic message conveyed by 
policies such as the headscarf ban. The same reason we have for valuing cultures at 
all, also gives us reason to be wary of suppressing or discriminating against cultures 
on the basis that they are “inferior”. Thus even if we granted French republicans the 
premise that their immigrant Muslim population had an inferior and oppressive 
culture, it would still not be a straightforward deduction to the conclusion that 
headscarves should therefore be banned from schools. If we add into the mix that 
the net result of the ban has been to exclude girls from the state school system and to 
stigmatise the wearing of the headscarf even outside schools, then the ban seems to 
be both illiberal and perverse in its effects.  
This does not mean that we need shy away from criticising cultures which 
oppress either their own members or outsiders. No epistemic abstinence is required 
by our concern for justifiability. In fact, the heuristic reading of justifiability can 
help uncover the reasons why certain aspects of a culture might rightly be 
considered oppressive – for instance, a culture which condones child brides might 
legitimately be prevented from marrying off their twelve- and thirteen-year-old 
children, because when we ask why the practice might be reasonably rejected, we 
find reasons to think that humans of that age may not yet be physically, emotionally, 
or intellectually prepared to take on the responsibilities of marriage and 
childbearing.
141
 An acknowledgement of the role played by cultures as the necessary 
context in which individual freedom can be exercised is compatible with criticising 
that culture’s unsavoury aspects. But the means of doing so need to be carefully 
considered, precisely to avoid compromising the very individual well-being which 
governments are meant to be protecting and promoting.  
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Liberal doubt #3: A successful, stable liberal society relies on having a common 
culture united in liberal values. The fear is that allowing the veil to be worn in 
public and in educational institutions will cause the fragmentation of society, 
dooming the possibility of creating the common culture which is the cement of 
society.
142
  
There is a liberal argument to be made for civic education of a sort that is 
distinctively liberal. Broadly speaking, if one believes that the liberal way of life, 
with its commitment to a set of protected individual liberties, and to a principle of 
toleration, is valuable, then one has reason to safeguard its transmission across 
generations. Rawls and Raz share a considerable amount of common ground on this 
count.
143
 If we look at the lists they each have for what should be taught to children 
as part of civic education, both include knowledge of their rights, including the right 
to liberty of conscience and the right of exit from the culture they are brought up in; 
inculcation of toleration and mutual respect,
144
 which presumably would require 
some awareness of the other cultures that exist within the political society in 
question.
145
 In addition, both Rawls and Raz include the requisite preparation for 
participation in the economy and in the politics of their society.
146
 
Does such a civic education necessitate a school space that is free from 
religious affiliation? Certainly that was Bayrou’s claim in the French case. The 
argument was that in order to achieve the civic function of schools, they need to be a 
space where religious differences are not apparent. Bayrou’s is an empirical claim – 
I know of no purely conceptual argument that will prove that this is so. But even if 
empirical studies showed that pupils would learn (for instance) the principle of 
toleration better in a school space emptied of all religious insignia, this 
consideration would still have to be weighed against the objective of trying to retain 
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as many as possible in the national education system, so that they could benefit from 
being taught their basic rights and responsibilities as citizens.  
Returning to the question of the justifiability of liberal civic education – is an 
education policy with such liberal civic content justifiable to citizens who might 
belong to illiberal sub-cultures?  To put this in terms of an objection raised by 
Thomas Nagel against Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness,147 could a citizen not 
object that insisting on a liberal civic education would not be fair to her conception 
of the good? Such a citizen might object that the imposition of a liberal civic 
education incorporating the elements listed in common by Rawls and Raz, would 
inevitably erode the viability of her conception of the good. One can without 
difficulty see how this might happen – Rawls uses the example of “various religious 
sects (which) oppose the culture of the modern world and wish to lead their 
common life apart from its unwanted influences”.148 For such groups, requiring their 
children to learn that there are different ways of life in their society which contradict 
the values they have been brought up to believe are true, and telling these children 
that they have the (legal) freedom to leave their religion if they so choose, might 
indeed make it more likely that they would indeed do so. 
To respond to this citizen, we need to remember that our concern for 
justifiability is ultimately based in a desire to respect people, not their conceptions 
of the good.
149
 Our respect for cultures (just like our respect for countries), is 
derivative. What is fundamental is respect for individuals. Thus while a liberal 
education policy could indeed have the consequences described in her worry, our 
primary concern must be whether such an education policy would be justifiable to 
citizens. To this question, the answer is affirmative – because each person has a 
compelling interest in enjoying freedom of conscience, an education that informs 
citizens of their right of exit from any culture or religion is justifiable.  
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I have searched in vain for a successful liberal argument for the headscarf 
bans in France and Turkey. From the discussion above, I think it is clear that the 
same fundamental liberal concern with individual liberty and well-being which 
motivates the three liberal doubts, also undermines the justifiability of the headscarf 
bans. In addition, what has emerged is that much of the deliberation about the 
justifiability of the headscarf bans does not, in fact, take place at the level of 
principle. Applying the heuristic device of liberal justification can help us identify 
the reasons that bear on each of the cases at hand, with all their idiosyncrasies. It can 
push us to take account of other perspectives, and to clarify our understanding of the 
values involved - those of mutual respect, freedom of religion (including the free 
exercise thereof), and the value of political community, for which children need to 
be educated for participation in their political community. But it cannot resolve the 
practical compromises that need to be made in order for people to live together. 
Thus, for instance, no justifiability test will yield a determinate result for whether 
Muslim schoolgirls should be allowed to be exempted from physical education 
classes – in such cases, the practical matter of figuring out how to live together must 
play a deciding role in figuring out what policy to adopt.
150
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A modest place for philosophy... 
 Reasons are the daily truck of the human animal. It is an unavoidable fact of 
life that humans are the sorts of beings that act for reasons. Most would say this is 
not something to be lamented. Philosophers, as a group, have a special affinity for 
reasons. They are the tools of our trade, built into arguments, jointed together with 
distinctions. Whether or not that makes us better at wielding reasons rightly is a 
judgement perhaps best left to others. The task of the philosopher, in societies 
indelibly marked by reasonable pluralism, is to help uncover the reasons that make 
possible living together on terms that are justifiable to each.  
The case studies on Malaysia, Turkey and France contain a caution for the 
philosopher engaged in this task. Unearthing the reasons why some policy may or 
may not be justifiable is extremely important, but it is only the beginning of trying 
to figure out what to do. Finding a principle or policy that is justifiable is no 
guarantee that, practically speaking, we will succeed in moving past the deep 
disagreements that divide us. History, sociology, and politics, are just as necessary 
for living well together, and philosophers would benefit from a good dose of 
modesty about the place of conceptual argument in the real world.
1
  
 Intellectual modesty, to reclaim the term used by Leland and van 
Wietmarschen, should mean that philosophers try to think rightly of their role in a 
complex world. To start cordoning off classes of reasons in an attempt to achieve 
agreement would be a false modesty, and a harmful one, to boot. If reasons are why 
we act, we want to act in view of all the reasons that we have. What I hope to have 
shown in the preceding chapters is that one common route people take  to epistemic 
abstinence - the desire for justifiability – does not, in fact, need to lead that way.  
 Philosophical argument of the nature I have been describing is not meant to 
be the exclusive province of the political philosopher. These investigations have, I 
hope, reminded us that the desire for justifiability runs deep in all of us. Asking the 
question of justifiability – “How could X reasonably reject this policy?”- is 
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something each of us tends instinctively to do. Making use of this motivational 
impulse, made concrete in what I have called the heuristic device of justifiability, 
helps us, individually and together, to uncover the dependent reasons which justify 
political power. If we ask these questions as we reason together in the public sphere, 
then even if we do not succeed in resolving our moral disagreements, we will at 
least emerge with a deeper understanding of the people with whom we share a 
political society. 
 
...in a philosophically-informed politics 
 Most politicians and policy-makers give short shrift to philosophy. Like the 
general, their focus tends to be on action rather than reflection. The preceding 
chapters suggest that they ignore reasons of justifiability at their peril. If the desire 
for justifiability is indeed deeply rooted in human moral psychology and motivation, 
then flouting the demands of justifiability will ultimately lead to a break-down of 
the ability to live successfully together.  
 The hope is that seeing clearly these two things we have reason to care about 
– namely, living together on terms justifiable to each, and living together in peace - 
will give us a better chance of living well together. It will allow us to face down our 
deep moral disagreements with a clear mind and try to resolve them. And where 
resolution proves impossible, we will be able to say, with a clear conscience, that we 
respect the people with whom we live. With some historical good fortune, we might 
even be able to aspire to that ancient ideal of counting fellow citizens as friends.  
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